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The (Un)Scene of Memory: Energetic Theory and Representation in Theatre and Film 
Summary 
The wager of this thesis is that, firstly, there exists an intrinsic relationship between 
memory and representation in visual performative media and, secondly, that a 
referential, Aristotelian conception of memory is made problematic by these same 
visual media. There are aspects within the ontology of both theatre and film, the specific 
media examined, which resist the model of representation that this memory constitutes. 
It is my contention that there is an alternative conception of memory, more appropriate 
to the difficulties that theatre and film present, which enables another way of 
understanding these media. This other memory is derived from the distinction in 
Freud‟s work between psychoanalysis as a hermeneutics, and as an energetics. I draw 
upon an „energetic‟ conception of memory as the foundation for an energetic approach 
to theatre and film. In the first chapter I enunciate this distinction in Freud‟s work, 
tracing his energetic model from the Project of 1895 to the role of affect in the 
metapsychological papers, before moving to its elaboration by later psychoanalysts 
(including André Green, Christopher Bollas and César and Sára Botella). For the second 
chapter, I relate this psychoanalytic discussion to poststructuralist theory, which 
Freudian energetics has considerably influenced. This is examined through Jacques 
Derrida‟s interpretation of Freud‟s work on memory, and Jean-François Lyotard‟s own 
philosophy of energetics (with which much of my work is in dialogue). The third and 
fourth chapters turn to theatre and film respectively. Each chapter initially explores the 
aspects of each medium that complicate the more familiar notion of referential memory 
as a relevant model of representation. I then establish how these same points of 
difficulty demonstrate an affinity with an energetic approach, opening the possibility of 
a new way of thinking theatre and film through memory, and of thinking memory 
through these visual media. A comparative approach is taken to identify and articulate 
the distinctiveness of these particular media, through their unique interactions with 
energetic theory. Looking ahead, this aims to provide the foundation for developing a 
means of addressing emergent visual media (particularly the videogame), which 
similarly complicates hermeneutic readings, based upon a study of their most significant 
antecedents: theatre and film. 
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Preface: Setting the (Un)Scene 
Memory. The strangeness of this concept is our way in. But, not a concept, no, only 
ever notional, speculative, on the border of... „A concept‟ would confer a sense of unity, 
stability, singularity: the resistance to these qualities makes memory, and makes 
memory our way in. Our way into where? 
Let us start with a beginning. The evolution of the multifaceted, and multi-appellated, 
grouping of visual media that originate with, and are defined through, their application 
of digital, virtual and computer-based technologies challenge the practices of visual 
analysis, across the disciplines of „visual studies‟. Whilst this evolution is spoken of 
with much hyperbole, being heralded equally in tones of acclamation and 
condemnation, it remains a decidedly under-theorised phenomenon. We are certainly 
witnessing the emergence of a new, and composite, visual art-form, even though its 
shape has not yet cooled from the forge, if, indeed, it ever will. The necessary 
vagueness of „new visual media‟ is perhaps the best approximation of a referent for it at 
this stage: an unashamedly non-committal term that reflects the spirit of the media that 
it signifies well. However, it is not only the inevitable shift in methods of reception, 
which is always necessitated by the development of a new genre, practice, or medium, 
that raises questions for criticism here, but also the nature of „new visual media‟ 
themselves. Many of these media are spoken of as „ephemeral‟ and „transient‟. This is 
partly due to the constantly changing technologies upon which they draw, and partly 
due to their frequent actualisation as one-off events, often within „cyberspace‟, and 
often leaving no material record or detritus. However, they are also well deserved 
epithets owing to the challenges posed by these media for „representation‟. The 
representative function is complicated in new visual media, not least by their, only ever 
tangential, relationship with authenticity: the images that they create are, or at least can 
be, entirely fabricated. This is not an unheard of condition in visual studies. However, 
the degree to which this fabrication can be made indistinguishable from „real world‟ 
perceptions is unprecedented, and becoming increasingly emphatic. 
Whilst the image is „representative‟ on one level, this is only ever secondary in new 
visual media. There are no spectators in these media forms, only participants. Or so it is 
claimed. As Auriea Harvey and Michaël Samyn, new media artists and directors of 
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independent videogame developer Tale of Tales, state in their „Realtime Art Manifesto‟: 
„The user is not disembodied in virtual space / but takes the body into the experience.‟1 
These media are positioned as experiences. And, as such, they are both instantaneous, 
and determinedly individual and subjective. This creates problems for critical responses 
that focus upon unpicking the meanings, or analysing the detail, of a single image or 
sequence of images. The „image‟ here is no „fixed‟ or repeatable object, for the 
participant-spectator enters the world of the image directly and becomes a part of it. 
Perhaps the closest analogy we can find to this peculiar state of affairs is the experience 
of the first audiences of cinema. We have frequent descriptions of, for example, the 
apprehension felt at being splashed by water spraying indiscriminately from a garden-
hose on screen,
2
 and, of course, the apocryphal siderodromophobia that the Lumière 
brothers presumably traumatised into their first unfortunate spectators of 1895.
3
 Whilst 
the train does not change, the exact same image is there on film for us to view even 
now, the fear of those viewing it for the first time in the Paris Grand Café was a fear of 
being too close to the image: of the image entering the world of the human, of the 
human and the image sharing one world. As an observer for the Cincinnati, Ohio, Star 
wrote, and as quoted in advertising for the Edison Kinetophone, „one feels that he had 
been in another world.‟4  With new visual media, it is, in a converse movement but to a 
similar effect, the participant-spectator that enters the other world of the image, 
becomes one with it. It is in this sense that the „transience‟ and „ephemerality‟ of these 
media challenge visual studies: there is no distance between subject and object. Whilst 
predominantly visual, they are „felt‟ with immediacy. Dream-like, they are to be 
viewed, but primarily traversed. They are representative, but also experienced. 
Despite their apparently revolutionary status, I would argue that new visual media do 
not appear ex nihilo but are, more accurately, an evolution. Both in terms of their formal 
organisation, and their ontological characteristics (particularly in reference to those that 
                                                             
1
 Auriea Harvey, & Michaël Samyn, „Realtime Art Manifesto‟ (2006) <http://tale-of-
tales.com/tales/RAM.html> [accessed 10 November 2009]. 
2
 As Maxim Gorky states: “You think the spray is going to hit you too, and instinctively shrink back”. 
Maxim Gorky, „Review of the Lumière Programme at Nizhni-Novgorod Fair‟, Nizhegorodski listok, 4 
July 1896. 
3
 Martin Loiperdinger provides a thought-provoking discussion concerning the truth of this reaction, and 
its status as cinema‟s „founding-myth‟. However, there is enough primary evidence to support, if not this 
occurrence or this degree, then a similar hesitation and automatic response being provoked by other early 
film screenings. 
4
 The American Talking Picture Company, „Promotional material for the Edison Kinetophone‟, 1895. 
3 
 
we have so far identified), new visual media find their antecedents, self-consciously and 
often by self-definition, in the practices and discourses of theatre and cinema. Of course, 
these are not the only influences. We can also consider television, painting, geography 
and architecture as just some of the fields which could be said to contribute towards the 
shaping of new visual media. However, theatre and cinema remain the most significant 
influences, not only through their shared constitution as the visual in movement, but 
also through the differing forms of spectator-relationship which they establish, through 
their mutual concern with the concept of presence/absence, used so often as the basis of 
their definitions and distinction, and through their play on the borders of reality and 
fantasy. 
It is, then, one of the objectives of this study to provide a theoretical basis that has the 
potential for addressing new visual media in their originality. But the method that I 
follow in doing this, is to interrogate the processes and characteristics of theatre and 
cinema that challenge, that resist, modes of interpretation which seek to „uncover‟ 
absent and external meanings, or that position the spectator as passive „receiver‟ of the 
image. Through this strategy I seek to develop an approach that is both more suited to 
engaging with the „difficulties‟ and „problems‟ that the „progenitor‟ media, theatre and 
cinema, present for interpretation, and is, consequently, better able to respond to the 
demand that new visual media seem to make for a radically alternative way of thinking 
them. 
I suggest that it is through an examination into the nature and function of „memory‟ that 
we will be able to begin to define a model that allows us to formulate such an approach. 
Why memory? This would seem to be the most immediate question when presented 
with such an assertion. Firstly, I find memory to be the most productive means through 
which to think visual representation due to the intrinsic relationship between them. This 
is a connection with an exceedingly long history, stretching back to the 
„mnemotechnics‟ of the ancient Greeks, if not further, and discussed most eloquently by 
Frances A. Yates in her classic work The Art of Memory. In this she states, reflecting 
upon the opinions of her friend Gertrude Bing, that: „the problems of the mental image, 
of the activation of images, of the grasp of reality through images [are] problems ever 
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present in the history of the art of memory‟.5 This connection between memory and the 
image is the foundation for, as Yates terms it, the „fruitful interaction between the art of 
memory and the visual arts‟.6 I would suggest that memory can be seen as an archetypal 
model for practices of visual representation, for how we think visual representation, 
due, at least in part, to its role in processes of representation in the psyche. As Freud has 
noted repeatedly, mnemic representation works primarily through, privileges, the visual. 
A point that we shall come to when discussing his theories in greater detail. And, 
perhaps, the most prevalent, certainly the most vivid, form of visual representation in 
the normal functioning of the psyche is, Freud tells us, constituted through mnemic 
images. We speak, of course, of the dream. As Jacques Derrida has said, „expression in 
dreams... valorizes visibility‟.7 It is thus quite appropriate for us to examine the 
practices of representation in visual media through memory, the first mode of visual 
representation that becomes known to us. 
Secondly, memory provides a model for interpretive approaches, approaches that seek 
to recover a meaning, a prior signification, situated elsewhere. However, memory can 
also be thought otherwise. It offers the potential for a different model through which to 
approach visual media. This is a study of memory. But, then, it is also not a study of 
„memory‟. For we are working with a concept of memory that may be unfamiliar, that is 
little theorised, and never theorised in a definitive sense (I would argue), yet its 
influence has been substantial. We name this an „energetic memory‟. It is part of the 
wager of this work to bring this mnemic conception out of obscurity, and demonstrate 
its value, particularly in the context of emerging or problematic modes of representation 
that challenge formerly hegemonic interpretive models. 
In the first chapter we are concerned with elaborating the nature of an energetic 
memory. It is a concept derived, ultimately, from Freud, and is complicit with the 
demarcation that can be made in his thought between a „hermeneutics‟, a theory of 
psychoanalysis that emphasises interpretation, and an energetics, a psychoanalysis that 
works with a „dynamic‟ account of the psyche, that posits psychical processes in terms 
of an „economics‟ of energy, a movement of intensities, and affective forces. Chapter 1 
                                                             
5
 Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (London: Pimlico, 1992), p.14. 
6
 Yates, p.177. 
7
 Jacques Derrida, „Freud and the Scene of Writing‟, in Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass 
(London: Routledge, 1978; repr. 2001), p.277. 
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describes Freud‟s energetic psychoanalysis, the relation that it has to a hermeneutics, 
and finds memory, which could be thought of as intrinsically associated with a 
hermeneutics due to its role as a „repository‟ of the past, to be fundamental in Freud‟s 
presentation of the energetic. The second part of Chapter 1 explores the work of four 
contemporary psychoanalysts: André Green, Christopher Bollas, and Césare and Sára 
Botella. Each of these has developed theories and practices for working with energetic 
aspects of the psyche. Through a close reading of some of the key elements of their 
theories, we further develop our understanding of the nature of the energetic, and some 
of the psychoanalytic concepts that are associated with it (such as „negative 
hallucination‟), whilst also beginning to see how an energetic approach can be used as a 
mode of response, here in the psychoanalytic situation. 
In Chapter 2, we move on to examine the influence of an energetics, and its role in 
poststructuralist theory, in particular. We explore how a psychoanalytic theory of 
energetics has been thought, to some extent integrated, and most of all re-shaped by 
certain poststructuralist critical approaches. In the first instance we consider Derrida‟s 
treatment of energetics in his work Writing and Difference, its place within his 
depiction of a „psychical writing‟, his discussion of the relation between „force‟ and 
„signification‟, and the consequences that this has for critical approaches to 
representation. In the second, we turn to the work of Jean-François Lyotard, who has 
written extensively on energetics and representation, but whose primary engagements 
with it occur at approximately the same moment, gravitating around his work Libidinal 
Economy (1974). As well as paying close attention to this text, amongst others, we shall 
also we looking in particular detail at his paper „The Tooth, The Palm‟ (1973), as a self-
acknowledged attempt to use energetic theory as a way of conceiving of theatre. It also 
provides one of the clearest explications of the way in which an energetic approach can 
work. This can be understood, as I argue, by reading this paper not, as Lyotard intends 
it, as a paradigm for a practice of theatre, but as an exposition of a mode for responding 
to, for thinking theatre. The final section of this chapter seeks to both summarise how 
we can understand an energetic conception of memory, and introduce its potential role 
in opening a model through which we can approach visual media energetically. 
We begin to examine how an energetic approach can relate to specific forms of visual 
media, through looking at theatricality in Chapter 3. The structure of this chapter opens 
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with an exploration of recent studies looking at the relationship between memory and 
theatre, before moving on to focus upon a single element of theatricality. In the first part 
of Chapter 3, this element is „ontological coincidence‟: the identity of the theatrical 
object and the theatrical image, the means of representation and the representation itself. 
We discuss this condition in terms of, what we can call, a „hermeneutic‟ memory, a 
conception of memory as repository, as having a referential function, finding that it 
challenges such a conception and, finally, reveals it to be insufficient for this element of 
theatricality. Rather, „ontological coincidence‟ aligns more appropriately with an 
energetic approach, and we seek to demonstrate how this approach can engage with 
ontological coincidence, through the model of hysteria. We show how ontological 
coincidence is closely related to „hysterical conversion‟, and detail the energetic 
processes involved in this psychoanalytic concept, to elucidate how an energetics can 
engage with the ontological coincidence of theatricality. In Chapter 3, Part 2, we 
explore a further element of theatricality, through the same structure, this being what I 
term „elision‟, which is discussed in reference to the energetics of „negative 
hallucination‟. This reinforces the sense that an energetic approach has a wide purchase 
upon theatricality, having the potential to elucidate multiple aspects that resist or make 
difficult interpretive schemas. 
However, we should not think that an energetics is restricted to, or even has a particular 
affinity with, theatricality. Chapter 4 involves an analysis of the filmic relation to 
memory, finding that aspects of the filmic complicate a „replicative‟ sense of memory 
just as theatricality can. However, this is presented in a somewhat different way, 
through a discussion of the filmic relation to reality, and the perception of film as a 
hypomnesic medium, a medium of „mechanical reproduction‟. Such a conception is 
discovered to be deeply problematic, not only upon grounds of suitability, but also 
ethically. An energetic approach enables an alternative way of „experiencing‟ film, and 
this is theorised through a close reading of „haptic visuality‟ in dialogue with Roland 
Barthes‟s conception of „obtuse meaning‟ and Lyotard‟s „acinema‟. The means by 
which we relate an energetics and the filmic, it will be seen, is of a different register 
than that through which we engaged with theatricality. And this reflects the need for 
adaptation in the method of approach, dependent upon the medium with which it is 
engaged. 
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This is an important point, as there is a potential danger in our kind of methodology: we 
may seem to teeter on the edge of homogenizing the media with which we are dealing. 
We may seem to be suggesting that a single approach, a single way of thinking, is 
equally appropriate for theatre and cinema, and consequently new visual media: that 
their differences can be disregarded and each medium freely compared through one 
theoretical perspective. What we are proposing is diametrically opposed to this. By 
examining the interaction between medium and theory we aim to develop an original 
way of comparing and contrasting each medium in its uniqueness. Thinking each 
medium through an energetic conception of memory does not only allow us to 
understand the nature of the medium differently, with new insight, but also requires us 
to re-shape our theory of energetics, memory and representation as we do so. 
Throughout our examinations of theatre and film it will be seen that we are holding in 
tension two conceptions of memory. These should not be thought of as mutually 
exclusive, and we make the point that these are alternative perspectives upon the 
relevant medium. They perform alternative functions, and are suited differently to 
different tasks.  Our discussions of an energetic approach are, implicitly and explicitly, 
working with a model of energetic memory, just as „interpretive‟ approaches are 
necessarily associated with a model of „referential‟, „replicative‟ memory. 
Throughout this work our aim, it should be noted, is not so much to provide particular 
examples of an energetic approach, comprehensively defined and applied. Rather, it is 
to provoke a certain „way of thinking‟, to „re-orientate‟ thinking, so as to take account 
of the originality of the energetic within visual media. Often we will be drawing upon 
analogies and comparisons to gain insights into the processes and models that we are 
working with, due to the fact that they often seem to resist, or „slip away‟ from, any 
conclusive verbal description or containment. This is true not only of the energetic, but 
also of the „theatrical‟ and the „filmic‟, which extend beyond the theatre and the cinema. 
They are constantly over-spilling any specific term or definition. But this condition is of 
the nature of the energetic, and it is an integral part of its value in the context in which 
we are situating it. For these reasons, this work is positioned very much as a speculative 
endeavour. It is an opening, a challenge, in which we do not seek an answer, but rather 
begin to discover how to ask the question. 
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Chapter 1: An Energetic Psychoanalysis: Images, Memory and Affective 
‘Interpretation’ 
1.i Freud  and the Theory of an Energetic Approach 
The importance of memory in any theory of psychoanalysis is difficult to overstate. 
Freud himself tells us that „a psychological theory deserving any consideration must 
furnish an explanation of „memory‟.‟8 Despite this, Freud himself never gave a full and 
coherent theory of memory. It is, however, a major preoccupation throughout his entire 
body of work and, I would suggest, becomes virtually an obsession in that part of his 
oeuvre which is associated with, what has been termed,
9
 an „energetic‟ approach. 
Firstly, let us examine what is meant by this idea of the „energetic‟, and what such an 
approach is held in distinction from. Freud‟s theories can be seen as embracing two 
separate, yet inter-connected, modes of thought: the „energetic‟ and the „hermeneutic‟. 
They create a tension at the heart of psychoanalysis, with Freud discernibly oscillating 
between each pole, sometimes prioritizing one, sometimes the other, but always the less 
favoured lurks in the shadow of the preferred. They can never be entirely dissociated. 
The relation between these two approaches has been addressed perhaps most 
comprehensively by Paul Ricoeur in his work Freud & Philosophy: An Essay on 
Interpretation, and he succinctly summarises this duality within Freud‟s thought early 
on: 
Freud‟s writings present themselves as a mixed or even ambiguous discourse, 
which at times states conflicts of force subject to an energetics, at times relations 
of meaning subject to a hermeneutics.
10
 
Freud alternates between emphasising a conception of the psyche based upon the 
movement of forces, comprised of „intensities‟ or „quantities‟ of energy and their 
interactions, and a project of interpretation, in which psychoanalysis is seen as a method 
for discovering hidden meanings and wishes „behind‟ symptoms. The „energetic‟ 
                                                             
8
 Sigmund Freud, „Project for a Scientific Psychology‟, in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 1 (SE 1), ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 
1966; repr. 2001), p.299. 
9
 Some examples of note for their use of this term include, as referenced shortly below, Paul Ricoeur 
(particularly in Freud & Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation), and, as discussed at length in Chapter 
2, Jean-François Lyotard. 
10
 Paul Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (Yale University Press, 1970), p.65. 
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approach is most closely aligned with, what Freud terms, an „economic‟ perspective: 
this is theorised in the triple division of psychical processes, which Freud undertakes as 
part of his „metapsychology‟ (the other divisions being the „dynamic‟ and the 
„topological‟). It is crucial, for an understanding of the „energetic‟, with which we are 
most concerned here, to examine closely Freud‟s theorisation of the „economic‟, 
through which we can see the central role that is accorded to memory. The foundational 
text and example par excellence, in respect to the economic conception, is Freud‟s early 
work, the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895). And I would go so far as to say 
that a concern with defining the workings of memory is not only the „sub-text‟ here, but 
also Freud‟s principal motivation. 
The crucial concept outlined in this work is that of Q, Freud‟s shorthand for „Quantity‟. 
Whilst the Project is significantly prior to the metapsychological works, the concept of Q is 
clearly the forerunner, indeed the early equivalent, of the „economic‟ to which Freud later 
refers.
11
 The quantity being referred to through this designation is „general‟, „exogenous 
quantity‟.12 It is the „energy‟ of stimuli which come from the outside world „into‟ the 
psychical apparatus, via the body‟s nervous system, and is of a greater magnitude than 
the second form of quantity distinguished by Freud: Qή. Qή is „endogenous‟ energy at 
an „inter-cellular‟ level, within the psychic structure. It works at a far smaller scale, and 
is the „energy‟, „excitation‟ or „cathexis‟ which moves across, or „fills‟, neurones. It is 
the aim of the nervous system to „discharge‟ both of these quantities, and attempt to 
achieve „inertia‟. This endeavour is thwarted only by the need for the organism to retain 
a certain amount of Qή so as to perform actions necessitated by the „exigencies of life‟13 
(i.e. hunger). Despite this requirement, the aim of the system is to maintain the quantity 
„stored‟ at a low and constant level. The first of many ambiguities and peculiarities, 
which proliferate throughout Freud‟s depiction of the economic perspective, is to be 
found with this notion of „quantity‟. For Freud, by his own admission, is unable to 
define the precise nature of quantity. Whilst he is able to recognise that it is „capable of 
increase, diminution, displacement and discharge‟, he concedes that „we have no means 
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of measuring it‟.14 Indeed, quantity is frequently referred to as being un-measurable, or 
„unknown‟. As Céline Surprenant has pointed out: 
Rather than clarifying the many understandings of quantity in his theory, Freud 
insisted on their indefiniteness, for unconscious processes take place „between 
quotas of energy in some unimaginable substratum‟.15 
With these ideas, „unknown‟, „unimaginable‟, „indefinite‟, in mind regarding the strange 
nature of quantity, we shall leave it here, momentarily, for later reference. 
Quantity both flows across and cathects („cathexis‟, or „Besetzung‟, literally meaning „to 
occupy‟, with some militaristic associations etymologically) the neurones, which Freud 
identifies, based as he states on „recent histology‟, as making up the nervous system. 
The characteristics of these neurones are also of great importance to the economic 
theory, for their methods of interaction with Qή. Freud divides the neurones into two 
(and later three
16
) kinds: the permeable neurones (ϕ), and the impermeable ones (Ψ). 
These are determined by the attributes of their respective „contact-barriers‟. The 
permeable neurones are entirely freely traversable by excitation (Quantity): they are 
„those which allow Qή to pass through them as though they had no contact-barriers and 
which, accordingly, after each passage of excitation are in the same state as before‟.17 
Conversely, the impermeable neurones offer resistance to this passage, and are thus 
altered by it. Their „contact-barriers make themselves felt, so that they only allow Qή to 
pass through with difficulty or partially... [they] may, after each excitation, be in a 
different state from before‟.18 The image frequently evoked for the action of Qή forcibly 
crossing the Ψ neurones is that of „path-breaking‟, and it is a most appropriate one. For 
the Ψ neurone will permanently bear the mark of increased permeability after a first 
„conduction‟ of excitation through it. This is termed by Freud as the process of 
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 Sigmund Freud, „The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence‟, in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 3 (SE 3), ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 
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 Freud, SE 1, p.299. 
18
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„differentiation‟: he surmises that there must be a differentiation in conductive capacity 
within neurones caused by the conduction itself. A first conduction across the neurone 
creates an „improved conductive capacity for subsequent conduction‟.19 Essentially, the 
neurone „remembers‟ this first conduction in the form of a „path‟ of more conductive 
material, along which repeated conductions will find it easier and more expedient to 
travel. As they do so, they increase conductivity, which is determined by both the 
magnitude of excitation and the frequency of its repetition. This is the Ψ neurone‟s 
degree of „facilitation‟.  
Facilitations are different between neurones, owing to the differing amounts of 
excitation which originally breaks a path across them, the frequency with which this 
excitation is repeated, and the differing levels of resistance which the Ψ neurones offer. 
The „capacity‟ of the neurone „for being permanently altered‟ and, crucially, the 
„differences in the facilitations between the Ψ neurones‟20 are the fundamental and 
defining features that allow the „representation of memory‟. Without this difference 
between facilitations in the Ψ neurones, if facilitation were equal across the system, 
memory could not function or, indeed, exist. I would suggest that Freud gives memory 
the role of justifying, as purpose and evidence for, his principal ideas on neuronal 
theory. That is, the classification of distinct types of neurone and the concept of 
facilitation. From this perspective, we can view the „economic‟ approach as being, to a 
large degree, focused upon providing an „explanation‟ for memory. Such an assertion is 
reinforced by the placing of memory in the Project conceptually „between‟ the more 
mechanistic theories, and the expansion in scope to address wider functions and 
components of the psyche. Memory often acts as a „bridge‟ linking the two. A case in 
point is directly provided by Freud when he discusses the impermeable neurones as 
being „the vehicles of memory and so probably of psychical processes in general.‟21 
This conceptual role is borne out by the directions then pursued in the Project. Memory 
is the starting point, in the economic, for Freud to develop the mechanistic theories 
towards other „psychical processes‟. 
 
                                                             
19
 Freud, SE 1, p.299. 
20
 Freud, SE 1, p.300. 
21
 Freud, SE 1, p.300. 
12 
 
1.i.i Instinct & Affect 
We shall move our investigation of Freud‟s economic approach on now from these 
early, preparatory formulations to two closely related subjects: the „affect‟, and the 
„drive‟ or „instinct‟.22 These are key topics for the „energetic‟ approach, being, as 
Surprenant states, „the elements of Freud that appear most biological... [and] are points 
of reference for debating whether one should develop an hermeneutic and/or an 
economic, determinist understanding of psychoanalysis.‟23 Both the instinct and affect 
are, as with much of the economic theory, fraught with ambiguity and obscurity, 
particularly when we attempt to think their status as, and in relation to, representation. 
The most sustained discussions of the instinct that Freud provides us with are in his 
metapsychological papers of 1915. Here, in „Instincts and Their Vicissitudes‟, he gives 
us a suitably opaque definition of the instinct, which highlights some of its difficulties: 
An „instinct‟ appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and 
the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from 
within the organism and reaching the mind.
24
 
This clearly situates the source of the instinct with the endogenous (somatic) 
excitations, those excitations detailed in the Project, and referred to there as Qή.25 Here, 
the instinct begins to become problematic. Just as Qή cannot enter consciousness, „the ω 
neurones are incapable of receiving Qή‟,26 so „an instinct can never become an object of 
                                                             
22
 There is some controversy, and ambiguity, over the translation of the German word „Trieb‟ as 
„instinct‟, that should be noted. Freud uses both the terms „Trieb‟ and „Instinkt‟, and each has a unique 
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instances of doubt, in the case of which the term is clarified. 
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1957; repr. 2001), pp.121-122. 
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consciousness‟.27 The idea of the instinct being on a „frontier‟ illustrates its status as 
being both psychical and somatic: it cannot enter consciousness itself, we never 
experience the instinct directly, but it can appear in consciousness. And this is the key 
word here, for the instinct has no „appearance‟, but it can become „visible‟, indirectly. 
The instinct, as quantity, does not „represent‟ as much as attach to, infiltrate and 
appropriate other „representations‟, in order to attain access to consciousness. At least, 
this is one aspect. As Freud tells us, „if the instinct did not attach itself to an idea or 
manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it.‟28 The instinct is 
„represented‟ then in two distinct ways. One of which does not warrant the need for 
caution indicated by the previous scare quote, it is more comfortably termed as a 
representation, but the other is one that does. 
Firstly then, we have the „ideational representative‟, or Vorstellungsrepräsentanz.29 As 
Laplanche and Pontalis note, and as is becoming a fairly common feature in Freud‟s 
work, „Freud never really clarified this concept.‟30 However, we can get some sense of 
it from Freud‟s descriptions of its functions. We can think of the ideational 
representatives as giving form to the instincts, form not only in the sense of an object 
which is derived from perception, but also in the sense of being „conceivable‟ and 
„thinkable‟. This is clarified when we find Freud describing the origins of the ideational 
representative thus: „ideas are cathexes – basically of memory-traces‟.31 This claim is 
expanded upon in the later work „The Ego and the Id‟ (1923). This work is firmly 
situated within Freud‟s exposition of the second topography as opposed to the first, with 
which the metapsychological papers that we are primarily focusing upon are concerned. 
However, it also demonstrates a clear connection back to the earlier thoughts, in this 
point at least: 
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 From „The Unconscious‟, another metapsychological paper, also from 1915. (Freud, „The 
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Anything arising from within (apart from feelings) that seeks to become 
conscious must try to transform itself into external perceptions: this becomes 
possible by means of memory-traces.
32
 
The ideational representative is composed of perceptual material, drawn from the 
mnemic-traces, which have been „taken over‟ by the instinct, to enable its entry into 
consciousness. As Freud points out, „only something which has once been a Cs. 
perception can become conscious‟,33 and it is therefore necessary for the instinct to use 
the mnemic-trace of such a perception to become conceivable and thus actionable. 
The second way in which the instinct is „represented‟, the second part of the division of 
the „instinctual representative‟, is what Freud terms a „quota of affect‟ or Affektbetrag. 
The affect, one of the most elusive and contentious subjects in Freud‟s work, is more 
closely aligned with the energetic than is the ideational representative: „affects and 
emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are 
perceived as feelings.‟34 Whilst Freud often refers to the quota of affect as a 
„representation‟35 of the instinct, it is difficult to directly relate these two terms. The 
affect is the energetic component of the instinctual representative and, opposed to the 
ideational, is better described as being „felt‟ or „experienced‟. This is subtly indicated by 
Freud in „The Unconscious‟ (1915) through his change of language, the affect is no 
longer described as „representing‟ but as „manifesting‟: „if the instinct did not...manifest 
itself as an affective state‟;36 „repression can succeed in inhibiting an instinctual impulse 
from being turned into a manifestation of affect‟;37 etc. Indeed, the affect, almost 
paradoxically, can be „felt‟ in consciousness, but cannot be „thought‟. It does not need 
to take on external perceptions or memory-traces to become conscious, as is indicated in 
the quotation from „The Ego and the Id‟ above. When Surprenant quotes André Green 
as saying that affect is „a challenge to thought‟,38 this is literally the case. Affect, 
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therefore, requires attachment to an idea, not to become conscious, but to become 
„analyzable‟, as Freud tells us in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900-1901): 
We cannot make any psychical assessment of an affect unless it is linked to a 
piece of ideational material.
39
 
We cannot „think‟ affect without ideational content to work upon, which the affect can 
work through. Yet, the affect can still be „felt‟ in consciousness without ideation. This is 
precisely what happens when the instinctual representative is repressed. In repression 
the quota of affect, or „instinctual energy‟, is detached from its original ideational 
correlative, as Freud demonstrates through the definition he gives in „Repression‟ 
(1915): 
It [the quota of affect] corresponds to the instinct in so far as the latter has 
become detached from the [original] idea and finds expression, proportionate to 
its quantity, in processes which are sensed as affects.
40
 
Freud is clear about what happens to this detached quota of affect, giving it three 
possible outcomes, two of which do indeed allow it to be „expressed‟ as affects, and one 
in which repression is successful: 
Either the instinct [including the instinctual energy, or quota of affect] is 
altogether suppressed, so that no trace of it is found, or it appears as an affect 
which is in some way or other qualitatively coloured, or it is changed into 
anxiety.
41
 
The quota of affect, in the latter two outcomes, is either able to find a substitute idea to 
which it can become attached (this being the „affect which is in some way or other 
qualitatively coloured‟), or it is expressed as a general anxiety. 
It should be noted here that the attachment of the affect to a substitute idea does not 
entail a transformation of the affect. The affect remains the same as that which was 
produced by the original instinctual representative, and originally connected with a 
different ideation. Freud identifies this characteristic in the process of examining 
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dreams, which have a particular capacity for enabling these movements to be 
observed:
42
 
Ideational material has undergone displacements and substitutions, whereas the 
affects have remained unaltered...affects are always appropriate, at least in their 
quality.
43
 
We do find an apparent contradiction over this point, as Freud states in „The 
Unconscious‟ that „the nature of that substitute determines the qualitative character of 
the affect.‟44 However, this surely cannot be the case. Freud‟s theories are replete with 
examples of ideas being associated with affects which are unexpected and seem 
inappropriate, from dreams to the psychoneuroses. Indeed, in the same paper, Freud 
tells us that, in repression, „either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is [my 
italics]; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all into 
anxiety; or it is suppressed‟.45 The only time that the affect is „transformed‟ into 
something „qualitatively different‟ is when it is unable to find a substitutive idea, and 
becomes a general sense of anxiety. Further complications are raised, however, by the 
vagueness with which we found Freud describing this process in the paper „Repression‟, 
above: that affects are „in some way or other qualitatively coloured‟ [my italics]. The 
sense here is that affects are not entirely unaltered by attachment with the idea, but they 
are also not completely „determined‟ by it. It is as though the affect is imbued with the 
characteristics of a different quality, is not so much fundamentally changed as 
„influenced‟ by the substitute ideation. This vacillation in Freud‟s thinking is partly, I 
would suggest, due to the ambiguity inherent to affect, and also to Freud‟s evident 
reluctance to deprive substituted ideational content of any bearing whatsoever upon it.  
Freud‟s theories concerning affect leave us with problems. There is certainly a sense of 
indecision in Freud as to the relationship between the affect and representation, as there 
is between the affect as quality and/or quantity. To take the first of these points, the 
quota of affect is not so much represented as it is experienced. It can be „manifested‟ in 
a „conceivable‟ form by attachment with an ideational representative, through which the 
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affect can work (this is not a relationship of representation, as shown by the ease with 
which affect can move between ideas, substituting and displacing them). Alternatively, 
it can be felt as a general „anxiety‟, which is both indefinite and indescribable. Affect 
has also been termed a representation itself, of the instinct. However, ideational 
representation is the criterion for the instinct to enter consciousness, and „even in the 
unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea.‟46 
The affect is purely the „manifestation‟ of the energetic component of the instinctual 
representative, it is a „sum of excitation‟, and to define it as a representative is, in this 
context,
47
 I believe, a misnomer born of the attempt to privilege a hermeneutic approach 
at the expense of the energetic. This brings us to the problematic status of the affect in 
terms of quantity and quality. For the affect does, when in a form „thinkable‟, 
„nameable‟ to consciousness, have a qualitative dimension, as Freud tells us above, 
whether this is simply pleasure or unpleasure. However, the affect is also a quantity, an 
energetic phenomenon. It is produced by the quota of affect (a term directly developed 
from Qή), detached from its original ideational representative and „sensed as affect‟ 
„proportionate to its quantity‟. This is perhaps the most ambiguous aspect of Freud‟s 
theories on affect. Whilst the „quota of affect‟ is purely energetic, the affect itself has a 
qualitative dimension. How this comes about, Freud explains only very loosely: 
Pleasure and unpleasure [affects], therefore, cannot be referred to an increase or 
decrease of a quantity... although they obviously have a great deal to do with 
that factor. It appears that they depend, not on this quantitative factor, but on 
some characteristic of it which we can only describe as a qualitative one. If we 
were able to say what this qualitative characteristic is, we should be much 
further advanced in psychology. Perhaps it is the rhythm, the temporal sequence 
of changes, rises and falls in the quantity of stimulus. We do not know.
48
 
In this rather abstruse definition, the qualitative appears to be determined by the 
quantitative: despite Freud claiming that affects „cannot be referred to an increase or 
decrease of a quantity‟, the „qualitative‟ factor that he replaces it with, in his best 
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estimation, may well be determined by „rises and falls in the quantity of stimulus‟. The 
qualitative here, as elsewhere,
49
 is based upon the movement of quantities, their waxing 
and waning, their ebbs and flows. Does this make the qualitatively distinguishable 
affects representative of the energetic quota of affect, and thus the instinct, however? I 
would suggest not. It is only through ideation that the representative function is 
established. Rather, they are coincident. They cannot be separated into a referent and 
referee as they are comprised of the same „material‟, in a relationship which will 
become familiar to us as we go further in our analysis of affect and representation. 
These principal features of the economic approach will serve us for the time being, and 
will also, I propose, best be elaborated as we advance further through the theory. 
1.ii Working with Affect in the Psychoanalytic Theories of André Green, Christopher 
Bollas and Césare & Sára Botella 
The question of affect and representation has been of significant interest to recent 
European (specifically British, French, and Italian) psychoanalysts, and none have 
contributed more to how we approach the substantial problems that it raises than André 
Green, Christopher Bollas and, although less widely recognised, Césare and Sára 
Botella.  
1.ii.i André Green: The Fabric of Affect 
André Green has produced probably the most sustained psychoanalytic investigation 
into affect currently available, in the form of his 1973 work Le Discours vivant.
50
 In this 
he elaborates a new theory, a new way of approaching affect and representation. The 
Fabric of Affect is a complex and wide-ranging text, which we will approach by 
focusing on specific points most relevant to our present concerns, often through the 
postscripts which were written at various stages after the main text. They provide useful 
summaries, reflections on and evolutions in Green‟s theories. Firstly, Green suggests 
that the hierarchical dyad usually set up between affect and representation can be 
reversed: 
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One always speaks of affect in terms of complement, of connotations. One says: 
there is representation and then one must not forget the affect that accompanies 
it. ...why not think, on the contrary, that the profound nature of the affect is to be 
a psychical event linked to a movement awaiting a form?
51
 
Affect here takes on an active role. It is an „event‟, a „happening‟, „linked to a 
movement‟ (the quota of affect), which is seeking representation. According to Green: 
„the affect, indistinguishable from representation, is unrepresentable. It is looking for 
representations.‟52 How is the affect „indistinguishable from representation‟? In the 
same way that Green postulates for the „psychical representative‟ (a composite 
formation of „what will be the ideational representative (which is a representation) and a 
quota of affect‟53): 
What one is dealing with here is a completely different epistemological status of 
representation, in the sense that there is no model. But the psychical 
representative of the excitations that come from inside the body and reach the 
psyche is in no way representable. In other words, one is faced with a 
conception of representation... without any reference to what is represented, for 
the psychical excitations coming from inside the body cannot be the object of 
representation.
54
 
Just as with the psychical representative, which the affect is one transformation of/in 
and which the quota of affect is a part of, the affect, as a representation of quantity (an 
„affect-representative‟ „of essentially economico-traumatic significance‟55), is non-
representative. To become truly representative „an encounter with a form‟ is required. 
Green explicates this process when he states that: 
If one regards the ideational-representative as coming from the external world, 
one must situate the affect-representative as coming from the level of the 
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affective induction of the other. The drive... can come into existence, be 
manifested in a thinkable way, only by mediation.
56
 
„Manifested‟ links us directly back to Freud‟s description of the instinct (drive, Trieb) 
being manifested as affect. And this is quite in keeping with what Green tells us here. 
The affect-representative seeks an ideational-representative to allow both itself as affect 
and the instinct to enter consciousness, to become „thinkable‟. A process Green terms as 
„mediation‟. „One is forced to have recourse to mediations; in the broad sense, they are 
representations. One can work only through these mediations.‟57 
But let us go back a little way. Whilst the affect is integrated with ideational 
representations, and can be „manifested‟ through these, it never loses its quantitative 
characteristic of non-representation. The affect poses a risk to the ego that we have not, 
up until now, explored, but which Green highlights. The ego attempts to avoid 
„affective processes‟: these „psychical events‟, which comprise of fluctuating quantity 
and tend towards discharge. „[D]ischarge disturbs the activity of thought by the intensity 
of the quantities that it mobilizes [my italics].‟58 Affect, it must be remembered, is 
anathema to thought: it is essentially „inconceivable‟ without ideational mediation. It 
infiltrates „discourse‟, the network of representations, as an unstable energy, always 
posing a disintegrative threat. Affect is in motion. It moves between psychical realms, 
between representations, and can reveal itself in any place, invasive and unanticipated. 
This moving, flowing, protean aspect is an important attribute of affect, one that we 
should note, and only serves to heighten its menace. This portrayal of the unnerving 
capabilities of affect is in keeping with Green‟s characterisation of it: 
The essence of affect is its dynamic attribute, its capacity to seep into other 
domains and inhabit them.... the core of all affective phenomena: this reference 
to a force – which is not always noticeable as such but can always potentially 
manifest itself, movable by essence, capable of invading any or all parts of an 
individual... bearing an impressive capacity for unpredictable change.
59
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There are echoes here which may strike a 21
st
 century reader as having a, more than 
passing, descriptive affinity with accounts of the threat posed to the social body by 
terrorist activity. And this would not be an entirely inappropriate metaphor. The 
explanation that Green gives of the potential for affect to do violence to the ego and the 
order of representation reinforces this, as does the fear of the ego at its prospect. It is 
worth quoting this section in full as it addresses a crucial feature of the nature of affect: 
Insofar as it [the affect] appears as an element of discourse, it is subjected to that 
chain [of cathected representations], includes itself in it as it attaches itself to the 
other elements of discourse. But insofar as it breaks with representations, it is 
the element of discourse that refuses to let itself be linked by representation and 
arises in its place. When reaching a certain quantity of cathexis, a qualitative 
mutation occurs; the affect may then snap the chain of discourse, which then 
sinks into non-discursivity, the unsayable.
60
 
Affect is within discourse, but alien to it. By its association and expression through the 
ideational, it is part of discourse. However, as a quantitative factor it can disrupt 
discourse by introducing a qualitative change, an overwhelming „passion... ruinous for 
the psychical organization‟.61 Affect has the potential to „arise‟ in the place of 
representation, meaning that it can exceed the order of representation, or ego 
organization. Under the pressure of affect, this organization then becomes fractured, 
fragmented. At its most extreme, Green tells us, the affect can break into consciousness, 
the id subsumes the power of the ego, and the affect is experienced as an „epiphany‟: a 
direct manifestation without mediation. Normally, „as force, the affect is what sustains 
that linkage of the ideational representatives... what provides the energy necessary to the 
operations of the psychical apparatus. The affect, then, has this conjunctive-disjunctive 
role, a function of “penetration of the signifier”.‟62 Conjunction and disjunction: within 
discourse and outside it. If the balance tips too far towards the affect (disjunction, non-
discursivity), if the cathexis is too high, if it is „discovered in its manifestations‟63 [my 
italics], it can „recover, abolish, replace representation‟ altogether. If this occurs, „its 
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most striking effect is negative hallucination‟.64 Negative hallucination is a relatively 
rare condition amongst patients in psychoanalysis, but one that Green gives an increased 
importance to, and one that we will return to throughout the course of this study. Green 
defines it as „not the absence of representation, but representation of the absence of 
representation‟:65 „representation and affect are dissociated, together with the 
disappearance of the power to see the representation.‟66 Negative hallucination is 
experienced as an „absence‟, but an absence which is also a representation. It „covers 
over‟ an image, rather than „annihilating‟ it. 
Negative hallucination is useful for our current purposes as an exemplification of the 
work of affect through an extreme condition. It is a psychoanalytic concept that can be 
experienced in analysis, but which may, at first, seem difficult to reconcile with a theory 
of visual response.
67
 However, we will be examining the potential that negative 
hallucination can offer an energetic approach to visual media, through our exploration 
of its relation to theatrical representation. For the moment, as we will see below with 
Botella and Botella, we are primarily concerned with the difficulties and demands that it 
presents, even for the analytic situation. The main function it serves here is to begin to 
indicate the tension that affect puts representation under, the processes through which it 
operates and the threat that affect poses if taken to an excess. 
Let us now turn, by going back a little, to look at how we can practically approach 
affect when it is in operation with/through discourse, how it can be identified and the 
methodology that it requires to be addressed. Green indicates the way in which we can 
do this when he examines, in „Postscript 3‟ of The Fabric of Affect from 1997 (in the 
original), the role of affect in the psychoanalytic situation: 
The evaluation of the interpretability of the discourse does not entail separating 
affect from other aspects of discourse.... what returns to the surface of analytic 
communication is extended over a spectre that mixes in various proportions an 
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element whose content is usually appreciated in ideational terms and another 
that cannot be encompassed by the previous one, recognized as expressing 
„motions‟, that is to say, movements in which affect is to be found, as a dynamic 
phenomenon.
68
 
Here, Green is examining how the discourse of the analysand can be „understood‟ by 
the analyst, by looking at both the ideational aspects and the affective ones 
simultaneously. The affect works through the ideational representatives of discourse, 
and is „recognized as expressing „motions‟‟. „Movements‟ which „cannot be 
encompassed‟ by ideational representation. The manifestations of the affect can be 
„felt‟, „experienced‟, „identified‟ through its movements across and through discourse, 
its motions and its dynamic characteristics. Receptiveness to this „movement‟ is a key 
part of the sensibility that is required to enable a response that focuses upon this 
affective element within discourse/representation. To explore this approach in more 
detail, we turn now to the work of three psychoanalysts who have extensively addressed 
the ways in which affect can be „received‟ and worked with in analysis: Christopher 
Bollas, and Césare and Sára Botella. 
1.ii.ii Christopher Bollas and The Idea of a „Receptive Unconscious‟ 
Our interest in the work of Christopher Bollas is centred upon the concept, which he has 
developed, of a „receptive unconscious‟. This is of considerable value, and use, 
primarily for what it tells us regarding the reception of affect and unconscious energetic 
processes. Bollas has discussed the idea of a „receptive unconscious‟, briefly suggested 
by Freud in „The Unconscious‟, at length in his recent work The Freudian Moment 
(2007). The significance of this term is to indicate that there exists an „unconscious 
perception‟, and that one person‟s unconscious can „react upon that of another without 
passing through the Cs.‟69 One example of this „perception‟ is what Bollas has called 
„the “unthought known”‟ (a concept that recurs repeatedly throughout his work). It is 
„unthought‟ as it does not enter consciousness in a „thinkable‟ form, but through and 
between the unconscious of the sender and receiver:
70
 „what is known cannot be 
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thought, yet constitutes the foundational knowledge of one‟s self: the “unthought 
known”‟.71 It is „transmitted‟ through elements of communication, particularly 
„maternal communication‟, which are not ascertained or „picked up‟ by conscious 
perception. Whilst the „unthought known‟ does not correspond to the reception of affect 
per se, it does provide us with a model through which we can understand how the non-
representative nature of affect is communicable, and how it can be apprehended through 
the receptive unconscious, through a „receptive state‟ in the analyst. The communication 
of the „unthought known‟ through the „receptive unconscious‟ is a process that is 
repeated in the analytical situation, between the analyst and analysand: 
What I term the receptive unconscious must be the unconscious to which Freud 
refers in... describing evenly suspended attentiveness, when the analyst catches 
the drift of his patient‟s unconscious with his own unconscious... he [Freud] has 
made it clear that the analyst‟s unconscious is indeed receptive.72 
The requirement for this kind of communicative relationship rests upon the 
determination that there are aspects of the psychoanalytic discourse which cannot be 
discerned consciously, or directly represented. Aspects, I would suggest, such as affect. 
Instead, the analyst looks for movements, „rhythms‟ and „patterns‟ in the unconscious of 
the analysand: 
There are characteristic rhythms of a person‟s session... The analyst‟s 
unconscious will not only perceive that rhythm, he will attune to it.
73
 
These „rhythms‟ are expressed, at a perceptible level, through such features within the 
discourse of the analysand as „pauses‟, „hesitations‟, „divergences‟, „sudden significant 
remarks‟ as well as, presumably, gestures and physical changes. Whilst these are, of 
course, individually observable at a conscious level, their significance is only received 
unconsciously by the analyst. At the level of conscious perception, they may be 
unnoticed, disregarded or determined to be unconnected. The analyst‟s unconscious is 
permeated by the unconscious „rhythms‟ of the analysand, and he/she can become 
aware of this alteration within him/herself: 
                                                             
71
 Bollas, The Freudian Moment, p.34. 
72
 Bollas, The Freudian Moment, pp.36-37. 
73
 Bollas, The Freudian Moment, pp.49-50. 
25 
 
It is only the psychoanalyst who understands that what goes on within himself or 
herself is often the patient‟s articulation of an idea that can only be thought 
through the other‟s inner experience.74 
It is then that he/she can begin to work with them, to approach them. The same is true, 
and perhaps more clearly so, of „patterns‟. Bollas determines that „character‟ is only 
perceptible by the other: it is transmitted by the subject, but cannot be perceived by the 
subject. „Character‟, as Bollas says, „is a pattern‟.75 It is a mix of actions and categories 
of expression which „follow a highly idiomatic pattern‟. This pattern is then identified 
and constructed by the „other‟s receptive unconscious‟: „the other‟s receptive 
unconscious perceives any pattern.‟76 From here, the analyst can, surreptitiously, 
become aware of it consciously: 
The analyst‟s receptive unconscious, which looks for and organizes everything 
into patterns, is discovering patterns in the connective tissues of thought and 
often the patterns of thought arrives in the analyst‟s consciousness as an inspired 
idea.
77
 
Unconscious expressions through „rhythms‟ and „patterns‟ in discourse are just two 
examples of „perceptions‟ that can be made by the receptive unconscious. It is, I would 
suggest, a method by which the „unthinkable‟, the „non-representative‟, in 
psychoanalytic discourse
78
 generally can be received. The „motions‟ and dynamism of 
affects, crossing between, through, and within discourse, which Green identifies, may 
equally be received in this way.  
The method which the analyst must adopt in becoming receptive to these movements, 
rhythms, patterns, is, paradoxically, a non-analytic one. This is captured by the 
significance of Freud‟s term „evenly suspended attentiveness‟, which we have seen 
Bollas quoting above, and the similar condition which Bollas terms „neutrality‟: 
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Because the analyst is neutral – he has neutralized his character up to a point – 
he opens himself to a deep reception of the other‟s impact upon himself: to 
otherness.
79
 
The analyst must attempt to avoid organizing the material with which he is presented; 
avoid closing it by attributing meaning too early; avoid the temptation of interrupting 
with interpretation:  
Analysts who practise neutrality enable the patient‟s free associations to guide 
the sessions. They are more receptive to the analysand‟s free talking than 
analysts who believe that analysis is a highly interactive event.
80
 
The analyst is encouraged to allow the analysand to speak, not to impose their own 
opinion or reading too soon, but to be „impressed‟ by the discourse of the patient. And 
specifically to allow the non-representative movements within this discourse to be 
received and emerge as an „inspired idea‟, without the intervention of hermeneutic 
analysis and active re-construction. This kind of sensibility, of sensitivity and 
„attentiveness‟ is also articulated, in a comparable though different way, and reinforced 
by Césare and Sára Botella. We will now, finally, turn to their theory of affective 
reception, and complete the section of our investigation that attempts to address what is 
required for approaching affect, from a psychoanalytic perspective. 
1.ii.iii Césare and Sára Botella: Introducing „Negative Hallucination‟ and the Role of 
„Conviction‟ 
The principal work of Botella and Botella would appear to have little direct association 
with exploring the relationship between affect and representation, or the energetic 
within discourse, or, indeed, with helping us towards a theory that responds to visual 
media. This suspicion would be first aroused, quite reasonably, by the title of this text: 
The Work of Psychic Figurability: Mental States without Representation (2001). The 
focus of Botella and Botella‟s study is those mental states which retain an affective 
component, but not an ideational representative one. A key example here is, of course, 
negative hallucination. The affective component is generally experienced as a „void‟, 
which has lost its mnesic representative. Indeed, Michael Parsons, in his Introduction to 
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The Work of Psychic Figurability identifies this as an „amnesic trace‟,81 a term 
influenced by the Botellas‟ phrase „memory without recollection‟. An apt description of 
negative hallucination. The first way in which the work of Botella and Botella can be of 
assistance to us is in identifying how, given this extreme condition of affect and mental 
(non)representation, the analyst is able to apprehend affect. How he/she gains access to 
this „void‟, how he/she is able to experience it and what action he/she can take as a 
result of this identification. The Botellas do not give an explicit definition of how the 
analyst can receive affective processes from the analysand, but do give us a very 
definite sense of this from their descriptions of the effects that it produces in the analyst. 
Parsons has succinctly described the state of the analyst required by the Botellas, and 
we find it to be strikingly similar to that required by Bollas. The analyst should 
endeavour to foster: 
free-floating attention and avoidance, so far as possible, of preconscious 
assumptions... The analyst [then] picks up, at an unconscious level of awareness, 
the patient‟s experience of non-representation... The sense of a void, which this 
can produce, may have a quality of horror.
82
 
The Botellas put forward the theory that the analyst can, through „working as a double‟ 
with the analysand, give representation to what is un-representable by the analysand 
alone. What is of interest to us here, for we shall return to the Botellas‟ treatment of 
negative hallucination in another context in Chapter 3, is that the analyst puts 
him/herself into „the state of session... halfway between the waking and sleeping 
state‟.83 This disables, to a certain degree, preconscious intervention and he/she can then 
undergo a „regression of his thought‟.84 This involves the analyst „receiving‟ the 
manifest discourse of the analysand and, rather than interpreting it, allowing his/her 
thought to regress towards an earlier state. He/she comes into contact with the 
„unknown‟ within the analysand, which he/she becomes aware of as „an affect, 
signalling the danger of non-representation‟.85 However, if the analyst can endure this 
affect, the „quality of horror‟ that is non-representation, this will allow a representation, 
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a product of both the unconscious of the analysand and of the analyst, to arise in his/her 
own mind (the analyst‟s). This thereby provides the ideational representation to the 
unrepresentable „void‟, that the patient could not. It can then be related, „given‟, to the 
patient by the analyst. In the Botellas‟ description of this process, we can note the 
determination that conscious interpretation on the part of the analyst should not take 
place too early, or too forcefully: 
If the analyst‟s thinking can tolerate the movement of regression, without having 
recourse to defensive solutions such as investing the analysand narcissistically, 
analytic theories, „ready-made‟ ideas, or again, memory... without the obstacle 
of the counter-transference and the field of pre-conscious memory, remaining as 
close as possible to the unknown of the analysand that is a triggering cause of 
the state of quality of his thinking, interpretations of a particularly intuitive 
nature can come to the analyst.
86
 
This process is essentially an artificial way of reproducing the process by which the 
affect attaches to ideational representation in normal psychical functioning. And this 
leads us to the second point in the Botellas‟ work which is of interest to our present 
investigation. The Botellas are insistent that the representations which become 
associated with the „unknown‟, the „negative hallucination‟, of the analysand do not 
have to be authentic memory traces. They need not have any association with the 
original ideational representative of the affect (the psychical representative, before their 
dissociation through repression), or even have ever been experienced by the patient. 
This provides us with a key way through which we can think the place of memory in an 
energetic theory of visual media. The „value‟ of the „construction interpretation‟ formed 
through the conjunction of the analyst and analysand, their „work as a double‟, „does not 
reside so much... in the recollections it can evoke or in its historical reality as in the 
degree of conviction that [it] arouses in the analysand.‟87 „Conviction‟ is the key to 
providing the analysand with a representation
88
 which can serve as an outlet for the 
affect, which has been denied representation through, for example, negative 
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hallucination. This connects, as the Botellas note, with Freud‟s assertion that the 
„conviction aroused in the analysand by the work of the analyst “achieves the same 
therapeutic result as a recaptured memory”.‟89 From here they can claim that „analysis 
could no longer be considered simply as a work of remembering.‟90 Indeed, the very 
question of memory has changed: 
We are far from a problem of memory linked to repression. We are faced with 
an alteration concerning, not the contents presented, but the function of memory 
itself.
91
 
If the ideational representatives constructed by the analyst do not have to correspond to 
authentic memories, it would suggest that the primary function of memory, both in this 
artificial psychoanalytic process and in normal psychical affective processes, is not its 
capacity for the accurate reproduction of past events, not its place as a directly 
referential „store‟ of experiences. Rather, it is memory‟s facility for being traversed by, 
for being manipulated by, for conducting, affect. That this is precisely the aim of the 
analyst‟s constructed ideational representation is indicated by Botella and Botella: 
The retrogressive movement of thought is a means of transforming the force of 
the affects into the „sensory strength‟ of a visual image.92 
From an energetic perspective, the affect can distort discourse, can displace and disrupt 
ideational representation by its passage through and within it, can use representation as 
a means of making itself felt, of expressing itself. And it is this that is the principal 
focus of an energetic approach, not the meaning of the contents themselves. It is only 
through ideational representation, and specifically the tensions that their organization 
comes under, that the energetic (the affective) can be approached. This is true when we 
are thinking of the energetic in visual media, as much as it is exactly the reason why 
Botella and Botella must provide an ideational representation for the affective 
„unknown‟, for it to become „thinkable‟ in the psychoanalytic situation. 
Our task now turns to examining how these psychoanalytic processes and phenomena 
link with a theory of „interpretation‟, through its influence and development in 
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poststructuralist theory and philosophy, before we then look at this in relation to its role 
as a way of approaching theatre and film. 
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Chapter 2: Out of the Consulting Room: Energetics in Poststructuralist Thought 
and Visual Media 
 
Poststructuralism, as a mode of thought, attempts to integrate the same shift in critical 
focus as that which is necessitated by affective processes in psychoanalysis. Indeed, the 
shift in poststructuralism from structuralism is undoubtedly, at least partially, influenced 
by the co-dependent duality in psychoanalysis between affect and representation, 
between the energetic and hermeneutic. One of our primary sources in making this 
connection is Jacques Derrida‟s early paper „Force and Signification‟ (1963), in Writing 
and Difference. In this Derrida is critical of structuralism for its singular emphasis upon 
the „geometry‟, the „form‟, the „morphology‟ of a work: 
One risks being interested in the figure itself to the detriment of the play going 
on within it metaphorically.
93
 
This „risks stifling force under form.‟94 However, Derrida is not advocating a complete 
turn away from structure towards force. Such a move would amount to accepting 
nihilism. „The geometric or morphological elements of Forme et Signification [by 
Rousset] are corrected only by a kind of mechanism,
95
 never by energetics.‟96 
What is this „mechanism‟ which Derrida advocates? He explains it in terms of a 
relationship between form and force, of one being within the other, being simultaneous 
and inseparable: 
Our intention here is not, through the simple motions of balancing, equilibration 
or overturning, to oppose duration to space, quality to quantity, force to form... 
we maintain that it is necessary to seek new concepts and new models, an 
economy escaping this system of metaphysical oppositions. This economy 
would not be an energetics of pure, shapeless force. The differences examined 
simultaneously would be differences of site and differences of force.
97
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Like affect, force only becomes thinkable through form, „an encounter with a form‟, as 
Green says. What is more, form and force must be simultaneous, not oppositional: they 
cannot be seen apart. It is as much of a problem to focus exclusively on structure and 
form, which reduce everything to a flat, dead, geometry, to „rings, spirals, and 
helices‟,98 the terms in which Derrida says one cannot define the beauty of Le Cid, as it 
is to focus exclusively on „shapeless force‟. By this Derrida is referring to an energy 
equivalent to Freud‟s quantity (Qή): meaningless, literally, and unapproachable without 
ideational representation of some kind. There is no concept „which would permit the 
conceptualization of intensity or force‟99 in and of itself. What Derrida demands of 
criticism is to do away with the oppositional binary that it tends to create between force 
and form, not to regard them in a relationship of alterity or hierarchy: „force is not 
darkness, and it is not hidden under a form for which it would serve as substance, 
matter, or crypt.‟100 Neither is in possession of a greater „truth‟ or „reality‟. And until 
criticism has been able to accept this way of thinking, this way of approaching a work, 
it will, as Derrida says: 
not be able to exceed itself to the point of embracing both force and the 
movement which displaces lines, nor to the point of embracing force as 
movement, as desire, for itself, and not as the accident or epiphany of lines. To 
the point of embracing it as writing.
101
 
This view of „force as movement‟ is crucial here, and highlights the conjunction of 
Derrida‟s requirements from criticism with the approach that Green, in particular, and 
reinforced by Bollas and the Botellas, advocates for addressing the discourse of the 
analysand.  
However, Derrida establishes that an affective, „energetic‟ mode of thinking is not 
restricted to the analytic situation. His provocation at the point quoted above, near the 
closing remarks of his essay, is to term this coincidence of force and movement, which 
can only be a movement through and within form (the „lines‟ which it „displaces‟), as 
„writing‟. Writing seems to be a, perhaps the, most „representative‟, referential medium. 
But Derrida defines „writing‟ differently. His paper „Freud and the Scene of Writing‟ 
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(1966), also from Writing and Difference, is one of the key moments in which he 
discusses precisely what this re-definition amounts to, and how it is being thought. 
2.i Jacques Derrida: „Freud and the Scene of Writing‟ 
Throughout this paper Derrida performs an intensive re-reading of Freud‟s presentation, 
particularly centred on the Project, of memory, its relationship with force, and how 
Freud uses the metaphor of writing as a way of thinking these. Our main focus, here, is 
to consider how Derrida conceives of „writing‟, and how it can be constituted as an 
„amalgamation‟ of force and meaning.102 Derrida makes a key distinction between what 
he terms „psychical writing‟ and „the writing we believe to be designated by the proper 
sense of the word – a script which is coded and visible “in the world”‟. This latter kind 
of writing „would only be the metaphor of psychical writing.‟103 Writing proper can 
only bear this relationship with psychical writing due to the profound differences that 
Derrida reads Freud as having attributed between them. These attributes allow us to 
understand how Derrida is shifting our view of writing, and how this shift necessitates a 
different mode of criticism.  
The primary point of comparison which Derrida identifies, in attempting to explicate the 
notion of „psychical writing‟, is that of dreams: „this writing, for example the kind we 
find in dreams‟.104 The first consequence of this is that it „cannot be read in terms of any 
code‟: 
No meaningful material or prerequisite text exists which he [the dreamer] might 
simply use... As much as it is a function of the generality and the rigidity of the 
code, this limitation [of predefined codes or lexicons for the dream, i.e. the 
Traumbuch] is a function of an excessive preoccupation with content, and an 
insufficient concern for relations, locations, processes, and differences.
105
 
A non-codifiable writing complicates the first condition of writing proper, the 
relationship between a signifier and its signified: „The absence of an exhaustive and 
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absolutely infallible code means that in psychic writing... the difference between 
signifier and signified is never radical.‟106 Signifier and signified become, not a matter 
of reference, but rather of coincidence. A phrase used by Botella and Botella, in a 
different context, fits this circumstance most aptly: „the dancer and the dance are the 
same.‟107 As Derrida points out, this makes them „no longer, properly speaking, 
signifiers‟. They have only a „status-as-meaningful‟,108 determined by „unconscious 
experience‟, by their investment and by their relations. The proper „grammar‟ of this 
writing is how they make affective force palpable, how they are traversed and 
transgressed by it and how this passage is „seen‟ in the distortions of the network of 
discourse, in the „differences‟ between „representations‟ (which do not strictly 
„represent‟, but are, as experiences, as living expressions), in their relations. This, to 
echo Derrida‟s brief assertion in „Force and Signification‟, is no „energetics of pure, 
shapeless force‟. It is to be thought of more as a „mechanism‟, a network of relations, 
functioning through their inter-connectedness. 
What does this make of the „signifier‟ itself? It becomes identified with a certain 
„materiality‟: the congruence of signifier and signified, the inseparability of force and 
form, which denies the possibility of „translation‟ or „transcription‟: „the possibility of 
translation... is nevertheless and by definition limited.‟109 Indeed, translation and 
materiality cannot coexist: „Materiality is precisely that which translation 
relinquishes.‟110 But it is not only the translation of signifiers that becomes limited; it is 
the entire psychical „text‟ itself. There becomes no „unconscious text‟ shadowing the 
conscious one, which would provide a key to unlock all of its mysteries: 
There is then no unconscious truth to be rediscovered by virtue of having been 
written elsewhere... There is no present text in general, and there is not even a 
past present text... The unconscious text is already a weave of pure traces, 
differences in which meaning and force are united – a text nowhere present.111 
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There is only one text. The affective force works through and within ideational 
representation, it cannot be thought without this. The psychical text is thus always 
already worked over. Force and meaning cannot be disunited and still conceived of: 
„The metaphor of translation as the transcription of an original text would separate force 
and extension.‟112 There is no beyond or elsewhere to be referred to, there is only, in my 
sense of Derrida‟s meaning, surface. 
And this is crucial to determining the nature that Derrida attributes to the psychical text. 
The material quality of the signifier aligns it with the image. The image fulfils this idea 
of the material signifier through a particular pre-disposition for facilitating the 
cohabitation of form and force. The dream provides practical evidence for this: „the 
materiality of the signifier constitutes the idiom of every dream scene‟.113 As Freud has 
demonstrated,
114
 the dream expresses itself through images. And this is a feature that 
Derrida explicitly reminds us of: 
Having recalled the archaic character of expression in dreams, which accepts 
contradiction and valorizes visibility.
115
 
„Archaic expression‟, the most „primitive‟ form of expression in the psyche is 
perception, is the image. And this psychical „writing‟ is one of images. It is „dream-like‟ 
in a literal sense: „The border between the non-phonetic space of writing... and the space 
of the stage (scène) of dreams is uncertain.‟116 To enable this comparison writing must 
be attributed with certain qualities: 
Freud, in order to suggest the strangeness of the logico-temporal relations in 
dreams, constantly adduces writing, and the spatial synopses of pictograms, 
rebuses, hieroglyphics and nonphonetic writing in general. Synopsis and not 
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stasis: scene and not tableau. The laconic, lapidary quality of dreams is not the 
impassive presence of petrified signs.
117
 
This writing is not only „visual‟ (formed of „pictograms, rebuses, hieroglyphics‟), but 
also must be seen as a „totality‟. „Synopsis and not stasis‟: an interwoven whole rather 
than a series of discrete „moments‟. „Scene and not tableau‟: the scene is one of action, 
of change, as opposed to the stillness of the tableau. The „relations‟ and interactions of 
signifiers is key here, rather than any fixed „signified‟ or „meaning‟, rather than 
producing „petrified signs‟.  
Derrida defines this writing through the single term „Bilderschrift‟.118 Literally meaning 
a „pictographic script‟, Bilderschrift is: 
not an inscribed image but a figurative script, an image inviting not a simple, 
conscious, present perception of the thing itself – assuming it exists – but a 
reading.
119
 
The psychic text as Bilderschrift is to be „moved over‟. We are not presented with a 
„perception of the thing itself‟, but a relational series, a network, a chain. Significance is 
derived from these relations, the movement through and between images. It is the 
discursive network which affective force disturbs, not the ideational representative 
itself, in any conception of singularity. This is how the Bilderschrift invites a „reading‟: 
it is a process, constantly in motion, not autopsic stasis. „The figurative content is then 
indeed a form of writing, a signifying chain in scenic form.‟120 Given these conceptions 
of the psychical text, of a form of criticism that is sensitive to the amalgamation of force 
and meaning and seeks to approach writing in terms of this conjunction, of the 
Bilderschrift, Derrida is led to assert that „a psychoanalysis of literature respectful of the 
originality of the literary signifier has not yet begun‟.121 This originality consists in 
„reading‟ the signifier for its relational status, its figurative and material qualities, its 
affinity to, and definition as, image in process, a visual mechanism. If Derrida seeks to 
redefine the study specifically, as stated here, of literature in these terms, I find that the 
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question we are led to ask is how much more could we think images in terms of this 
„writing‟? 
2.ii Jean-François Lyotard: Energetics, Tensors, Libidinal Economics 
In proposing an „energetic‟ methodology (which is a misnomer from the beginning, it 
would be better to say a perspective, a tendency, an anticipation), rather than allowing 
hermeneutics its assumed precedence, we should take our lead, in this as in many 
respects when engaging with such things, from Jean-François Lyotard. Lyotard dealt 
repeatedly throughout his works, although most explicitly in those from the 1970s, with 
the notion of an „energetic‟ or „dynamic‟ theory in relation to representation and, often, 
to artistic representation. Our first point of departure is, naturally enough, Lyotard‟s 
brief and speculative treatise on an „energetic theatre‟, entitled „The Tooth, The Palm‟, 
from 1973‟s Des Dispositifs pulsionnels (translated in 1977 by Anne Knap). This work 
provides us with one of the clearest expositions of an energetic approach, and is thus 
primarily discussed here rather than in the next chapter, on theatre. 
In this paper Lyotard calls for a new form of theatrical practice: a practice that is not 
based upon the idea of representation. Representation is described by Lyotard through 
an analogy in which „the action of the palm‟ (clenching into a fist) „represents‟ „the 
passion of the tooth‟ (toothache) in a causal relationship, as „two investments of the 
libido‟. Rather than this, he seeks a practice in which „signs are no longer looked at in 
their representative dimension… they do not represent, they permit “actions”‟.122 
Theatrical „signs‟ are taken to be „transitory investments‟, „forces, intensities, present 
affects‟.123  They are „transformers‟ of the „libidinal flux‟ upon and within which they 
are staged. The question which immediately presents itself in this context is one that 
Lyotard raises himself in the last expression of the piece: „is it possible, how?‟124 
After finding clear parallels between his „energetic theatre‟ and Artaud‟s „Theatre of 
Cruelty‟, Lyotard is ultimately forced to conclude that Artaud‟s theatre is doomed to 
failure in its aims. Artaud cannot escape falling back on imposing a semiotic structure: 
he is too „European‟. In Lyotard‟s refusal to make this same capitulation, it becomes 
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undeniably possible that his ideal theatre is, in the last instance, not realisable. However, 
it is not this question that I am seeking to address. The theory of an „energetic theatre‟ is 
the expression of a move away from representative theatre, and it is in this trajectory 
that we are most interested here. Lyotard‟s theories in „The Tooth, The Palm‟ can be 
read, not as a prescription for a future theatre, but rather as a mode of interpretation. 
Which is, of course, a mode of „non-interpretation‟. 
How this can function in practice is elucidated if we turn to the idea, defined by Lyotard 
in his 1974 essay „Beyond Representation‟, of an „economy of aesthetics‟.125 The modus 
operandi of this „economy‟ is well surmised early in this same essay when Lyotard 
claims that: 
 Understanding will no longer be a matter of establishing an ultimate libidinal 
content (be it even a lack, the effect of an empty signifier) but rather of 
identifying, in all its ineffectual delicacy and complexity, the device by which 
the energy of drives is guided, blocked, freed, exhausted or stored up - in short, 
channeled into extreme intensities.
126
 
In this view, we must think of the „work‟ as „flat‟, its „subject… conceals no content, no 
libidinal secret… force lies entirely in its surface. There is only surface.‟127 Lyotard‟s 
meaning here is that representations, for we can still speak of representations (if only 
through necessity for, in this sense, they do not strictly „represent‟), are not to be seen as 
„substitutes‟, they are not in place of any supposed „lack‟ or absence. They are only 
present in themselves: they are „concentrations of libidinal energy on the surfaces of the 
visible‟.128 It is the task of an economy of aesthetics to attend to the movement of this 
energy, and the „devices‟ through which we are not only made aware of it, but also put 
into direct contact with it. Not as something to be considered, digested or cognized, but 
as experiences: as sites of libidinal energy which act as immediate and discontinuous 
„events‟. We are perhaps approaching abstraction once again, as did Artaud. But let us 
keep the idea of „movement‟ in mind. Hold it for revival shortly. 
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If we leave the theory of an „energetic aesthetics‟ at just this, we may, indeed, condemn 
it to pure theory: it can only ever be insubstantial idealism. However, Lyotard is careful 
to tread around this trap. His notion of „understanding‟, it is true, does not rely upon 
„establishing content‟. But this is not to say that he is calling for a „non-semiotic' order, 
a renunciation of signs, or the inauguration of „another field, a beyond 
representation‟.129 As Lyotard elaborates, in his 1974 book Libidinal Economy, such a 
suggestion would „amount to saying: we quit signs, we enter the extra-semiotic order of 
tensors‟, and would be „so “stupid”‟.130 Libidinal Economy is written at approximately 
the same time as the other texts to which we are here referring, all of which are working 
towards a characterization of the energetic, with which Lyotard is clearly preoccupied at 
this time. In it Lyotard posits his alternative to this „quitting signs‟, which is, in the most 
concise terms, to think that: 
signs are not only terms, stages, set in relation and made explicit in a trail of 
conquest; they can also be, indissociably, singular and vain intensities in exodus. 
Is it a question of another kind of sign? Not at all, they are the same as those 
turned into theory and textual practice by the semiotician.
131
 
Lyotard‟s definition of, what he calls, the „tensor sign‟ is, thus, one which is within a 
semiotic network of signification, standing in relation to other signs, and both referring 
to and representing the lack which is meaning (deferred). Whilst also „indissociably‟ 
being „a strained singularity, an instantaneous, ephemeral concentration of force.‟132 
Why strained? Simply because the sign becomes a co-existence of „incompossibles‟: 
„worlds‟ which are possible, but not possible together. It is therefore defined through 
„tension‟.133 
Libidinal force is not a different and independent „system‟ to representative signs, but is 
„within‟ (although this word gives an inaccurate sense of „depth‟) them. „Beyond 
representation‟ does not convey a „leaving behind‟ or „exchange‟ of representation, but 
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an „addition to‟, no, rather a „refocusing‟, a change in how the sign is approached and 
what it is expected to do. „We understand it otherwise. It speaks to you? It sets us in 
motion‟.134 The distinction Lyotard is drawing here is between a sign that conveys a 
particular meaning, from someone to an addressee, and the sign serving to integrate one 
into the „libidinal flux‟, to „move‟ us (emotionally, physically, „instinctually‟135) 
between intensities. Whilst it remains a mode of communication, it also functions 
energetically. And this is why a different understanding is not a different interpretation 
of meaning, but a different, and pre-verbal, mode of reception. 
2.ii.i The Tensor and the Transgression of Representation 
To illustrate the kind of demands that the „tensor sign‟ makes, and the way in which it 
functions, we can turn to Hans-Thies Lehmann‟s 1999 work Postdramatisches Theater: 
Verlag der Autoren (translated into English in 2006 as Postdramatic Theatre). In this 
study Lehmann discusses Lyotard‟s „energetic theatre‟ in relation to his own notion of 
„postdramatic theatre‟, and presents them in a fascinating and productive context. 
However, I take issue with his occasional lack of precision in this particular discussion, 
and it is with just such an instance that we are here concerned. He claims that Lyotard, 
influenced by Artaud, has found that: 
 In theatre, gestures, figurations and arrangements are possible that refer to an 
„elsewhere‟ in a different way than iconic, indexical or symbolic „signs‟.136 
This suggestion is to misunderstand the nature of the tensor sign, in which there is no 
„elsewhere‟ indicated. Rather, the referential function of signs, in their semiotic and 
linguistic sense, is crucial for Lyotard‟s theory as much as their status as „concentrations 
of libidinal energy‟. To „refer to an “elsewhere”‟ would make of the tensor sign (which 
is the model of the „sign‟ Lyotard engages with in „The Tooth, The Palm‟, the essay that 
Lehmann is primarily drawing upon), a sign which „stands for‟ something else (albeit an 
unknown something), somewhere else. This once more entraps it within the discourse of 
„lack‟, of nihilism, rather than addressing it as a „device‟ or „transformer‟ of libidinal 
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flux („affirmatively‟, as Lyotard would say). Lehmann posits that „Lyotard speaks of an 
“energetic” instead of a representational theatre‟ [my italics],137 however the 
„representational‟ quality of the tensor is vital to Lyotard‟s energetic theory. As Lyotard 
states in „The Tooth, The Palm‟: 
[T]heatre… where libidinal flux becomes representation, wavers between a 
semiotics and an economic science.
138
 
This undecidability, this „wavering‟, serves a practical purpose in that the libidinal force 
of the tensor can only be identified thus: 
 The elements of a total „language‟ [a totality of theatrical signs] are divided and 
linked together in order to permit the production of effects of intensity through 
slight transgressions and the infringement of overlapping units [my italics].
139
 
Much like Lyotard‟s notion of the action of the figural „within‟ and „upon‟ discourse, 
the network of signification is necessary for the „energetic‟ to work through: 
 An account of the economy of works of art that was cast in libidinal terms… 
would have as its central presupposition the affirmative character of works: they 
are not in place of anything; they do not stand for but stand; that is to say, they 
function through their material and its organization.
140
 
The „material‟ (content, „signs‟) and its „organization‟ are to be thought of purely in 
terms of its „relations, not only between pitches, but also between intensities, timbres, 
durations.‟141 This emphasis on „relations‟ leads to „dematerialization‟: 
 [T]his „dematerialization‟… [is] a result of the mise en signes, conquered and 
crossed by the trails of influxes, offering the libido new opportunities for 
intensification, the fabrication of signs through „dematerialization‟ providing 
material for the extension of tensors.
142
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The „work‟ becomes a relational (de)composition of signs, which are crossed, traversed, 
by „influxes‟ (libidinal energy). It is both transgressed: the representing sign being 
distorted due to the movement of energy „underlying‟ it being „revealed‟, and 
„dematerialized‟: the „mise en signes‟ is fragmented through this movement of energy, 
to become „material‟ for the development and discovery of tensors „within‟ it.143 
The image that we should have here is of both „work‟ and sign under stress. As Iain 
Hamilton Grant rightly states: 
Lyotard‟s wish to reintroduce into the sign a tension that prevents it from having 
either a unitary designation, meaning or calculable series of such designations or 
meanings… is an attempt to block this movement of referral and remain as 
faithful as possible to the incompossible intensities informing and exceeding the 
sign.
144
 
It is important to recognise three key terms here: „wish‟, „attempt‟ and „as possible‟. As 
we have seen above, and as Lyotard recognises himself, this „attempt‟ will inevitably be 
unsuccessful due to the necessity of having the referential sign as a „cover‟.145 However, 
the crucial point is that Lyotard is reintroducing a „tension‟ into the sign, which is 
simultaneously and „incompossibly‟ defined by both its unavoidable referential function 
and the attempt (intrinsically limited) to be „as faithful as possible‟ to its intensities. The 
distortion characteristic of this „tension‟ is the visible transformation of the libidinal 
energetic. 
2.iii An Energetic Approach to Visual Media 
2.iii.i Energetic Memory: Developing a Model for Visual Representation 
Now that we have arrived at a grounding in the origins and theory of the energetic, we 
can begin to think about the kind of shape that an energetic approach may take in 
relation to visual media. We have repeatedly found the demand for a focus upon 
movement, upon a movement that distorts. A movement that is visible in the wake that it 
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leaves. This movement is of affect, of force, of indiscernible energy, which is 
simultaneous with ideational representation, with the network of discourse.  
And here we find the central place of memory in energetic theory. Memory is redefined. 
An energetic conception of memory is not seen for its referential, historical or verifiable 
qualities, but as a „text‟ to be traversed, transgressed, to manifest and express the 
energetic, through relations and differences. It is a „tensor‟, caught within the tension of 
„incompossibles‟. It is a surface. Any relationship of depth, of transcription or 
translation, is necessarily challenged. It is that which allows the energetic to be felt. It is 
important that this position is clear, so we will take this opportunity to re-state it, in the 
context of our previous discussions. 
If Freud gives us one sense of memory as, essentially, a recording device (à la „mystic 
writing pad‟), a „sign‟ or „representation‟ which „stands for‟ a deferred presence, a 
„lack‟ (in Lyotard‟s terms), he also gives us another which is, perhaps, never given a 
comprehensive treatment but is frequently assumed, and which we have detailed in the 
previous chapter. The mnemic image is fundamentally situated „within‟ (with its now 
familiar reservation) the world of the primary processes. As we have seen throughout 
Chapter 1, this first description of memory accords with a hermeneutic approach in 
Freud‟s thought and psychoanalysis generally. However, the second positions memory 
as an energetic concept. Thought in terms of its role as the facilitator of affective force, 
it is the means by which the affective can be expressed, through its movements, patterns 
and distortions in ideational representation (comprised of mnemic images).  
This conception of memory provides us with a model through which we can approach 
visual media energetically. And this model is well illustrated by Lyotard‟s description 
of the „dream-work‟ in his paper „The Dream-Work Does Not Think‟. We can read this 
paper as an example of the kind of interaction between the energetic and visual 
representation that is operative in our engagement with visual media. Whilst Lyotard 
addresses the fact that the dream, which is comprised of mnemic images, does represent 
a wish and „at bottom is fully intelligible‟,146 thus allowing the possibility of a 
hermeneutic approach, it is also an „always-already‟ „worked-over text‟,147 a „surface‟ 
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„worked-over‟ by desire. It is in the „dream-work‟ that we see the ephemeral and 
transitory nature of the mnemic image and, as Lyotard quotes Freud as saying: „the 
dream-work… is the essence of dreaming‟.148 Desire „transforms‟ the mnemic image(s) 
of the „text‟,149 making these transformations, the movement and relations between 
images, the means by which desire is expressed: 
[T]he work of desire is the result of manhandling a text. Desire does not speak; it 
does violence to the order of utterance.
150
  
This violence provides an „encounter‟ with desire, rather than a communication of it: 
the mnemic image does not „stand for‟ desire, but desire irrupts through its 
transgression. The dream can be thought of as a surface, over which desire moves 
through distorting mnemic images. It is a conception of the mutual interaction of 
energetics and representation that is characteristic of Derrida‟s „psychical writing‟ as 
much as Lyotard‟s libidinal economy of the tensorial sign. A conception heavily 
influenced by the psychoanalytic treatment of a theory of energetics, integral to the 
function of which is an original reading of memory, memory thought otherwise. 
We can begin to see, typified through this example of the dream, how we can use an 
energetic conception of memory, a conception of memory that is defined by its place in 
an energetic theory, as a model through which to develop an energetic approach to 
visual media. By holding representation in visual media to be of an equivalent status to 
ideational or mnemic representation, as we have determined it in psychoanalytic theory, 
in poststructuralist theory and in Lyotard‟s energetic approach to the dream above, we 
can think the processes of representation in each medium differently: through their 
dialogic engagement with an energetics, rather than privileging a hermeneutic response. 
We have found this energetic approach often to be associated with a requirement for 
becoming „receptive‟ to affective processes through what is variously termed „free-
floating attention‟, „evenly-suspended attention‟, even, with some modification, the 
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„receptive unconscious‟. For as much as these processes are in motion, so they move us. 
We must seek to resist the temptation to „analyse‟, but instead become passive, become 
sensitive to the displacements, ebbs and flows of affect. This involves allowing 
affective force to permeate our unconscious, so that it can develop into, become 
conscious as, the „inspired idea‟. This sounds too abstract, too „spiritual‟. Can this be 
avoided? We must attempt to deal in evidence. And so I shall try. 
I shall endeavour, firstly, to do this through drawing upon a particular attempt to 
practically implement an energetic approach to painting. The source that we shall be 
looking at is the work of Anton Ehrenzweig, such a major influence upon the ideas of 
Lyotard and yet relatively forgotten in recent years.  
2.iii.ii Anton Ehrenzweig: „Unconscious Scanning‟ and the Potential Problems of an 
Energetic Approach 
In his 1967 work The Hidden Order of Art, Anton Ehrenzweig makes a clear distinction 
between two different kinds of possible response to art: „conscious intellect‟ and 
„unconscious intuition‟.151 In a strategy which closely resembles the requirements that 
we have found being demanded in order to address an energetic approach, Ehrenzweig 
claims that: 
What, of course, is needed is an undifferentiated attention akin to syncretistic 
vision which does not focus on detail, but holds the total structure of the work of 
art in a single undifferentiated view.
152
 
This „undifferentiated attention‟ will clearly remind us of the practices called for in 
psychoanalysis by Green, Bollas and the Botellas, and this is no accident. Ehrenzweig is 
certainly drawing upon psychoanalytic practices for his model.
153
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Similarly, he calls for „passivity‟154 and an „absence of mind‟,155 which enable the 
process that he terms „unconscious scanning‟. We should be familiar, from our previous 
explorations in energetic theory, with the kind of sensibility that is being referred to by 
Ehrenzweig, but it is in the way that he presents its practical realisation in relation to a 
visual medium that we find our primary interest. He is emphatic in citing the necessity 
for unconscious scanning to be held in relation with conscious intellect. As he states: 
The integration of art‟s substructure is only observed through its conscious 
signal: pictorial space. In this way we are forced to observe the unconscious 
structure of art with the gestalt techniques of the (conscious or preconscious) 
secondary processes which will automatically infuse a more solid and compact 
structure into it.
156
 
Whilst we would take issue with Ehrenzweig‟s assertion of a „substructure‟ in art, and 
his apparent assumption that the „unconscious‟ „hidden order‟ is obscured by, hidden 
beneath the consciously perceptible image, it is the case that we can only become aware 
of affective force through the representative, the consciously apprehensible.  
In art, the point which allows us access, as Ehrenzweig tells us, is „pictorial space‟. In 
responding to pictorial space, the spectator must perform an alternation, a „swing[ing] 
between two poles... now focusing on single gestalt patterns, now blotting out all 
conscious awareness in order to take in the undivided whole.‟157 A „syncretistic‟ vision: 
seeing the work as a totality, embracing it in its entirety in a single moment. How? 
Ehrenzweig means this literally, as he tells us in relation to „counterchange ornaments‟ 
or „Rubin‟s double profiles‟: „it must be assumed that the artist can unconsciously 
comprehend both alternative views in a single glance.‟158 „Unconsciously comprehend‟: 
this oxymoronic phrase not only strikes an awkward note, but also, I would surmise, 
exemplifies the point of difficulty within this model. A recognition that we shall return 
to momentarily. 
But we stay for now with Ehrenzweig‟s theory. „An undivided whole‟ – the pictorial 
space is comprised, first and foremost, of relations: 
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Pictorial space serves as a signal of the countless form relationships by which 
every single element of the work is tied to every other element in the 
structure.
159
 
These relations are of such variety and complexity that, whilst they can be perceived 
consciously, they can only be experienced as a network, in its entirety, through 
unconscious scanning. Relations are linked to form patterns (cf. Bollas), patterns which 
are constantly in flux, in motion: 
Our vision is... directed to highly mobile and unstable patterns of pictorial space 
and its fluttering pulse... A mighty pulse skims through the entire picture plane, 
now lifting this or the other area to form a fleeting and swiftly crumbling 
pattern.
160
 
We can see the alternation here. A „fluttering pulse‟, a „mighty pulse‟: the waxing and 
waning of force, the difference it creates: the intensity of force is felt differently. It is 
„mighty‟, overpowering the pictorial space, blindingly incandescent. It is „fluttering‟, 
shifting, slipping. Ungraspable, without the most determined receptivity, the most 
intricate scrutiny of its distortions, of its affective impressions upon the spectator. Its 
patterns are in motion: perceived, felt, and then we are „moved‟ to and by another „area‟. 
We see the pattern, we see the distortion; we feel the affective force marked by 
representational difference; we are moved by its flow. 
There is a first danger in this approach, of falling too far into one response or another. 
The balance must be kept between a conscious and „unconscious‟ response, all aspects 
of this process must be in co-ordination and conjunction. They are indivisible. 
Ehrenzweig details the risk of consciously „fragmenting‟ the pictorial space, of, 
somewhat artificially, seeing it as a surface of distortion, but not allowing oneself to be 
receptive to the force that is simultaneous with it, that innervates it. He describes artistic 
practices that exist in this condition as „schizophrenic art [which] only offers the surface 
experience of fragmentation and death without being redeemed by low-level 
coherence.‟161 Patterns do not emerge; there is no movement in this art. As each element 
is in isolation, there is no network. And this is a danger also for criticism, a danger 
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which Ehrenzweig compares with the problems that analysis may face with a 
schizophrenic patient: 
Highly articulate interpretations that appeal only to the rational surface level of 
thinking may only invite more violent fragmentation.
162
 
Interpretations which are either too complete, or too premature, risk closing the work, 
risk reducing it to a dead surface, to desertification. Conversely, Ehrenzweig states very 
simply the risk of over-undifferentiation, of losing contact with the network of 
discourse, a phenomenon that we have seen in relation to, for example, negative 
hallucination: „Death is undifferentiation.‟163 It marks the end of any kind of response, 
denies the possibility of a pattern emerging and results in a pure homogenization for the 
spectator. 
Finally, with this understanding, we can turn to look at perhaps the most complete 
concrete example that Ehrenzweig provides of the response that he is advocating. We 
find this being given in the rather unassuming form of the London Underground Map: 
If we choose to look at it as a good design, the lines of the diagram will 
suddenly detach themselves from the surface and rhythmically intertwine and 
embrace each other. This change indicates that we no longer react with our 
reason alone, and have mobilized deeper levels of sensitivity.
164
 
But whilst Ehrenzweig provides us with examples of an energetic approach as a practice 
of vision, a way of seeing an image, he does not give any instances of it working as a 
mode of criticism or „interpretation‟ („response‟ remains the more accurate term) in 
relation to the image. 
There is a clear reason for this, and it is a reason that poses a problem, that, as we shall 
find, constitutes another danger, and that constantly threatens any attempt to develop an 
energetic approach. Whilst there is much in Ehrenzweig‟s theory that our conception of 
energetics is in agreement with, and his explanations offer useful elucidation concerning 
some of the processes with which our energetic approach seeks to engage, he also 
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illustrates well a risk that we must attempt to avoid. His theory of a mode for viewing 
art results in an entirely subjective response. The „patterns‟ that emerge are for the 
spectator, and only for the spectator in their idiosyncrasy. Subjective response is 
inevitably an aspect of any energetic approach, but to fall into this position exclusively 
has the consequence of refuting any possibility of a critical practice, any debate or 
dialogue over a work, any frame of reference through which it can be discussed. 
Ehrenzweig‟s notion of „undifferentiation‟ may pose the threat of „death‟, of 
homogenization, for the spectator, disallowing „unconscious scanning‟. However, the 
practices of „unconscious comprehension‟ and „unconscious scanning‟, themselves, 
pose a correspondent threat to the development of a non-hermeneutic methodology that 
engages with the energetic aspects of representation. 
This is not a problem that we are necessarily attempting to solve. Rather, it is a 
challenge which we seek to address through our dialogic studies of energetics in theatre 
and cinema, respectively. As will emerge in greater detail during the course of the 
medium-specific arguments over the following chapters, we attempt to avoid the 
necessity of a pure subjectivity. Instead we focus upon the processes through which an 
energetics can be seen to work in each medium, upon the ways that each medium is 
structured towards particular modes of engagement with the spectator, and how aspects 
of each medium resist hermeneutic interpretation, becoming „thinkable‟ through their 
affinity with energetic concepts and models. We focus upon structures and intrinsic 
features that are distinctive to the particular medium, over readings of specific works. 
One of the aims in this is to establish a framework through which the peculiarities, 
innovations and modifications that are established by individual works, interacting with 
the characteristics of their medium, may be thought. But for the present, we are 
concerned primarily with opening a debate, speculative as it inevitably is, regarding the 
nature of the tension between hermeneutic and energetic responses to the 
representational modes of specific forms of visual media, and the suitability of each 
approach. 
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Chapter 3: Theatre and an Energetic Approach, Part 1 
3.i The Ghosts, Memory, Plays 
The question of memory in the theatre is one that has attracted much recent attention. 
Several book-length studies having been published in the last ten years that take this 
problematic, and labyrinthine, subject as their point of departure, either for exploring 
specific forms of theatre or for attempting to define some of the constituent processes 
and features of theatre. 
In Memory-Theatre and Postmodern Drama, first published in 1999, Jeanette Malkin 
provides a key example of an approach that deals with the former: specific forms of 
theatre. She claims that there has been a significant shift in „the way we remember‟, 
identifying this shift with a certain „postmodernist‟ construction of memory. This 
change, she argues, is reflected in the ways that „postmodernist‟ theatre performs the 
workings of memory. Malkin argues that each of the „postmodern‟ plays and 
playwrights that she refers to exhibit this „postmodern‟ memory in divergent ways 
(although some are more divergent, further from her characterisation of „postmodern‟ 
memory, than others). In her analysis, „postmodernism is the form and worldview 
through which... memory is processed and inscribed into... drama/theatre.‟165 But what 
is this „change‟ in memory, and what does this kind of analysis entail? 
The group of playwrights that Malkin discusses (Samuel Beckett, Heiner Müller, Sam 
Shepard, Suzan-Lori Parks and Thomas Bernhard) are either said to express what has 
„happened‟ to memory in its postmodernist conception, or they explore how cultural 
trauma is remembered, memorialised (or not). Often they do both. For Malkin, citing 
Richard Terdiman, each „era‟ has its own memory. Both Malkin and Terdiman are 
working with a historicised idea of memory, presenting it as a concept that changes 
between self-defined historical periods. For example, Terdiman claims that the period 
from „1789 to 1920 or so‟166 can be termed a time of „memory crisis‟. Malkin‟s 
periodisation is slightly different. For her there is a „modernist‟ conception of memory, 
in which „we find paradigms of a basically unified (personal or collective) 
consciousness, employing coherent dramatic enunciations in order that a past be 
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illuminated and a present explained... through memory‟.167 This is a deeply problematic 
definition, which we shall be looking at a little more closely further on. 
By contrast, „postmodernist‟ memory is determined to be the „nonnarrative reproduction 
of conflated, disrupted, repetitive, and moreover collectively retained and articulated 
fragments.‟168 It is comprised of „disconnected stimuli: conflicting discourses, 
overlapping voices, hallucinatory fragments.‟169 Between these two definitions there is 
not a change in our conception of memory itself, but rather within the referential 
function of memory. The way that memory refers to the past, the way that the past is 
„accessed‟ (or now, as Malkin states, more often than not „intrudes‟) is different. 
Memory remains a „repository‟ of the past, but now a fragmented and nonlinear one. A 
„traumatised‟ one. Each play is examined in relation to this notion of memory: each 
situates itself differently, approaching memory in a unique way, but all share the same 
fundamental ethos. Malkin sets herself the task of elucidating how the group of 
playwrights that she engages with, characterised by their shared thematic interest in 
memory and their shared „postmodern aesthetic‟,170 reflect this „new way of 
remembering‟, and how they represent „the wounds and commands of history as 
inscribed within their particular national, ethnic, or personal milieu.‟171 These 
arguments serve to illuminate the plays with which Malkin is concerned in relation to a 
specific understanding of memory. But this is not our memory. 
We are closer, perhaps, to the other side of our preliminary disjunction, to thinking 
theatre itself, its constituent processes and features, through memory: 
[O]ne might argue that every play is a memory play.
172
 
This deceptively off-hand comment by Marvin Carlson, in his The Haunted Stage: The 
Theatre as Memory Machine (2001), seems, momentarily, a strikingly sweeping one. 
However, Carlson does frame this statement with the recognition that he is referring to a 
particular idea of „memory‟, and it is a quite specific one: „cultural memory‟. Carlson‟s 
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argument here has two aspects. Firstly, that all plays, theatre in general, provide „society 
with the most tangible records of its attempts to understand its own operations‟,173 as 
„repositories‟ for them. This view relates closely to Malkin‟s claims regarding the 
expression of a „postmodernist‟ conception of memory in a specific group of plays. The 
second aspect is that plays also integrate, are „haunted by‟, the repetition of past 
performances, of previous perceptions and familiar experiences. Theatre is a recycling 
machine par excellence. This second characteristic is named „ghosting‟ by Carlson: 
„unlike the reception operations of genre... ghosting presents the identical thing... in a 
somewhat different context.‟174 Both the figure of the „repository‟ and the process of 
„ghosting‟ construct an idea of memory as something to be „recalled‟, as something that 
will present itself, unadulterated, in another time, another place, another „context‟. 
Alice Rayner identifies precisely the significance of this line of thought in her recent, 
and highly insightful, book Ghosts: Death‟s Double and the Phenomena of Theatre 
(2006): 
If the returning thing is identical to what was encountered before, it... is rather 
part of an identifiable historical memory that is fully available to 
consciousness.
175
 
This factor of „identifiability‟, this definition of memory as being accessible and 
localisable as part of a personal or historical narrative, again, this is not our memory. 
Rayner certainly finds such a conception troubling in relation to the idea of the „ghost‟ 
or „haunting‟. As she argues, if what returns is „identical‟ to its previous incarnation, it 
loses any possibility of being an „uncanny‟ return. Rather, „making full use of the terms 
ghost and haunting involves, it seems to me, their remaining in the realm of 
uncertainty.‟176 This disagreement over the nature of the „ghost‟ is, at heart, a 
disagreement over the function of memory. The ghost for both Carlson and Rayner, I 
would suggest, is the manifestation of the action of memory in theatre, and a figure that 
marks, that institutes, very different ways of thinking theatre itself. For Rayner, the 
quality of spectral „uncertainty‟ is illustrative of the theatrical medium. For her: 
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Theatre is the specific site where appearance and disappearance reproduce the 
relations between the living and the dead, not as a form of representation, but as 
a form of consciousness that has moved beyond dualities and problems of 
representation without disregarding them [my italics].
177
 
Carlson, however, through the process of „ghosting‟ makes theatre indelibly 
representational and referential. The repeated image, gesture or motif refers the 
spectator to a past and previous source, to a different scene, to somewhere else. It is this 
„past‟, ancestors at various removes, that haunts the play, every play. And I, like 
Rayner, as indicated by her above qualification „without disregarding them‟, would not 
wish to argue that this process does not occur. It certainly does. Even though precisely 
where we are being referred to is perhaps another matter. However, to think that this 
backwards-looking, referential process is the limit and extent of the mnemic model or, 
indeed, the „there-gone‟, re-/dis-membered figure of the ghost, in relation to theatrical 
representation would be to close the discussion before it has really begun, and thus not 
„make full use‟ of our terms or subjects. „We understand it otherwise‟: Lyotard‟s 
declaration echoes throughout. 
But, if we think that there is another dimension to memory in theatre, as theatre, as a 
way of „thinking‟ and „seeing‟ theatre, what is this other memory that is at play? 
Let us work this through. Initially, let us think what is unaccounted for by this 
retrospective, referential concept of memory, by exploring those aspects of theatricality 
that complicate, discomfit and render such a concept insufficient. Or, perhaps we could 
say more appropriately, incomplete. 
3.i.i „Funesian‟ Memory 
The first thing to note, however, is that my constant need to refer to „this particular 
concept of memory‟ imposes such awkward phrasing upon my prose. A more concise 
appellation would certainly allow a greater clarity in terms of both syntax and argument. 
I suggest the term „Funesian‟ to describe the type of memory that, for example, we see 
Carlson drawing upon in relation to theatre, particularly through his concept of 
ghosting. It is a type of memory that is broadly analogous to the „construction of 
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memory‟ that Richard Terdiman defines as „the absolute reproduction of unchanging 
contents‟178 or „the literalist memory model‟.179 The term „Funesian‟ is derived from a 
short story, „Funes the Memorious‟,180 by Jorge Luis Borges. In this a young man 
obsessed with precision, named Ireneo Funes, comes to possess, as the result of an 
accident, a perfectly „infallible‟ memory: 
He knew by heart the forms of the southern clouds at dawn on 30 April 1882... 
Two or three times he had reconstructed a whole day; he never hesitated, but 
each reconstruction had required a whole day.
181
 
As we can see, Funes is clearly an extreme example, and there is no shortage of wit in 
Borges‟s ad absurdum description of his condition. Thus, of course, I am not implying 
that Carlson‟s theory of „ghosting‟ assumes or requires such a radical malformation. 
However, both presentations do make equivalent claims concerning how memory 
functions; their difference is simply a question of degree. If we are thinking of memory 
as a form of archive, a store of experiences to be recalled when required (and do all of 
us not usually consider it thus and, indeed, rely upon it throughout our daily lives?) 
then, in many ways, Funes represents an ideal. Who has not wished at some point for a 
more reliable, „better‟ memory? But Borges is far from representing Funes‟s 
circumstance as an enviable one. As a result of his flawless powers of recall, Funes „was 
not very capable of thought. To think is to forget differences, generalize, make 
abstractions. In the teeming world of Funes, there were only details‟.182 The ability to 
think abstract thoughts, to think creatively, in fact, to think well („capably‟) is denied to 
Funes. And Borges relates this side-effect to Funes‟s incapacity to dream, or at least to 
do so in any recognisable way, as Funes states: 
 „My dreams are like you people‟s waking hours.‟183 
Funes‟s dreams are not marked by distortion, they are acts of recollection and nothing 
more. What is lost in Funes‟s dreams and, indeed, his psychical functioning, is the play 
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of unconscious forces, of desire, of repression: they are not dreams as we would know 
them, but are essentially exact reproductions of Funes‟s days. There is no possibility of 
association (which, it could be said, is essentially a „forgetting of differences‟). Funes‟s 
memory sacrifices the affective, the energetic, in favour of precise, automatous 
reproduction. My use of the term „Funesian‟, therefore, denotes a conception of memory 
that privileges this latter position or tendency. 
3.i.ii Death: A Complication 
„Memory‟ and „the ghost‟ are entwined, and particularly so in theatre. They dance in 
connection, sometimes together, sometimes apart, but always held in tension one to the 
other. And this is truly a danse macabre, as the stage upon which they dance is a site for 
trafficking with death. A little melodramatic. Perhaps. But theatre has been posited in 
relation to death throughout its history, and this relation is embedded within theatre‟s 
founding narratives. As Roland Barthes notes: 
We know the original relation of the theatre and the cult of the Dead: the first 
actors separated themselves from the community by playing the role of the 
Dead: to make oneself up was to designate oneself as a body simultaneously 
living and dead [my italics].
184
  
To partake of theatre is an act of „separation‟: it is to become imbued with a certain 
impression of death that marks one as being not quite part of the world of the living, but 
between two worlds. We could say a state of „un-death‟; we could say a status akin to 
the ghost. And, indeed, in his typically rigorous work Theatricality as Medium, Samuel 
Weber echoes Barthes by discussing theatricality in precisely these terms: „life and 
death can no longer simply be opposed to one another as mutually exclusive. In the 
spectral space of theatricality, the two are revealed to be inseparable‟.185 
Funesian memory does not, it seems to me, fit easily as a model through which to 
approach such accounts of theatre. And this is represented most efficaciously by two 
distinct (but complementary) characteristics of theatricality, each a defining constituent 
in determining theatrical „ghostliness‟; phenomena that are situated between life and 
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death. The names I give to these are: ontological coincidence and elision, each of which 
is explored individually below. Ontological coincidence is discussed, initially, in terms 
of its challenge to Funesian memory, which is then followed by an enquiry into its 
dialogic place within an energetic approach. This forms the remainder of this chapter. 
Elision is dealt with in the following chapter (Chapter 3, Part 2), and entails a similar 
structure, also culminating in a speculative analysis of how elision can be seen to 
engage with an energetics of theatricality, as opposed to a Funesian mnemic model. 
3.ii Ontological Coincidence: what is a dog, and yet not a dog? 
Much of Bert O. States‟s now classic book, Great Reckonings in Little Rooms, is 
concerned with a uniquely theatrical condition: the absolute coincidence between 
representation and the thing which it represents. As he succinctly explains: 
A dog on stage is certainly an object...but the act of theatricalising it...neutralizes 
its objectivity and claims it as a likeness of a dog... [I]n the theatre there is no 
ontological difference between the image and the object.
186
 
The object is both „a dog‟ and a „likeness of a dog‟, object and „image‟. What seems of 
most interest to me here is the question of what happens to the object? 
If we consider the object that most preoccupies thinking about theatre, the human-as-
actor,
187
 we find this issue being described in similar terms by both States and Rayner. 
States observes, for example, that: „No matter how he acts, there is always the ghost of a 
self in his performance [my italics]‟.188 And this identification, regarding the position of 
the figure of the ghost, is paralleled by Rayner when she says: „To inhabit a character 
fully is to become a ghost who wears a human, living mask.‟189 Yet, we should note that 
States and Rayner diverge over their specific referents when using the term „ghost‟. For 
States the „ghost‟ is the „objectivity‟, in the sense of being an object: the term is 
ambiguous, but States‟s use of it is unavoidable, of the human-as-actor. It is the self of 
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the actor which has become ghostly in the performance, which haunts his/her 
performance of the character. Rayner, on the other hand, identifies the „ghost‟ as „the 
phantom of character‟: the human-as-actor is made ghostly by becoming the character. 
Essentially, these two perspectives are different sides of the same duality. The key point 
is that the performing of a role, the act of becoming a theatrical „image‟ (although the 
more inclusive „representation‟, referring not only to the visual, would perhaps be more 
accurate), is to depart one world for another and to exist between them, is to „become a 
ghost‟. 
And, naturally, becoming a ghost involves a death. The death of a self, as Rayner states: 
The launch into performance involves the death of a particular sense of self, of 
the particularity of self: a giving away of self.
190
 
However, as is perhaps becoming a familiar motif with references from Rayner‟s work, 
one must pay close attention to her use of qualifications. The death here is „of a 
particular sense of self‟, „the particularity of self‟, not of the self entirely. Indeed, 
States is quite explicit in rejecting, as he says, Rousseau‟s concern that the actor 
„“annihilates himself” in the character.‟191 Rather, for States, the self is detectable as: 
[s]omething else in the characterization, a superconsciousness that could be 
nothing other than the actor‟s awareness of his own self-sufficiency as he moves 
between the contradictory zones of the illusory and the real.
192
 
This claim risks, I would suggest, going too far in the opposite direction. The term 
„superconsciousness‟ indicates, literally, an „above‟, „beside‟ or „beyond‟ 
consciousness. But the question then becomes, what is this consciousness that is 
„beneath‟, or that has been „left behind‟ by, the actor‟s self or „superconsciousness‟? 
States‟s answer is: the self of the actor that „consents to serve as the channel‟193 for 
theatrical representation. We see here that States attempts to counteract the notion of the 
actor‟s „disappearance‟ by theorising a kind of dual-ego for the actor. The actor is at 
once „someone who consents to be used‟,194 and also „unavoidably remains just outside 
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the character he is playing‟.195 The former constitutes „perhaps... the true source of the 
sacrificial depth of playing‟,196 yet this „sacrifice‟ is really no sacrifice at all. It is, to use 
States‟s term, a „displacement‟, in which the „remains‟ of the actor are deemed „self-
sufficient‟. For him there is a ghost, but no death; nothing is lost. Leaving aside the 
perhaps rather vexed questions of whether it is possible to demarcate and „self-contain‟ 
one‟s ego in such a way, and what „self-sufficiency‟ (i.e. not requiring „aid or support 
from outside; able to supply one's needs oneself‟197) would entail for the 
„superconsciousness‟ of the actor, this model seems both unnecessarily complex and 
counter-intuitive. That becoming a character involves a loss, a surrender, at least of 
some form, is both extensively posited
198
 and, unlike States‟s argument, complies with 
the principle of Ockham‟s razor („Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate‟199). 
But, let there be no doubt, States is quite correct, in my view, to resist the idea of the 
actor‟s disappearance or „annihilation in the character‟ („annihilation‟: from the Latin ad 
nihil, „to nothing‟, to no-thing). The human-as-actor is an object, a thing, and account 
must be taken of the actor‟s self in the theatrical image, which is always a composite, a 
compromise. Rayner indicates how we might do this in her reference to the 
„particularity of self‟. How might we interpret this phrase? The „particularity of self‟ is 
the self as individual, the specificity of the self, as an entity whole and of-itself. This 
particular sense of self is sacrificed. It becomes something else. A new sense of self. 
Call it a ghost. It is this condition of theatrical representation that dramatist Howard 
Barker describes in one of the highly poetic, and provocatively opaque, vignettes that 
comprise a significant proportion of his pithy yet wide-ranging study, Death, The One 
and the Art of Theatre: 
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I am consumed by a sense of intimacy with the world, the self disintegrated, a 
dissolution therefore, but also a belonging. The dead have known this, and some 
knew not only this but precisely this.
200
 
Whilst these apparent digressions may seem to bear little relation to theatre, Barker‟s 
constant refrain of „[a]ll I describe is theatre even where theatre is not the subject‟201 
encourages us to read them not simply as metaphors for theatre, but as illustrations of 
theatricality beyond theatre. In this dense quotation, Barker identifies theatricality with 
a „dissolution‟ of the self. Literally, a „separation into parts‟, a „destruction of the 
existing condition‟ and, to take its scientific connotation, in physics, „to diffuse the 
molecules of (a solid or gas) in a liquid so that they are indistinguishable from it‟.202 
Just so, the self „disintegrated‟, the self „consumed‟, is „diffused‟ with the character, to 
produce the theatrical „image‟. 
And herein lies its uniqueness. There is a death, yes, but let us not forget that there is 
also a „belonging‟: the self of the human-as-actor does not disappear, as States is fearful 
of, but is implicated in the image. More than this, however, „belonging‟ is a requisite 
feature of the ghostliness of the image. The ghost is a figure that both belongs and does 
not belong: it is this characteristic that defines its uncanny status. Unheimlich, „un-
homely‟, Freud‟s now prevalent term that is commonly translated as „uncanny‟: to be 
defined thus presupposes a link with the home, to disturb the homely requires that the 
disturbant be in some way of the home. The ghost un-settles specifically because, at 
least on some level, it belongs here. It always has. The ghost has a certain legitimacy, a 
claim on the place that it haunts, as Weber notes: 
A ghost, in short, must take place... It is tied to a particular locale, and yet not to 
any single one.
203
 
The ghost is „tied‟, bound, to a „locale‟, but not „any single one‟. What do we make of 
this? 
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„Locale‟ is a relatively uncommon term, and chosen very judiciously. It refers 
specifically to „a place considered with reference to some particular event or 
circumstances connected with it‟:204 the locale is defined in relation to a „particular 
event‟. Closely informing how we are to understand this concept is the preceding 
phrase, which Weber returns to throughout Theatricality as Medium, „taking place‟. As 
he says: 
They [theatrical „events‟ or „happenings‟] take place, which means in a 
particular place, and yet simultaneously also pass away.
205
 
The „locale‟ is the ideal figure, the ideal term, for referring to the site of such „taking 
place‟. It indicates both the need for a specific, physical placing of theatrical 
representation, and also its status as an „event‟, a „passing away‟. We can see, therefore, 
that the corollary „not to any single one‟, in the former quotation, is already implicit 
within the sense of „locale‟. It fundamentally serves to elicit, to disinter, the tension that 
this word encapsulates in its theatrical context. A theatrical conception of „locale‟ 
already suggests that, whilst the ghost is bound to a certain material „place‟ (the 
objective), this place is never the same twice. This is concomitant with the notion that 
theatrical representation is an event which is ghostly at its inception, it is haunted from 
the beginning, is nothing before the ghost. So, whilst the ghost always „belongs‟ in this 
place, it is also always different from any previous instance, no matter how familiar, 
similar or referential it may be. Weber succinctly enunciates the position that this leaves 
us in, when he states that: 
Out of the dislocations of its repetitions emerges nothing more or less than the 
singularity of the theatrical event.
206
 
„Dis-locations‟: the „putting out of place‟ of the locale. The singularity of the event, of 
theatrical representation, is simultaneously and, paradoxically, co-dependent (we could 
say, to use a neologism, „intercausative‟) with the originality of place. From this we can 
come to the conclusion that ontological coincidence in the theatrical act is originary. It 
is never identical to itself. And this condition of theatrical representation is problematic 
for Funesian memory. 
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3.iii Always a First Time: Ontological Coincidence and Funesian Memory 
Funesian memory, as has been described above, is based upon a theory of „recall‟: it 
supposes that the primary function of memory is to return to mind a detailed impression 
of something perceived or experienced in the past (distorted to a greater or lesser 
degree, in practice). This assumes that there exists an authentic, recoverable version of 
the past, one that is more or less accurate and, theoretically at least, verifiable. A source, 
if you will, an origin. One of the key contributions in developing this concept of 
memory is Aristotle‟s treatise De Memoria et Reminiscentia (or, On Memory and 
Reminding Oneself). In this work he proposes a model of memory that is very explicitly 
founded upon a causal relationship between an incorruptible „perception or conception‟, 
which is the original, and an „affection‟, „picture‟ or „copy‟ (the latter two of which are 
various translations for Aristotle‟s term „eikôn‟) that is consequently derived from it: 
Memory is not perception or conception, but a state or affection connected with 
one of these, when time has elapsed... [P]erception is of the present, prediction 
of the future, and memory of the past. And this is why all memory involves 
time.
207
 
Memory is conceived of as a kind of „copy‟, a version of the thing itself, between which 
a period of time must have elapsed. Richard Sorabji articulates this relation with great 
clarity in a passage that is worth quoting in detail: 
Aristotle‟s theory of remembering requires not any kind of image, but an image 
that is a likeness or copy of the thing remembered... The image is causally 
derived from a past act of perceiving and from the corresponding object of 
perception.
208
 
If we think of this in theatrical terms, we can see how this model complements 
Carlson‟s theory of „ghosting‟ well. Carlson similarly posits the existence of a prior and 
causally linked past „act‟ (to take advantage of an equivocation) to which the present 
theatrical „image‟ refers, of which it is a „likeness‟ or a „copy‟ („the identical thing... in a 
somewhat different context‟). However, ontological coincidence complicates this idea 
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by demonstrating that the theatrical image is unique, „singular‟ and originary to itself. 
To reiterate, this does not preclude a certain notion of „ghosting‟, which can certainly be 
maintained and provide useful insights when analysing plays, but it does suggest that 
this supposition (particularly when asserting identity between past and present 
incarnations) cannot appropriately account for the specificity of theatrical 
representation. Perhaps we can elucidate this argument further by turning to an example, 
in the form of a short digression, albeit a slightly circuitous one, the relevance of which, 
to a discussion on theatricality, may not be immediately apparent. However, it will 
allow us to consider a practice of theatricality that makes use of an extreme 
phenomenon, which has a bearing upon our current discussion, named the Immediacy 
of Experience Principle. 
I spent some time over the winter of last year reading a book by American linguist 
Daniel Everett entitled Don‟t Sleep, There Are Snakes, a past-time I would very much 
recommend. Whilst slightly outside my usual remit, I became quite engrossed in both 
his fascinating experiences from 30 years of field work with the Pirahã tribe in the 
Amazonian jungle, and his rather radical claims regarding their language. The key 
linguistic and sociological claim that Everett makes is that Pirahã culture is governed by 
a demand, or „taboo‟, called the Immediacy of Experience Principle (IEP). The IEP 
states that only that which has been directly experienced or witnessed is of value or, 
even, to be believed: 
The Pirahãs highly value direct experience and observation. The Pirahãs not 
only would agree that “seeing is believing”, but that “believing is seeing”. If you 
want to tell the Pirahãs something, they are going to want to know how you 
came by your knowledge. And especially they will want to know if you have 
direct evidence for your assertion.
209
 
This connects with Everett‟s observations that the Pirahãs „don‟t store food, they don‟t 
plan more than one day at a time, they don‟t talk about the distant future or the distant 
past – they seem to focus on now, on their immediate experience.‟210 This demand is so 
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strong that it is even present in Pirahã linguistic structures, explaining not only their 
lack of „recursion‟, but also their lack of perfect tenses (all statements are defined 
relative to the moment of speech). Such a conclusion suggests that the cultural mores of 
the Pirahã have a determining influence upon the formation of their language, in 
contravention of the phylogenetic principle governing Noam Chomsky‟s theory of 
Universal Grammar. This may, hopefully, all be very interesting, but where does it lead 
us in relation to memory and theatre?  
Everett includes a brief, but very revealing, section on the Pirahã use of ritual. Needless 
to say it similarly complies with the IEP: 
The relative lack of ritual among the Pirahãs is predicted by the immediacy of 
experience principle... a ritual where the principal characters could not claim to 
have seen what he or she was enacting would be prohibited.
211
 
The Pirahãs get around this prohibition in relation to the „enactment‟ of one of their 
spirits, for example in a loosely ritualistic dance described by Everett, in a particularly 
theatrical way: „the man playing the role of the spirit claims to have encountered that 
spirit and claims to be possessed by that spirit.‟212 Indeed, for Everett the most direct 
way to think of this ritual, and the frequent „encounters‟ with spirits that the Pirahã have 
in their daily lives, is as „a form of Pirahã theater‟.213 For this performance to be 
acceptable, the events portrayed, the encounter with the spirit (in this case, Xaítoii), 
must be taken to have happened directly to the person „acting‟ the role. The spectators 
must believe that he is not, in fact, acting at all. They must believe (for „seeing is 
believing‟ and „believing is seeing‟) that what they are seeing is not a representation of 
the spirit Xaítoii, but that it is the spirit Xaítoii, right there before them in the immediate 
present.
214
 This ritual becomes an extreme example of ontological coincidence: there is 
literally no distinction between the „actor‟ and the „role acted‟, even to the point that the 
tribesman „being‟ the spirit will, upon later questioning, deny all knowledge of having 
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been present at all.
215
 He is the theatrical image.  And this case in point has clear 
implications for Funesian memory as both the concept of „ghosting‟ and in terms of its 
philosophical precedents, exemplified by Aristotle‟s theory, when related to theatre. As 
Everett notes, a consequence of the IEP is that:  
The Pirahãs avoid formulaic encodings of values and instead transmit values and 
information via actions and words that are original in composition with the 
person acting or speaking, that have been witnessed by this person, or that have 
been told to this person by a witness [my italics].
216
 
„Ghosting‟, which identifies the transmission of a previous incarnation of a theatrical 
image within a present incarnation that implicitly or explicitly copies and refers to it, as 
we can see, is complicated under the IEP. These performances, firstly, are clearly 
original, not only in terms of the object, the body of the „actor‟, but also as the „actions 
and words‟ used will be different every time (i.e. he „tells them about where he lives in 
the jungle, and what he has been doing that day‟:217 there are no specifics to be 
repeated). Secondly, whilst very general aspects of each performance may be shared 
(such as the name of the spirit, his bravado, or the fact that he throws snakes towards the 
audience), the IEP would prohibit any understanding of it as a copy or derivative of 
another performance. Each performance of the Xaítoii dance rests upon the belief that it 
is, or has been, „immediately experienced‟.218 General similarities are to be explained by 
the belief that „this is just how Xaítoii is‟, rather than that this performance is referring 
to a prior one. That the only other comparison Everett makes with Pirahã spirit 
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encounters, in addition to theatre, is to say that „these... encounters with spirits – [are] 
similar to Western culture‟s seances [sic] and mediums‟,219 should be of little surprise to 
us. Ontological coincidence is the conjoining of the living and the dead in one entity, 
which makes of the spectator a witness to an event that is happening in the here and 
now. In addition to this, the IEP further demands that the performance not be 
understood (by any participants) to make reference to, or copy in any way, a past event. 
To do so would be hearsay, would be to warrant disbelief. Thus, the conclusion to be 
drawn is that in theatre generally ontological coincidence opposes the identical quality 
of ghosting (or, indeed, the Aristotelian mnemic model of copy-source) but, with the 
Pirahã, the IEP disallows the possibility of ghosting at all. 
A slight aside. The Pirahã have one final facet that perhaps raises more 
questions than it answers, but is certainly of interest to our current discussion. 
We have said that Funes, as an extreme example of a certain kind of memory, 
had great difficulty working with abstract concepts, due to his over-precise 
memory function. This difficulty, Borges tells us, extended to his use of 
numbers, the implication being that numbering systems are imprecise due to 
their reliance upon numerical groupings (or place values), such as „tens‟, 
„hundreds‟, etc. Funes‟s memory allows him to attribute a specific sign to each 
individual number. The Pirahã are a culture that operates near the opposite 
extreme of this. A 2008 article, jointly authored by M.C. Frank, Everett, et al, 
notes that „Everett has suggested, however, that there are no numerals in the 
language whatsoever and that these words instead indicate “small size or 
amount”‟.220 He clarifies this in his 2008 book by positing that „number entails a 
violation of immediacy of experience in many of its uses‟.221 The Pirahã‟s IEP, 
with its emphasis upon direct experience and the present, counteracts the use of 
a numbering system which „generalizes beyond the immediate‟.222 The result of 
this is that the Pirahã have very poor memories for exact quantities: „the case of 
Pirahã suggests that languages that can express large, exact cardinalities... allow 
                                                             
219
 Everett, p.141. 
220
 Michael C Frank; Daniel Everett; Evelina Fedorenko; Edward Gibson, „Number as a Cognitive 
Technology: Evidence from Pirahã Language and Cognition‟, Cognition, 108 (2008), p.820 
<http://www.stanford.edu/~mcfrank/papers/FEFG-cognition.pdf> [accessed 21 February 2009]. 
221
 Everett, p.196. 
222
 Everett, p.196. 
66 
 
the speakers to remember and compare information about cardinalities 
accurately across space, time, and changes in modality.‟223 Thus, one of the 
conclusions that the Frank, Everett, et al, paper reaches is that: 
Number words [are] a cognitive technology, a tool for creating mental 
representations of the exact cardinalities of sets, representations that can 
be remembered and communicated accurately.
224
 
Numbers are literally an aide-mémoire, a technology that assists the memory to 
be precise and work with exact quantities, no matter how large. It is striking, 
therefore, that both the Pirahã, on the one hand, with poor memories for exact 
quantities due to their concern with existence in the present, and Funes, on the 
other, with a perfect memory for exact quantities due to his infallible access to 
the past, are unable to comprehend the use of cardinal numbers. In both cases, 
numerical systems are too abstract, and do not relate to their experiences of the 
world. 
We can see through the relatively extreme example of the Pirahã one of the ways in 
which ontological coincidence challenges Funesian memory (specifically through its 
originality). However, this is not the only way. 
3.iii.i The Intimacy of Ontological Coincidence 
In this talk of ontological coincidence, something crucial has been left behind. We can 
find it alluded to in the passage from Barker, a description of ontological coincidence 
(for such indeed is what it is) that we cited some time ago. One sentiment in particular 
we should recall: 
I am consumed by a sense of intimacy with the world.
225
 
„Intimacy‟ is a term that recurs often within discussions of theatre, and no more so than 
in the self-definitions of playhouses and theatrical institutions. We need only think of, 
most famously, August Strindberg‟s „Intima Teatern‟ in Stockholm, or the profusion of 
epithetical and eponymic uses this word is put to by theatres of all kind (from publicity 
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material for the Globe, to the „Intimate Theatre‟ of John Clements in London, or of 
Christopher Weare in Cape Town). Evidently, intimacy is, then, a virtue. How is this to 
be thought? 
Intimacy is derived from a sense of „closeness‟, of „familiarity‟, specifically with 
another person. But it is more than this. Intimacy is predicated upon physicality, upon 
the tactility of the means by which theatre represents, upon an engagement with (and, 
indeed, through) the body. We have spoken of a „sacrifice‟, a sacrifice of one „sense of 
the self‟. There is also a sacrifice in which the body partakes (this is, clearly, an 
artificial distinction for the purposes of our argument: they are of the same movement). 
This is broached by States when he refers to „our creatural bond with the actor, who 
stands before us in a vulnerable place‟.226 Intimacy does not arise only due to the simple 
co-presence of a person, like us, that is there to be touched (potentially), that is spatially 
contiguous with us. In addition to this, it is also due to the position, the status, of that 
fellow human being. „A vulnerable place‟. Ontological coincidence is tenuous. Always 
on the edge, its oscillation between reality and illusion, object and image, spins 
imperceptibly, unless tipped into a fall: decided by interruption, by denudement, by the 
„shattering‟ of the image, in so many possible ways. And this is a risk that the actor 
exposes him/herself to. This is the vulnerability of his/her position. A body, essentially 
prone on a stage of wood or concrete, which wounds itself in the very act of consenting 
to become ontologically coincident, which accepts this exposure as the price of life for 
the theatrical image. 
Whether it is coincidence or design is quite irrelevant, but the ideal illustration for this 
act is provided by Strindberg in The Pelican (Pelikanen, 1907), one of the chamber 
plays that he wrote for his new Intimate Theatre. At the end of this play Frederik (the 
Son), poignantly referring to his father, realises that „it must have been him who was the 
pelican, because he plucked his feathers and gave them to us.‟227 The allusion that this 
reference makes is to the reputed behaviour of the pelican in nature, which will, 
supposedly, wound itself by pecking at its own breast to feed its young. This is a 
common representation in heraldry, and is termed „vulning‟ (from the Latin vulnus: a 
wound). This use of the word „vuln‟ is the only use still current (and has been for 
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around 400 years). However, it is also the root of the more common word „vulnerable‟. 
„Vulnerability‟ is thus the acceptance of a wound to oneself, weakening oneself, 
sacrificing one‟s own well-being, in favour of another. Intimacy in the theatre is a 
condition of vulnerability: the „creatural bond‟ is accentuated by empathy for the 
sacrifice being undertaken here, before us, by a being that is just like ourselves. Whilst 
not a connection seemingly made by Strindberg, his image of the vulning pelican could 
be said to be a model for the intimacy that his newly designed theatre was striving for. 
In all of this the body is the constant reminder, the incarnation or the memento mori (we 
could say), of vulnerability. It is the site of vulnerability, and this produces an unsettling 
tension between a certain empathy that comes from the „creatural bond‟ and, as States 
terms it, „the pleasure of this intimacy [that] consists in the invitation to the audience to 
share a world of spirit and feeling [my italics]‟.228 This „pleasure‟, as I would frame it, is 
a desire for theatrical representation to continue, to evoke deeper responses, for the 
sense of intimacy to become stronger. Theatricality is structured to take advantage of 
this, to harness the quality of sadism that is implicit in this relationship. And this tension 
is one that Barker has described evocatively through another of his short, allegorical 
passages: 
When the light came on, he saw her face was disfigured. This had the effect of 
extinguishing his desire. He found an excuse to avoid the consequences of what 
he himself had initiated. His actions were, however, dictated by consideration of 
a purely public kind. It was not in his sexuality that he experienced offence. On 
the contrary, he sensed his erotic instinct was enhanced by her disfigurement 
(„what or who had so damaged her? How had she inspired such 
mistreatment?‟). Once he was able to acknowledge this he accepted the 
challenge of her condition. He nevertheless stipulated that she wore tighter 
clothes. All I describe is theatre...
229
 
This is a decidedly disconcerting passage, I think it will be agreed. It is also one that 
invites a wide variety of digressions, and could be debated at great length. However, I 
must keep to the task at hand. The disfigurement of the body is a mark of its 
vulnerability. It is evidence that the anonymous „she‟ has been „damaged‟, „mistreated‟ 
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(no accident this injury, this wound: she herself was to blame for it, had „inspired‟ it) 
and, clearly, the power relation here presupposes that she is vulnerable to such 
mistreatment again. Simultaneously, his desire is „extinguished‟ by this vulnerability 
and his „erotic instinct‟ is „enhanced‟ by it. Such ambivalence is characteristic of the 
organisation of intimacy that constitutes theatricality. And we can see the competing 
attitudes that determine the contradictory forces at work within „his‟ desire. The element 
of empathy that we have associated with intimacy, with the creatural bond, precludes 
desire for the vulnerability of the body of the other. This is how I understand the 
meaning of the phrase „of a purely public kind‟. It is that element of intimacy that is 
acceptable publicly. It is an acceptable admission to empathise, to pity the sacrifice 
being made. „His‟ initial reaction is this empathic one. However, „intimacy‟ also, we 
must not forget, carries with it a clear sexual connotation of „being intimate‟ with 
another. The desire for this intimacy, the eroticism inherent to intimacy, is increased by 
the vulnerability, should we say the „suffering‟, for there is certainly a sense of this, of 
the other. And this desire, this erotic investment of the vulnerable body is, ultimately, 
the stronger. Barker emphasises this through the final „acknowledgement‟, private 
„acceptance‟ and demand made by „him‟ that „she wore tighter clothes‟. This drawing 
attention to the vulnerable body, making a spectacle of it, is a necessity for theatrical 
representation. The desire to see must overcome the empathic pity for the fellow 
„creature‟ who is just holding on, walking with trepidation along the edge, in the place 
of vulnerability that is the stage. 
This conception of intimacy in the theatre, of the status of the body in ontological 
coincidence, has, as we might expect, an uneasy relationship with Funesian memory. To 
elucidate how, we turn to a short, yet exactingly intimate essay by dramaturge (amongst 
other things) Jan Kott, entitled „The Memory of the Body‟ (from his 1992 book of the 
same name). Once more, this is not directly „about‟ theatre. But it certainly addresses, as 
we have termed it before, the nature of theatricality beyond theatre. Kott frames his 
discussion by making an initial distinction, from which the rest of the paper is 
developed: 
70 
 
We all know that there are external and internal experiences, or, to put it another 
way, experiences that can be communicated and those that are memory or 
knowledge possessed by the body.
230
 
Kott here claims that there is a certain kind of experience that is of the body, that which 
the body bears as a kind of „memory‟, but that cannot be communicated through 
discourse. An experience that, indeed, cannot be represented to another without a sense 
of having „left something behind‟, without there always being an enigmatic remainder 
just outside understanding. What kind of experiences could have this elusive quality? 
Kott provides us with two examples. The first of these, connecting with our previous 
discussion, is the erotic knowledge of the body (containing an ambiguity I would not 
want to remove, between knowledge belonging to the body and knowledge about the 
body), a form of, as Kott names it, „internal knowledge‟. 
The eroticism of intimacy, which we have spoken of, is constituted through an 
engagement with the body of the other, a body that is always potentially outside the 
purview of discourse, which is capable of experiences that are strictly indescribable. 
Kott announces such an experience by asking a question that is truly unanswerable in 
any definitive sense: „What do we know about sex?‟231 His response to himself is 
divided between the „external‟ and the „internal‟: 
The experience of sex can be described [i.e. „as discourse‟], but it is not the same 
as the knowledge of the experience... An orgasm given by a body is inarticulate 
speech... Right now I am trying to change this into discourse, but I know that 
there is an entire dimension that is inexpressible.
232
 
Kott, by his own admission and in his own practice, finds himself at the limit of the 
communicative power of language, of discourse. The orgasm is an experience that 
cannot be fully contained within representation. It is an instance of „a peculiar memory 
without names or concepts‟,233 a memory that is situated in the body, is too much of the 
body and cannot be „understood‟ except through the body. Whilst Kott is certainly not 
original in discussing the orgasm (jouissance, could we not say?) in such a way, his 
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linking of this with the concept of a bodily memory that exceeds communication is, and 
this holds the most relevance for our present interests regarding the sense of 
vulnerability in ontological coincidence.  
The second example that Kott provides, if anything a more intimate one, is a further 
refinement of this notion of „internal knowledge‟. He relates how he has suffered from 
four heart attacks in his lifetime, with the fourth lasting a total of around thirteen hours, 
for which he was fully conscious throughout. Needless to say this has provided him 
with an uncommon perspective upon both the extremity of physical suffering that the 
body can experience, and also upon the nature of being in such close proximity to death. 
This is an experience that cannot be included in discourse because it is inseparable from 
the body: 
No escape into discourse or imago is possible in this case. This is in me. I cannot 
separate this from myself.
234
 
No word, no image: the experience of „somatic death‟ is terrifyingly personal, 
individual. It is not the death of anyone else or of ourselves observed from a distance 
(which is how we can normally envisage death, particularly when trying to think of our 
own). And an attack on the heart is an attack on the very core of our being, figuratively 
and physically. It figures what is precisely indivisible about the body. As Kott, 
capturing the contradictory discordance that is at work here, writes:  
The heart is both the signified and the signifier, the symbol and its referent. The 
pump and Eros are one and the same.
235
 
This statement identifies precisely the difficulty that the body of the actor, and the 
relationship of intimacy that is provoked by the circumstance of the body, entails for 
Funesian memory.  
There is an aspect, a „dimensionality‟ (to use Kott‟s term), of the body that refuses to 
enter into discourse: that can be replaced by no sign other than itself. It is demonstrated 
most efficaciously in those extreme bodily experiences that cannot be satisfactorily 
explained. Those that comprise a „memory‟ based upon sensation, upon a physical 
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„coding‟,236 upon an intuitive „knowing‟ that is necessarily indefinable and that will not 
be externalised.  This memory refers to the past only in the way that a scar, specifically 
a scar that cannot be seen, refers to the past. It is of the same order as, in Kott‟s words 
from his detailed and moving piece „The Heart Attack‟, „a wound to the heart [which] 
heals like all wounds, and, like all wounds, it leaves a scar. A trace remains until 
death.‟237 There is no „copy‟, no way to „re-present‟ the creatural bond: that which 
cannot be substituted or imitated, that is derived from a literally organic intimacy, „the 
pump and Eros‟, the base connection of gross corporeality. The vulnerable body, the 
sacrificial body, the organic, sexual, dying body that is just us, that instigates an 
unspoken bond, that is founded upon nothing more nor less than the „irrepresentability 
of the living present‟.238 This aspect has often been hidden in theatre through an excess 
of discourse: of „psychology‟, of dialogue, of characterisation. 
Does this sound familiar? Yes, of course. Artaud has been here, has wrought these 
concepts, these figures of theatre. He haunts them still, just as he has haunted theatre 
with an ideal of cruelty. Derrida‟s famous essay (pre-emptively quoted from a little 
before), „The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation‟, presents us with a 
portrait of Artaud‟s theories that incisively illustrates how they are expressly concerned 
with the originality, the unicity of the body, and the challenge that it intrinsically poses 
to theatrical representation. Specifically, that it poses to representation as repetition. As 
Derrida identifies, „foreign to the theatre of cruelty‟ is: 
a message that would not be totally exhausted in the act and present tense of the 
stage, that would not coincide with the stage, that could be repeated without it... 
Artaud wanted to erase repetition in general.
239
 
Repetition is definition: it is the act of separation at the advent of representation that 
„summarizes negativity, gathers and maintains the past present as truth, as ideality‟.240 It 
is the constitution of an original, a guarantee of past authenticity, which allows the 
possibility of the copy, or, to secure the allusion to Aristotle‟s theory of memory, the 
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„eikôn‟. Indeed, Derrida positions the Theatre of Cruelty in opposition to Aristotelian 
theories of imitation in the realm of aesthetics: „Artaud wants to have done with the 
imitative concept of art, with the Aristotelian aesthetics in which the metaphysics of 
Western art comes into its own.‟241 However, we can extend this to include Aristotle‟s 
theory of an imitative mnemonics also: the same dialectic is at work. As we are 
beginning to see, Artaud, and specifically the argument on the status of the body in 
theatre that he imbricates with, offers a challenge not only to Aristotelian aesthetics and 
theatrics, but also to Aristotelian memory (Funesian, as we say).  
Artaud‟s aim, as Derrida declares, is to „restore “existence” and “flesh” in each of their 
aspects‟242 through theatricality. Through theatricality? Indeed. As the irreducibility, the 
irrepresentability, of the body, “existence” and “flesh”, is at the core of theatricality (as 
we have discussed above). Except that it has been „violently erased‟: not „negated‟, but 
„covered‟ (still to be read), „corrupted‟, „perverted‟.243 The aim, then, is to promulgate a 
„true‟ theatricality, one that is founded upon, celebrates, the body‟s abrogation of 
discourse (or, to cite a particularly appropriate image, the „word cadaver‟244). This task 
is to rid theatre of repetition, to restore theatre to the status of life, not as an imitation of 
life. As Artaud asserts: 
We can no longer subscribe to theatre which repeats itself every night according 
to the same, ever the same, identical rites. The show we are watching must be 
unique and give us the impression of being as unexpected and as incapable of 
being repeated as any act in life, any occurrence whatsoever brought about by 
events.
245
 
„Living presence‟, life and the body (but this „and‟ is asked to do so much, it could 
easily be „of‟, „through‟, „needs‟, all of these and more: „and‟, at least, marks their 
inseparability and difference), it is these that Artaud uses to oppose repetition. 
Repetition, which is known by many titles. Just one, for now: „Another name of 
repetition: Being.‟246 Artaud makes this opposition explicit when he claims (quoted by 
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Derrida) that: “There is no greater enemy of the human body than being.”247 „Being‟ 
what? Precisely. „Being‟ something, something other than simply human. „Being‟ 
defined, determined, making of the human body something repeatable, which, an 
argument that Artaud is certainly the greatest advocate of, in theatricality it is not.  
And it is this refusal of „being‟ that disturbs Funesian memory, for the two are of the 
same nature, are equivalent through, as Derrida says, „the thinking of Being as 
memory.‟248 Writing, which serves for Artaud as a figure of repetition, of memory, is 
criticized by him, in Derrida‟s interpretation, for being „the erasure of the body, of the 
living gesture which takes place only once [my italics].‟249 In this phrase we find an 
adequate summation of the problem posed by ontological coincidence: its physicality 
(introducing a condition of intimacy) and originality, which counteract the demands of 
Funesian memory, fundamentally undermining its imitative, referential organisation as a 
structural model for theatre. 
However, we have dealt here exclusively with only the first half, although they are 
unequal halves, of Derrida‟s discussion of Artaud and the Theatre of Cruelty. I would 
suggest that there is a clear hinge around which his essay functions, found in the line: 
„There is no theatre in the world today which fulfills Artaud‟s desire.‟250 A majority of 
Derrida‟s paper is concerned with an ideal, Artaud‟s unrealisable ideal, but the second 
half turns to examining exactly the difficulty of escaping the repetition at the centre of 
representation. And there is much in our present investigation that has similarly dealt 
with concepts playing at the boundaries of representation/non-representation. Although 
this is an issue that we shall come to in due course. 
3.iv „Transforming the self into an event‟:251 Ontological Coincidence and Hysteria, An 
Energetic Approach 
„Seeing is believing‟:252 we recall the injunction of the Pirahã. It is an injunction to 
experience the event, here the theatrical event, immediately, always for the first time. 
This is the wager of ontological coincidence. The establishment of a „creatural bond‟, a 
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relationship of intimacy. This is its vulnerability, its risk and its return. „Seeing is 
believing‟:253 such is the experience of hysteria, both for the hysteric and for those that 
the hysteric involves in his/her world, as described by Christopher Bollas in his original 
and interventionist work Hysteria (2000). Hysteria is a condition that is eminently 
theatrical, as Bollas notes, it is „the art of turning the self into an event‟ in which „the 
hysteric sets the stage for... this living theatre‟.254 It is a theatricalization of the body of 
the sufferer. And it is, indeed, a suffering of the body in the process of representation. 
For support in this line of description, we need look little further than Freud and 
Breuer‟s case history of their patient Anna O. This is a case history that we will return 
to throughout this chapter and that serves as a locus, a nexus, for many of our paths of 
enquiry into theatricality. As Breuer details, Anna would often retire into a state of 
withdrawal, in which she spent her time „day-dreaming‟. She herself termed this her 
„private theatre‟, and Breuer expressly determines this „private theatre‟ to be a „pre-
disposing cause for her subsequent hysterical illness‟.255 Although it is used much more 
generally (cf. Laplanche & Pontalis), the term „acting out‟ has frequently been applied 
to hysterical symptoms,
256
 and the connection, and consequent terminology, which 
Breuer deploys here, may well be seen as a precursor to this.  
But we should pause here. Before turning to its relation with theatricality, let us start by 
exploring how hysteria is characterised in terms of an energetics, for it is perhaps 
surprising how completely Freud, Breuer and later psychoanalysts have identified the 
concept of hysteria with an energetics. Indeed, Breuer describes hysterical conversion, 
literally, in „comparison with an electrical system‟.257 Hysterical conversion occurs 
when „the excitation arising from the affective idea is “converted” into a somatic 
phenomenon‟:258 the affective force of an „incompatible idea‟,259 of „sexual desire‟,260 of 
„a psychical conflict‟261 (I quote these various references as a means of indicating the 
generality of possible causes for conversion across the literature) is transformed or 
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„converted‟ into „corporal innervation‟.262 The energy is transferred to the body, which 
expresses and discharges it through physical, somatic symptoms. Hysterical conversion 
is, thus, a process of energic displacement. Yet, as Green points out, following Freud 
and Lacan amongst others, its mode of symptom-formation should also be thought of as 
a form of language: 
Conversion is not a de-differentiated somatisation. The language changes tools, 
but it continues to sustain a discourse. The hysteric „speaks with his flesh‟ as 
Lacan puts it.
263
 
This notion of hysterical conversion as a „language‟ takes on a certain ambiguity, a 
certain strangeness. Particularly so as Green, in one instance, describes it as 
„continu[ing] to operate in the register of the symbolizable‟,264 whilst later noting that 
„for Freud, this substitute formation [hysterical conversion] can have nothing to do with 
representation in the classical sense of the term and be corporal innervation‟.265 This 
latter sentiment is reinforced by Bollas, who refers to „the hysteric‟s conversion‟ as „the 
route for the unwording of desire‟.266 However, this seeming ambiguity has its source, 
ultimately, in Freud and Breuer‟s own descriptions in Studies on Hysteria. One of 
Freud‟s patients (Elisabeth von R.) suffered from a hysterical symptom that involved a 
pain in her legs. He notes during her treatment that „her painful legs began to “join in 
the conversation”‟.267 Laplanche and Pontalis cite this description as evidence of 
Freud‟s „symbolic conception‟268 of conversion. However, it appears somewhat 
incongruous when placed alongside Breuer‟s remarks that „hysterical phenomena 
(abnormal reflexes) do not seem to be ideogenic... because the idea that gave rise to 
them is... no longer marked out among other ideas and memories. They emerge as 
purely somatic phenomena, apparently without psychical roots‟.269 What can we make 
of these, on the face of it, contradictory statements?  
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Hysterical conversion is here presented as a kind of language, which is symbolic, 
referential to a past occurrence, but which is also not „representative‟, in a „classical 
sense‟.270 Let us take this latter point first. Green‟s reference here to „representation‟ is 
perhaps a little misleading, being unnecessarily generalized, and we must take his, albeit 
rather ambiguous, qualification seriously. By „classical sense‟, he is mirroring the point 
made by Bollas and Breuer, that hysterical conversion is not ideational, that it is not 
„represented‟ through words or images, that its substitute formation is not ideogenic,271 
but is an expression through an action or event situated in the body. Does this preclude 
representation? I would suggest not, but in a „classical sense‟... How can we think the 
nature of this non-ideogenic, non-verbal, language?  
One way open to us is to think it in relation to Derrida‟s description of a „psychical 
writing‟, from his essay „Freud and the Scene of Writing‟, which we have explored in 
the previous chapter. We will recall that Derrida postulates a notion of „psychical 
writing‟ when discussing Freud‟s work, specifically on dreams: „this writing [„psychical 
writing‟], for example the kind we find in dreams... cannot be read in terms of any 
code‟.272 Whilst dreams, as we have noted, constitute a „language‟ of images (mnemic 
images), the way in which Derrida formulates, and de-familiarises, this „language‟ 
provides us with an apt figuration of hysterical conversion‟s own determination as 
language. Indeed, there is an affinity between the processes involved in structuring 
dreams and hysterical conversion, as Bollas notes: „hysterical theatre is dream-like‟,273 
which allows us to consider hysterical conversion‟s relation to „psychical writing‟ as 
being more than simply coincident or convenient. For Derrida, „psychical writing‟ is 
characterised by „an absence of an exhaustive and absolutely infallible code‟.274 To 
speak of hysterical conversion in terms of a signifying „code‟ contains precisely the 
same flaw as to speak of dreams in this way. And this absence of a code, Derrida tells 
us, results in the condition that „the difference between signifier and signified is never 
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radical‟.275 It is the condition in which „meaning and force are united‟,276 in which the 
„expression‟ is distinguished by its „materiality‟.277 And these definitions are mutually 
implicit, one with the other. 
The „signifier‟ of hysterical conversion, the hysterical symptom, is indissociable from 
the affective force of which it is the expression or manifestation. Corporal innervation, 
that which is „signified‟ by the symptom, is simultaneous with the symptom: both 
constitute the act, the event, that is conversion. This simultaneity precludes the 
possibility that conversion, in its „materiality‟ (a point we shall return to), can be 
„translated‟ into another „language‟, i.e. ideation. As Green identifies, hysterical 
conversion is unique for Freud among forms of repression, unique as:  
[in] hysteria, the substitute is corporal innervation and the substitute formation 
coincides with the symptom formation: the two stages are combined into one.
278
 
The symptom and the corporal innervation, the expression of the energic „thing‟ and the 
„thing itself‟ (which, in actuality, is not a „thing‟, is strictly inconceivable on its own), 
are coincident. Ontologically coincident.  Situated within the body of the sufferer, these 
are two aspects contained within a single event: conversion. The nature of this intrinsic 
coincidence makes hysterical conversion an appropriate metaphor, or, to be more 
precise, an appropriate model for thinking the energetics of ontological coincidence in 
theatricality. 
But we need to address a matter that has, seemingly, been left behind. We noted 
previously the „symbolic conception‟ of conversion, and have since neglected to follow 
this line of thought. Freud tells us that hysterical „symptoms are... mnemic symbols of 
particular (traumatic) experiences‟.279 We may, therefore, suppose that the hysterical 
symptom is a powerful exemplification of Funesian memory, that it has a closer relation 
with a model of memory that is referential to the past in the form of recollection, than it 
does to the ontological coincidence of theatricality, which complicates such a Funesian 
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conception of memory. And, certainly, this reading is a valid one: a hermeneutic 
approach to hysteria is fundamental to analysis, just as a hermeneutic reading is 
necessarily a possibility in addressing theatricality. As we have argued, the energetic 
and the hermeneutic are two ways of understanding memory and representation, which 
are both operative and interact with each other in particular ways in particular 
circumstances. The point is that this is not our present understanding, our way of 
accessing, hysteria. Our emphasis is upon its energetic processes, rather than methods of 
interpretation for discovering past events or traumas. It is for this purpose that we are 
focusing upon hysterical conversion. For, just as the ontological coincidence of 
theatricality does not fit easily with Funesian memory, so hysterical conversion, 
specifically, is incongruous with a past referentiality.  
The hysterical symptom has two aspects, which in truth are not separable, but for our 
purposes we can think of these as two functions of a single act. The first (by which I do 
not mean to suggest any priority) is that it is the expression of a corporal innervation, a 
release of affective force: it is this relationship that is ontologically coincident. The 
second is its reference to a past trauma. Of course, these are linked, the corporal 
innervation being a substitute formation of the trauma. Freud makes this same 
distinction in the first of his „Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis‟, of 1909: 
[T]hese „strangulated‟ affects... in part they remained as a permanent burden 
upon the patient‟s mental life and a source of constant excitation for it; and in 
part they underwent a transformation into unusual somatic innervations and 
inhibitions, which manifested themselves as the physical symptoms of the case. 
For this latter process we coined the term „hysterical conversion‟.280 
Freud‟s reference to „“strangulated” affects‟ is interchangeable with his earlier reference 
to „traumatic experiences‟, which we have followed: both indicate an experience, and its 
consequent force, which is inassimilable and must, therefore, be „substituted‟ for. As 
this quotation from Freud illustrates, the „symbolic conception‟ of the symptom relies 
upon the symptom performing the dual roles that I specify above (referring to the event 
at which a „strangulated‟ affect was produced, and manifesting „somatic innervations‟).  
                                                             
280
 Freud, SE 11, p.18. 
80 
 
However, it is here that hysterical conversion challenges the model of a symbolic 
referentiality, of a Funesian memory. For in the moment of conversion, and therefore in 
the act of the symptom, the reference to the past experience, the „origin‟, is abandoned. 
It is the point at which the „symbol‟ is „detached‟ from its referent: they are only 
thought together through analysis. It is the point at which the symptom, as ontologically 
coincident, becomes originary to itself, „with apparent spontaneity‟.281 Or so we can 
conclude from such assertions as Freud‟s: 
 Wherever there is a [hysterical] symptom there is also an amnesia.
282
 
To elucidate this claim, we can draw upon the theorisations of hysteria provided by both 
Green and Breuer. Breuer describes hysterical symptoms as being „based on 
recollections which revive the original affect – or rather, which would revive it if those 
reactions [hysterical conversion] did not, in fact, occur instead [Breuer‟s emphasis]‟.283 
This statement enunciates well the tension that the symptom is constituted through. As a 
symbol it should refer to a past experience, but, „in fact‟, it arises in the place of 
recollection: hysterical conversion, which is „apparently without psychical roots‟,284 
which bears no trace in itself of its past derivation, is what substitutes and erases a 
referential mnemic connection. As Green summarises: „one can understand how 
conversion collaborates with repression‟.285 Repression is simultaneous with 
conversion: when conversion occurs there is no memory to speak of. And in this we 
find the disruption that hysterical conversion introduces for a Funesian model of 
memory. Its self-contained, non-referential, ontological coincidence, whilst it is an act 
of conversion, precludes its being thought through a condition as mnemic symbol. It is 
an act in which signifier and signified are united in the body of the sufferer, an act 
which is „originary‟. And it is this that makes hysterical conversion a fitting model for 
determining the energetic processes of, and a relevant approach to, ontological 
coincidence in theatricality. 
With this connection established, we can return at this point to fulfil a promise made a 
short time ago. Derrida‟s essay on Artaud‟s „Theatre of Cruelty‟, as we have said, 
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performs a kind of volte-face at the point at which the „reveal‟ is made, a particularly 
dramatic effect, that Artaud‟s theatre is an unrealisable ideal. That even Artaud knew 
this. That it „will always remain the inaccessible limit of a representation which is not 
repetition‟.286 An ideal based upon Artaud‟s radical emphasis upon, and positioning of, 
ontological coincidence as the core of theatricality. Ontological coincidence: the 
simultaneity of the expression of a thing and the thing itself, which aims to disturb any 
relation to an „external‟ referent or code and, thus, confound repetition, the basis of 
Funesian memory. Ontological coincidence, which, as it functions within both 
theatricality and hysterical conversion, is, I would suggest, therefore best thought of as 
an event: an event of the performative. 
The „performative‟ is a category of language which was first introduced, in this 
linguistic sense, by JL Austin in his famous 1962 book How to Do Things with Words, 
and theorised by Derrida in his concise but dense piece „Signature Event Context‟ 
(1971). Most pertinently for our discussion, „the performative is a “communication” 
which does not essentially limit itself to transporting an already constituted semantic 
content‟.287 Rather, as Austin‟s translator notes, it „allows us to do something by means 
of speech itself‟: „speech‟ or, to extrapolate, by means of the sign itself, generally. It 
signifies an act and is the act itself. As Derrida explains: „the performative‟s referent... 
is not outside it... It does not describe something which exists outside and before 
language. It produces or transforms a situation‟.288 And, in a description that will 
remind us of our exposition of hysterical conversion, in particular, the performative 
„communicate[s] a force by the impetus of a mark‟.289 
However, as our argument has been leading us, for Derrida there is no sign, there is no 
„origin‟ which has not always already been infiltrated by repetition. This is as true for 
Artaud‟s theatre, for which „what is tragic is not the impossibility but the necessity of 
repetition... The origin is always penetrated‟,290 as it is for the performative, for which 
there is always the possibility of „citation... the determined modification of a general 
citationality – or rather, a general iterability – without which there would not even be a 
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“successful” performative‟.291 As for the performative, so this is just the case for 
ontological coincidence also, in both theatricality and hysterical conversion. Predicated, 
as it is, upon its own originality: in its becoming, becoming original, ontological 
coincidence inevitably becomes compromised by repetition. How do we justify this, 
perhaps rather startling, peripeteia? 
It essentially comes down to Derrida‟s introduction and use of his concept of 
„iterability‟. For it is precisely this that haunts „the event [that] supposes... its allegedly 
present and singular intervention‟.292 Iterability is, as Nicholas Royle defines it, that 
which „must carry with it a capacity to be repeated in principle again and again... at the 
same time as being in some way singular every time. Iterability thus entails both 
„repetition‟ (sameness) and „alterity‟ (difference) [my italics]‟.293 We must take care 
with our reading here. For the iterable does not prevent ontological coincidence from 
being originary, and indeed so it is, but iterability does insist upon the „necessary 
possibility‟ that this „origin‟ could, potentially, „in principle‟, be repeated. Iterability is 
the possibility of repetition. As Derrida tells us, in relation to Artaud: 
Presence, in order to be presence and self-presence, has always already begun to 
represent itself, has always already been penetrated. Affirmation itself must be 
penetrated in repeating itself.
294
 
Once something is, once it originates, as an event, it is iterable. This is not to say that 
there is no singularity, „it is simply that these effects [i.e. of the performative, of 
presence] do not exclude what is generally opposed to them term by term, but on the 
contrary presupposes it in dyssemtrical fashion, as the general space of their 
possibility‟.295 It is a logic that always seems to me to be well-captured by a particularly 
melodramatic address to the viewer made by a voice-over in the animated TV series 
Futurama: „You saw it... you can‟t un-see it!‟ It happened. You saw it happen. It has an 
existence. It will always have happened, and could, just possibly, theoretically, happen 
again. 
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Although, it may be useful to note, iterability has its degrees. There is a „differential 
typology of forms of iteration‟,296 as Derrida notes, and these have differing 
potentialities in relation to repetition. Artaud, for example, „kept himself as close as 
possible to the limit: the possibility and impossibility of pure theatre‟:297 the prospect of 
repetition of Artaud‟s theatre, as of the performative, is „relative‟. As Derrida says, 
quoting Austin, „there is a “relative purity” of performatives‟.298 However, my telling 
you this, these words I write now, are infinitely repeatable, if you so wish. They are, in 
„relative‟ terms, highly „impure‟. With ontological coincidence, as a kind of 
performative „event‟, we are in Artaud‟s territory, very close to the limit. Repetition is a 
possibility only in the back of our minds, in the shadow of the event. It is not, 
necessarily, a „present danger‟, we could say, but does constitute a threat. And Derrida 
clearly posits it in these terms, by referring to, for example, „the menace of 
repetition‟,299 and noting that „failure is an essential risk in the operations under 
consideration‟ [my italics].300 
But how is this notion of „failure‟ to be thought? What kind of „failure‟ are we talking 
about here? „Failure‟ as an ever-present possibility is, of course, no absolute. As a 
qualitative judgement, it is always implicated in „success‟, just as „success‟ is in 
„failure‟. It depends upon where you‟re standing. As Derrida says: „what is a success 
when the possibility of failure continues to constitute its structure?‟301 Let us better ask, 
what is the „risk‟ here? What is the nature of this threat for ontological coincidence? 
Firstly, let us explore this question in relation to hysterical conversion. How is 
hysterical conversion „threatened‟ by iterability? This is our question.  
Green provides a brief, but highly detailed and revealing, analysis of the energic process 
of conversion and, what he considers of crucial significance, condensation. In his 
theory, hysterical „condensation‟ refers to the „condensation of signifiers‟, the 
„condensation of roles‟ and „also the condensation of affects that drives to discharge in 
the form of an enactment...‟.302 It is this latter that is most relevant for our purposes. 
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Condensation involves „an increase in energic density‟:303 this increase directly results 
in conversion, in „discharge‟. In this model, conversion is characterised as „the 
hysteric... devouring his affects [Green‟s italics]‟:304 conversion „aim[s] at swallowing – 
literally – the excess, absorbing it into the body‟.305 The act of conversion, this site, as 
we have described, of ontological coincidence, is driven by what Green terms „the 
hysteric‟s affective avidity‟.306 This is a trait that, he claims, „every psychoanalyst has 
noticed‟.307 For conversion to take place, for this hysterical enactment to occur, there 
must be an increase in energic tension and this increase in quantity is, indeed, desired by 
the hysteric. As Green, referring to Lacan, states: „Lacan is right to say that the hysteric 
desires unsatiated desire‟.308 Desire for what?  
Green describes this process in terms of object relationships in libidinal organisation, a 
particularly „clinical‟ account, with which we need not go into great detail. What we 
should note is that what the hysteric seems to desire are „phantasy objects‟, „love 
objects‟ or „objects with phallic value‟. The tension accrued through this desire is 
subject to, in energic terms, an „affective avidity‟, a greed for an increase in affective 
tension. In truth, it is not „possession of the object‟ that is desired, for this „satiety would 
suppress the desire for unsatisfied desire‟.309 The „achievement‟ of the object would 
result in the end of condensation, of the accrual of affective tension, and the abolition of 
hysterical conversion. The hysteric, therefore, the sufferer in the grip of hysteria, as 
much as he or she may pursue the object, truly desires only the pursuit, only the desire, 
itself. He or she only seeks an increase in affect, not the dispelling of the source of their 
affective accumulation. The key point for us is that „affective avidity‟ is correspondent 
with corporal innervation and, just as corporal innervation „can have nothing to do with 
representation in the classical sense‟,310 so „affective avidity is installed as a substitute 
for the object‟.311 The giving of an object to „desire‟, to the affective force of hysteria, is 
incompatible with corporal innervation, and thus with hysterical conversion. As we 
have referred to above, hysterical conversion is an „unwording of desire‟. The 
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attainment of the object is, in energetic terms, the equivalent to its „wording‟. Of course, 
this „wording‟ would be the „talking cure‟ that Freud and Breuer developed, initially in 
relation to hysteria. To put the desire of the hysteric into words, to provide the 
„strangulated affect‟ of a traumatic experience with an „outlet‟ in language, in 
representation, rather than corporal innervation. Or, as Bollas terms it, „facilitat[ing] the 
patient‟s matriculation in the paternal order‟,312 the paternal order that privileges „word 
and “truth”‟.313 This is psychoanalytic success. But for hysteria, this is a failure. The 
aim of hysteria is to „devour affects‟, to consume them, to force them onto the body: to 
sustain itself as ontologically coincident. Success, failure: implicit one in the other. 
It is through this „threat‟ of being „worded‟, of attaining the object, that iterability 
haunts hysterical conversion. The ontological coincidence of hysterical conversion, the 
unity of affective force and its symptom-expression, is iterable as there is the constant 
possibility that this affective force will be „worded‟, that the act of hysterical conversion 
could be repeated through this wording. Through wording as repetition: the repetition of 
hysterical conversion is its „wording‟; its „wording‟ is its repetition. A „necessary 
possibility‟, the „wording‟ of hysteria brings its resolution, brings its „death‟. As Royle 
describes: „our desires are oriented towards certain goals... We are, if you will, drenched 
in the teleological‟.314 Hysteria is certainly oriented towards a goal: the object, the 
word. But does not, in actuality, seek its arrival. And, in energetic terms, this „wording‟, 
this installation of repetition, results in the loss of affective force. As Green describes in 
relation to hysterical conversion: „once the substitutive formation is created, the 
affective tension drops... Having passed into the somatic, the hysteric finds peace once 
more‟.315 However, in hysterical conversion this is a continuous process: affective 
avidity will build up energic density again, corporal innervation will occur again, 
hysterical conversion will be performed again. But when „worded‟, affective avidity is 
replaced by the ideogenic and affective energy is lost permanently (at least in the theory 
of a successful analysis). This loss is presented as happening either suddenly, as 
experienced by Anna O.: „as a result of an accidental and spontaneous utterance... a 
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disturbance which had persisted for a considerable time vanished‟,316 or gradually, as in 
the process of „wearing away‟ described by Breuer: 
„Wearing away‟... which deprive[s] it [an affective idea] little by little of its 
quota of affect... The „wearing-away‟ influences, however, are all of them 
effects of association, of thinking, of corrections by reference to other ideas. 
This process of correction becomes impossible if the affective idea is withdrawn 
from „associative contact‟.317 
In other words, the „quota of affect‟ must be attached to an idea that is capable of being 
in „associative contact‟ with other ideas. It must, we could say, exist within a discursive 
chain, or have been „worded‟. In either instance, the „wording‟ of the affective force of 
hysteria results in its final dissipation, rather than continuation through somatic 
expression. The threat of repetition for ontological coincidence in hysterical conversion, 
the threat of its „wording‟, is a threat to its affectivity. 
Now, if we think back, Derrida‟s description of „psychical writing‟, to which (we 
argued earlier) the „language‟ of hysterical conversion is closely related, provides useful 
insights in this context. For the same reason that Derrida argues that „dreams are 
untranslatable‟,318 so too is hysterical conversion. The „wording‟ of hysterical 
conversion is not a „translation‟ as such, a translation that would be a „transcription‟, as 
it, like dreams, has „no text present elsewhere... to be transposed or transported‟.319 
There is no prior original to which a translation would refer, as if it were the act of 
hysterical conversion. It is more a potential movement, a possible teleological 
realisation, of the energetic. And the implications of this intrinsic possibility for an 
energetics and for ontological coincidence are well-illustrated by Derrida, in a passage 
that contains numerous connections with our preceding discussion, and is worth quoting 
at length: 
Force produces meaning (and space) through the power of “repetition” alone, 
which inhabits it originarily as its death. This power, that is, this lack of power, 
which opens and limits the labor of force, institutes translatability, makes 
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possible what we call “language”, transforms an absolute idiom into a limit 
which is always already transgressed: a pure idiom is not language; it becomes 
so only through repetition; repetition always already divides the point of 
departure of the first time.
320
 
Hysterical conversion is precisely just such an „absolute idiom‟ and the iterability that 
haunts it is this original repetition, this necessary possibility of being „worded‟ (which 
makes for hysterical conversion the condition of always already being „worded‟), that 
makes possible its „transformation‟ into language, its „translatability‟. A „translatability‟ 
that would make of the „translated‟ something the same, but different. This is what is 
indicated by the „power of repetition‟, which is also a „lack of power‟: repetition as 
„death‟ is the possibility of the energetic and its limit. A limit that makes possible „what 
we call “language”‟, that takes the place of the „idiom‟ and that, in thus instituting 
„translatability‟, cannot sustain the „materiality‟ of psychical writing. As Derrida 
explicates: „the materiality of the signifier constitutes the idiom of every dream 
scene‟,321 just as it does, I suggest, of hysterical conversion. And, perhaps most 
importantly, „materiality is precisely that which translation relinquishes‟.322 For 
hysterical conversion, this loss of materiality is equivalent to the loss of ontological 
coincidence: its affective avidity, its corporal innervation, the unity of signifier and 
signified, are „relinquished‟ in being „worded‟. This is the „threat‟ of iterability: always 
already operative at the origin of hysterical conversion, it is the possibility that 
„continues to constitute its structure‟.323 
3.iv.i Theatrical Avidity and the Vicissitudes of Materiality 
The materiality of ontological coincidence, which we have seen in hysterical conversion 
and in psychical writing more generally, is also a condition of theatricality. Derrida 
indicates as much, in one of the very same discussions that we have been focusing upon 
here in relation to psychical writing, „Freud and the Scene of Writing‟. In this he notes 
that „the materiality of the [dream] expression, does not disappear before the signified... 
It acts as such, with the efficacy Artaud assigns it on the stage of cruelty‟.324 As we have 
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observed, for Artaud ontological coincidence occupies a vital place in theatricality, 
promulgating the simultaneity of the „expression‟ in both the theatrical „image‟ and the 
thing itself (for example, the body of the actor), so as to advocate the „non-
representative‟. The „expression‟, the „gesture‟,325 in Artaud‟s Theatre of Cruelty is „as 
close as possible to the limit‟326 of non-repetition, through emphasising the „unicity‟ of 
ontological coincidence as a condition of theatricality. What Derrida here implies is a 
correspondence between the materiality of ontological coincidence in psychical writing 
(i.e. in hysterical conversion, I have argued) and in theatricality, through its most 
effusive priest, Artaud. As I have claimed, ontological coincidence in theatricality 
resists „representation‟, resists referentiality, by producing what we have named a 
„creatural bond‟. This bond is established upon the recognition that there are aspects of 
the body that will not „go into‟ discourse, that, following Kott, evade description, that 
will not be „worded‟. And this aspect serves as a kind of „guarantor‟ of non-repetition. 
However, as with ontological coincidence in hysterical conversion, and as we have seen 
in our previous discussion of Derrida‟s insights into Artaud‟s Theatre of Cruelty, the 
creatural bond in theatricality is similarly „threatened‟ by the „necessary possibility‟ of 
iteration. And it is through comparison with the consequences of iterability for the 
energetics of hysterical conversion that we can approach this condition of theatricality 
in energetic terms. This methodology, it is worth reminding ourselves, is based solely 
upon the suggestion that hysterical conversion provides a model for thinking the 
particular processes of ontological coincidence in theatricality. One specific affinity that 
I would now propose is that the creatural bond is premised upon a form of „affective 
avidity‟, just as hysterical conversion is. How can we think this? 
Firstly, we can note the „greed‟ that is a characteristic of ontological coincidence in 
theatricality. This is reflected repeatedly by Bert O. States. For example, he argues that: 
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Theatre is the medium, par excellence, that consumes the real in its realest 
forms: man, his language, his rooms and cities... Its permanent spectacle is the 
parade of objects and processes in transit from environment to imagery.
327
 
This sentiment is reinforced, even more explicitly, by his statement that: „theatre ingests 
the world of objects and signs only to bring images to life [my italics]‟.328 In States‟s 
presentation the „object‟ is continuously (a „permanent... parade of objects... in transit‟) 
„consumed‟ in the course of producing the theatrical image: in our terms, it is made 
ontologically coincident. And States is not the only theorist of theatre to frame its 
relation to ontological coincidence in such a way. We can consider Kantor, who inverts 
the priority that States assumes by proposing that it is the object, the world of objects, 
that „consumes‟ the fictive to produce the ontological coincidence of the theatrical 
„image‟. He extols the utilitarian space of the „cloakroom‟ as an exemplar of his ideal 
theatre: „A cloakroom works, / expands, / devours more and more spheres of the 
imagination. / It is continuously working.... [my italics]‟.329 Despite this reversal, 
Kantor‟s conception remains within the dynamics of ontological coincidence.330  
Or we can also consider, perhaps the most explicit and „bodily‟ portrayal of the „greed‟, 
the „hunger‟, inherent to ontological coincidence in theatre: Alfred Jarry‟s Ubu trilogy. 
Throughout these three plays (Ubu Roi, Ubu cocu, and Ubu enchaíné) Ubu is 
relentlessly „consuming‟ all that he can, whether this be food, „phynance‟, people or 
things. Being „in-corporated‟ within Ubu is a constant threat throughout the play, which 
is noted specifically in this final exchange between the Turkish emperor, Soliman, and 
his Vizier: 
                                                             
327
 States, p.40. 
328
 States, p.37. 
329
 Tadeusz Kantor, „The Impossible Theatre‟, in A Journey Through Other Spaces: Essays and 
Manifestos, 1944 – 1990, trans. Michal Kobialka (University of California Press, 1993), p.277. 
330
 The key point for us here is the characterisation and epithets of „consumption‟ that Kantor attributes to 
ontological coincidence. The reversal in terms of the „consumer‟ and the „consumed‟ does not, I would 
suggest, deny the fundamental processes or condition of ontological coincidence: there remains a 
simultaneity of the expression and that which expresses, although this status is made particularly apparent 
by Kantor‟s re-emphasis; there remains a creatural bond (Kantor‟s theory of „bio-objects‟ raises 
interesting questions here, but I would not necessarily seek to make a distinction between these and the 
situation of the human-as-actor); and the object remains in a „vulnerable‟ place. However, this reversal 
does, of course, modify how the specific function and significance of ontological coincidence is thought 
in particular performances and practices of theatre. A study of Kantor‟s theatre in terms of ontological 
coincidence, and the energetic, would certainly be of interest and value, but would be too great a 
digression for our present purposes. 
90 
 
VIZIER: He‟s [Ubu] in a terrible rage and threatens to stuff everyone in his 
pocket... 
SOLIMAN: ...if he got an inkling of it [Ubu‟s claim to the throne] he‟d 
immediately install himself here... and he‟d be bound to gobble up my fortune in 
no time at all.
331
 
All of this consumption, this rapacity, is given concrete form through Ubu‟s „Strumpot‟ 
(or „gidouille‟ in the original, a neologism that refers to his giant „stomach‟), of which 
he self-reflexively pronounces, as the ironic dénouement to the final instalment of the 
trilogy (Ubu enchaíné): 
PA UBU: Private sources have revealed to me that my Strumpot is huger than 
the whole world.
332
 
Ubu‟s service to his Strumpot is a figuration, I would suggest, of the „avidity‟ of 
theatricality. As Linda Klieger Stillman identifies, „gidouille‟ is „possibly derived from 
its similarity to the verb ouiller (to fill a cask as the level of its content diminishes)... 
Ouiller also indicates, by definition, the transfer of matter, and in exactly the same 
process of assimilation and rejection, input and output, that we associate with Ubu.‟333 
Ubu, like theatricality, „devours‟ objects, takes them into himself, in order to produce 
something else. For theatricality it is the production of the ontologically coincident 
theatrical image; for Ubu it is „the production of shit‟.334 The fact that his „Strumpot‟ (a 
theatrical image, let us not forget) has grown to be of greater enormity than „the whole 
world‟ symbolizes, in Jarry‟s own paradoxical and self-consciously „absurd‟ way, the 
potential of theatricality to incorporate „the world‟, the world of objects, any, and every, 
„thing‟. Indeed, as Stillman points out this condition is made even more „explicit in a 
version of Ubu cocu entitled Ubu cocu ou l‟Archéoptéryx, in which the entire first act 
takes place inside the Gidouille: it has literally become the universe.‟335 
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The insatiable consumption of objects, a constant process in the ontological coincidence 
of the theatrical image, is, as we have noted, premised upon a sacrifice, most 
particularly of the human-as-actor. A giving oneself up to the „voracity‟ of theatre. 
Theatricality, like the hysteric, suffers from what Green terms a „bulimia of objects‟.336 
And it is this requirement for a „vulning‟ of one‟s body that, we have seen, institutes a 
„creatural bond‟. As with hysterical conversion, of which Bollas notes there is „a sense 
of the self as sacrificial host‟,337 it is a form of avidity, an avidity for sacrifice, bodily 
sacrifice, like the blood-thirsty Huitzilopochtli or thunderous Taranis, like Artaud‟s 
victim-martyrs „tortured at the stake, signalling through the flames.‟338 Of course, this 
process is often presented in wildly „dramatic‟ terms – such as Artaud‟s, for which he 
will always inspire exhilaration. However, in truth, it is an act more accurately thought 
of as quiet, self-effacing, unflamboyant: succeeding by going unnoticed. A creatural 
bond is established in silence. A creatural bond whose „embodiment‟ determines its 
singularity, but that, in its iterability, is also originally subject to the possibility of 
repetition. As with affective avidity in hysteria, theatrical avidity is threatened by 
iteration. A threat directed against the „materiality‟ of ontological coincidence. The 
avidity that we find in theatricality can be thought in energetic terms as an accumulation 
of „tension‟, as an increase in „energic density‟ through the continuous intensification of 
the desire to gather „objects‟ into itself. The force of this desire results in the ontological 
coincidence of the theatrical image (much as condensation in hysteria results in the 
ontological coincidence of hysterical conversion). Theatrical ontological coincidence is, 
thus, the event through which this desire is expressed. This force, which is intrinsic to 
and impels the unity of ontological coincidence, is another way of thinking the 
„materiality‟ of the theatrical image. What is the manner of this desire?  
Much as the desire that ultimately drives hysterical conversion, in theatricality it is a 
desire to desire to consume the object, the „desire for unsatiated desire‟. We have 
elsewhere described this as a sadistic element in relation to the vulnerability of the 
creatural bond (produced through ontological coincidence): a desire for this 
vulnerability as a condition of continuing the performance, of sustaining the theatrical 
image. And, as with hysterical conversion, the threat posed by iterability to the 
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continuation of this desire is one of „wording‟. How can we think this? As Derrida 
describes, in relation to the „performative‟, it is best thought in terms of a „relative 
purity‟, as a „differential typology of forms of iteration‟,339 as a question of degree. The 
performances that offer the lowest degrees of resistance to repetition are those that, to 
some extent, efface their status as ontologically coincident, whether unwittingly or by 
design. Such performances suffuse themselves „more fully‟ with iterability by bringing 
themselves, perhaps we can say, closer to the word and further from the „embodiment‟, 
the Artaudian ideal of „the purity of a presence without interior difference and without 
repetition‟,340 of the performance that emphasises ontological coincidence. We can think 
of performances in the former modality as being imbued with a certain predisposition 
towards referentiality. This is exhibited, typically, through reference to a text or 
(although there is really no effective distinction) other prior codification of the 
performance. 
And it is such performances as these that are criticised from the perspective of a 
theatricality conceived through the latter „typology‟ of iterability; by those that, we 
could say, develop the role of ontological coincidence, as a fundamental condition of 
theatricality, within their own theories and/or practices of performance. For example, 
Artaud, of course, voices his criticism by disparaging the performance in which the 
actor is „required to give nothing more than a certain number of sobs‟.341 Or we could 
turn to founder and director of the Odin Teatret, Eugenio Barba, who is critical of 
„many directors... [who] tend to believe that a specific image or sequence of images can 
only transmit a particular meaning.‟342 In this case, they will „ask for explanations and 
demand coherence from the performer‟:343 coherence as reference to a pre-determined 
meaning, which can only be represented in a singular way. This highly iterable theatre, 
if we take it to its extreme, can, in practice, be thought of as indistinguishable from 
recitation. We can imagine the scene. Objects are presented, displayed on stage: there is 
the actor, and s/he says these words. Ontological coincidence is minimal and, thus, the 
creatural bond enfeebled, if palpable at all. There is the hysteric and, instead of corporal 
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innervation, s/he says those words. It is a scene that is eminently repeatable. It is this 
conception of theatricality that leads Austin to derogate it in relation to performativity, 
finding the performative to be „hollow‟, „non-serious‟ and „parasitic‟ when „said by an 
actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, of spoken in soliloquy.‟344 Derrida is quite 
correct in determining that what Austin rejects here, and demonstrates in his linking of 
these three instances, is „citation (on the stage, in a poem, or in a soliloquy)‟.345 Austin 
excludes theatricality as long as it is thought primarily in terms of its citability, hence 
the association of it with the re-citation of poetry (considered as precisely the speaking 
of a text memorised or, even, read aloud).
346
 And, to go one step further than this, there 
is the „true‟ „wording‟ of the theatrical image: the text itself. Unrealisable in 
performance, the text is the telos of iterability in theatricality: the end, the „death‟, of 
ontological coincidence. 
As with hysterical conversion, „wording‟ arises in the place of ontological coincidence, 
dissipating affective force. Extrapolating from this conclusion, I would also suggest that 
the tendency towards „wording‟, towards repetition, in theatricality is concomitant with 
a progressive reduction in affective force. Just as, in the converse case, a „heightened‟ 
ontological coincidence (i.e. theatricality that, as Derrida says, keeps „as close as 
possible to the limit‟) is accordant with an increase in affective force.  To illustrate this 
we can perhaps think of Harold Pinter‟s 2006 performance of Beckett‟s Krapp‟s Last 
Tape, at the Royal Court, London. Whilst this may not be quite as exact an example as 
could be found for detailing manipulations of the energic through ontological 
coincidence, it remains highly relevant to our purposes and is certainly worth drawing 
upon for its poignancy. Pinter‟s performance took place in the context of his own 
serious illness and impending death (on 24
th
 December, 2008). Indeed, much of the 
physical comedy and many of the humorous set-pieces that characterise the play (such 
as Krapp‟s banana-related antics) had to be cut, owing to Pinter‟s frailty. For a majority 
of the play‟s duration he remained seated in his motorised wheelchair, hunched over the 
famous tape-recorder. But I do not wish to give the impression that this performance is 
exemplary due to its biographical context, due to the pathos that it may, and surely does, 
arouse for Harold Pinter, the great literary figure, the great Name.  
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Rather, it is because of the introduction or, perhaps we would be better to say, 
revelation of mortality, of the closeness of death, as a condition of the theatrical image 
and of this theatrical image. The status of the theatrical image as ontologically 
coincident with the „object‟, here the human-as-actor, is emphasised as it is the place of 
Pinter-as-actor, the object itself, if we can speak so impersonally, that instates a 
circumstance of „near-death‟ into the image, that determines the image as such. Near-
death: not, to repeat, in the sense of a hind-sight, but as an unspoken „knowledge‟. 
Pinter is Krapp, Krapp is Pinter: the fact is that when, as Michael Billington describes in 
his review of the play, „at two precise moments, Pinter looks anxiously over his left 
shoulder into the darkness as if he felt death's presence in the room‟347 it is impossible 
to finally decide who is looking, fearfully, for death, Pinter or Krapp. Indeed, it is both. 
This undecidability establishes the distance of this performance from iterability. It 
remains, but we are far here from the threat of „wording‟. And the fact that it is no other 
feature that serves to enunciate the ontological coincidence of image and object than the 
mortality of the actor only heightens the power of the creatural bond (already amplified 
through the highlighting, rather than subsumption, of ontological coincidence). Pinter‟s 
vulnerability is there for all to see. Vulnerability as human. Only human. This sense of 
being near-death makes the phantomatic image (the status of ontological coincidence 
being, we recall, between life and death, both at once), paradoxically, more „alive‟. In 
energetic terms, we can think the intensity of the creatural bond, the prominence of 
ontological coincidence, which we find here as an expression of the desire, the avidity, 
of theatricality to desire to consume the object. It is to be compared with the more 
„worded‟ performance, in which affective force is significantly dissipated resulting in 
the diminishment of materiality. By contrast, in the current instance, the desire to 
consume is promulgated by both the constant expenditure of the object in the process of 
constituting the image (the consumption of the object in the theatrical image being 
always a first consumption: the object, i.e. the human-as-actor, is always consumed 
each time anew, necessarily) owing to its resistance to repetition and non-identity with a 
prior „code‟, and by the dependent sustaining of the creatural bond, which requires a 
constant enactment and re-enactment of vulnerability, or „sacrifice‟. Affective force 
ebbs and flows, waxes and wanes, with, to put it in general terms, the degree of 
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simultaneity between object and image, the degree, or „typology‟, of iterability as a 
possibility of theatricality. 
Finally, whilst the actual reception of affective force is necessarily subjective, the actual 
experience of affective force being unique to the spectator or participant, an energetic 
approach will think theatricality in terms of its processes, its energic movements and its 
manipulation of intensities through the play of ontological coincidence in its 
performance. In considering this, we can see the inadequacy of a criticism that seeks to 
codify theatricality, to name its parts, when confronted by an aspect of that theatricality 
which resists referentiality and repetition, as ontological coincidence does. Such a 
criticism works within, and often seeks to enforce, a conception of representation in 
theatricality that is allied to, that is even, we could say, modelled upon, Funesian 
memory. A model that ontological coincidence discomfits. We are reminded, perhaps, 
of Derrida‟s remarks at the beginning of Writing and Difference in which he says of 
structuralist criticism: 
Form fascinates when one no longer has the force to understand force from 
within itself. That is, to create. This is why literary criticism is structuralist in 
every age... Criticism henceforth knows itself separated from force... Thus is 
explained the low note, the melancholy pathos that can be perceived behind the 
triumphant cries of technical ingenuity or mathematical subtlety that sometimes 
accompany certain so-call “structural” analyses.348 
Structuralism, and such „structural‟ methodologies, separates form from force, focusing 
upon form to the exclusion of force. It enacts, thus, a kind of „wording‟ in itself, 
divesting materiality from that which it, quite literally, „analyses‟. For this reason, 
Derrida identifies a correspondent „low note‟, a sense of depleted intensity, of 
diminished affective potential, in even the most virtuoso critical evaluation that 
functions to codify or works from a „code‟. In theatrical criticism, we need only think of 
the semiotic „project‟, typified by the quite brilliant, in relation to its purpose, work of 
Keir Elam, for example. However, as Derrida tells us, criticism, that which seeks to 
approach, discuss, engage with a work; criticism cannot entirely avoid this condition. It 
can be self-aware of it; it can be ignorant of it; it can even relish it. But it cannot entirely 
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avoid it and remain a means of understanding, of comprehension. We cannot, through 
an energetic mode of approach, speak of force itself. No „energetics of pure, shapeless 
force‟.349 But, rather, we aim to speak of its facilitations, of which the play of 
ontological coincidence is one in theatricality. An aim whose foundations we are just 
starting to build, offering a speculative beginning through which we can perhaps 
approach the energetics of theatricality in its distinctiveness. And, of course, ontological 
coincidence is not the only distinct aspect of theatricality that opens a path to, and that 
aligns with, the energetic. We turn now, in the second part of this chapter, to address 
precisely another of these aspects, fundamental to theatricality and equally inconsistent 
with a model of theatrical representation derived from Funesian memory: theatrical 
elision. 
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Chapter 3: Theatre and an Energetic Approach, Part 2 
3.v Theatrical Elision, or „Something Missing‟ 
It seems to me justifiable to anticipate that the first question raised by this title is 
precisely what does this phrase „theatrical elision‟ mean? The Penguin Dictionary of 
Literary Terms & Literary Theory, an excellently hypomnesic source of reference, 
defines elision as: „the omission or slurring of a syllable‟.350 Which corresponds with 
the Oxford English Dictionary‟s: „The action of dropping out or suppressing: a. a letter 
or syllable in pronunciation; b. a passage in a book or connecting links in discourse‟,351 
and derives from the Latin elidere („to crush out‟). Whilst most often associated with 
the scansion of poetry or with the cadence of speech, elision is a feature that is also 
frequently found in theatrical representation. Not as a characteristic of speech or script, 
which would be literary uses, but as a formal device of the theatrical image and one that 
is, I would suggest, exclusively available to theatre. By theatrical elision I am not 
referring to actions, persons, places or objects that are situated „off-stage‟ (not the 
Muscovian promised land of Chekhov‟s Three Sisters, or the attic of Ibsen‟s The Wild 
Duck in which young Hedvig tragically shoots herself). No. An elision is not external to 
the chain of representation, to the image that we see before us. Its absence is right there, 
[not] to be seen. When an elisionary act is „performed‟ it is an on-stage absence, 
structured not as „nothing‟, or as „something‟, but as „something missing‟. It is an 
absence that is to be taken as having potency, as influencing and interrelating with 
characters and objects on stage that are physically and perceptibly represented. 
To think of elision we can consider such instances as, just in the case of Hamlet, the 
famous metonymic convention of Act 4 Scene 4, in which the stage directions demand: 
„Enter FORTINBRAS with his army over the stage.‟352 Here the „army‟ is typically 
substituted for by a handful of actors representing, the audience would then be asked to  
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assume, many thousands of soldiers.
353
 The rest of the army, which this device depends 
upon, would then be assumed to be there, as part of the image, even though 
„represented‟ by an absence. In other words, elided. We find another form of elision in 
the figure of the cliff, earlier, in Act 1 Scenes 4 & 5: 
 HAMLET: ...It waves me forth again, I‟ll follow it. 
 HORATIO: What if it tempt you toward the flood, my lord, 
 Or to the dreadful summit of the cliff 
 That beetles o‟er his base into the sea. (1/4/68-71)354 
The cliff in this exchange is a threat. It is one of the ways that the Ghost poses a mortal 
danger, in Horatio‟s view, to the body and mind of Hamlet. When combined with the 
other two threats that Horatio names („the flood‟ and „madness‟), the site of the cliff 
becomes a decidedly sinister place: it is the precipice over which the raging sea below 
waits, and intrinsically imperils the sanity of any who go there even without the added 
disturbance of a beckoning ghost („The very place puts toys of desperation, / Without 
more motive, into every brain / That looks so many fadoms to the sea‟ (1/4/75-77)). In 
production this setting, particularly as it is thus described, I would suggest, is rarely (if 
ever) realised. However, this omission or simplification cannot be classified as „off-
stage‟. Act 1 Scene 5 opens in an ambiguous location. Variously described, the text 
seems to refer to an unspecified part of the castle exterior further away from the action 
of Scene 4 (the Riverside Shakespeare version calls for „the battlements of the castle‟), 
but the context (and, not least, the dramatic potential) of the scene appears to suggest 
that the action of Scene 5 takes place in the vicinity of the precipice, of „the flood‟, of 
the madness-inducing vista. It is for this reason that Hamlet declares „Speak, I‟ll go no 
further‟ (1/5/1). This is spoken surely for fear of imminent danger, rather than fatigue or 
impatience. Given either interpretation, the point holds no matter how far along the path 
over „the battlements‟ to the cliff-edge we suppose that these events are occurring. The 
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high battlements (and the drop below), the cliff-edge, the view of the sea, these are parts 
of the image that are directly on-stage, not off-stage referents.  
Of course, this example depends entirely upon staging and specific decisions made 
regarding each production, but serves as an apt illustration for what we mean by 
„theatrical elision‟. For theatre, there is no need to portray these elements. We can think, 
for example, of Peter Brook‟s The Tragedy of Hamlet (2000), in which the encounter 
between Hamlet and the Ghost takes place on an essentially bare stage (with the 
exception of a single candelabrum). The performance of an absence can replace 
perceptible representation in a way that other visual media are not able to. If, for 
instance, we look to the same sequence in Laurence Olivier‟s classic 1948 film of 
Hamlet, we find a very different presentation from that which is practicable in theatre. 
We find Olivier‟s Hamlet warily ascending a stone staircase to the edge of the cliff, 
which is discernible just behind the Ghost, although shrouded in mist (Figures 1 & 2). 
The camera keeps close to his footsteps, emphasising the „completeness‟, the „reality‟ of 
the image before us: there is nothing that the screen cannot show, this is the suggestion. 
There is nothing missing from this image (certainly there is an off-screen, as there is an 
off-stage, but this is not the site of elision). Film shows all that happens. This is one of 
its founding premises (although not a straightforward or uncontested one), and this is 
something that we will be exploring in greater detail in the next chapter. 
Figure 1: Hamlet about to follow the Ghost up the 
staircase to the cliff edge. Hamlet (1948), dir.  
Laurence Olivier, Two Cities Films. 
Figure 2: Hamlet encounters the Ghost. The cliff edge 
is visible, just, in the lower left hand corner. Hamlet 
(1948), dir. Laurence Olivier, Two Cities Films. 
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With some explanation of what theatrical elision is, the next question that arises is how 
does it actually function? To answer this we can turn back to the term itself. „Elision‟ is 
an apt description for this process in theatre, as the absence that it creates functions in 
the same way in both language and the theatrical image. It involves an absence within 
the chain of representation, identified and determined by its context, the effects that it 
has upon other representations, and their interactions with it. For example, in a line such 
as „If a man‟s brains were in‟s heels, were‟t not in danger of kibes?‟,355 spoken by the 
Fool in King Lear, that it is the words „his‟ and „it‟ that have been elided is discoverable 
from both the narrative and syntactical contexts. The significance of the words 
surrounding the elisions provides us with a means for identifying their significance. In a 
manner of speaking, we could say that elisions are identifiable through their effects, are 
deduced, therefore, retrospectively. So it is in theatre (the main difference being that the 
written elision is denoted by a punctuation mark, such as an apostrophe or ellipsis, 
which theatrical elision is not), with the „effects‟ of the elided representation influencing 
the perceptible representations that engage with it, which can be said to be responding 
to it. 
Samuel Weber describes the action of theatrical elision, although he does not give it this 
name, in similar terms. He recounts a performance by the Liyuan Theatre, a Peking 
Opera company, of “Autumn River”. The scene itself involves a young nun, named 
Chen Miaochang, pursuing her banished love, Pan Bizheng. She comes to a river, across 
which she must travel, and a boatman with his ferry, which is her means. What is 
unusual about this performance, in terms of Western theatre, is that only the two actors 
are physically present on stage, and with a single prop (a long pole for the boatman‟s 
oar). The issue of the scene, Weber notes, is not to do with whether she will be 
successful or with the progress of her journey, but with the interrelation between 
theatrical objects, with the play of balance and influence through which they affect one 
another, with a staging of the capacity and unicity of theatrical representation. As 
Weber describes: 
This rustic figure glides onto the stage in his (invisible) boat, suggested by the 
way he holds and moves the oar... With the suggested movement of the boat, 
there is inevitably that of the water itself, “visible” only in its effects: the 
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rhythmic swaying of the man‟s body, rigid as it leans against the pole. [My 
italics].
356
 
This „exemplary allegory of theatricality‟357 is a precise example of elision, as we have 
defined it. In this scene, the boat and the water (their existence as well as their qualities) 
are only „suggested‟ by the „responses‟ of the perceptible objects to them, like a black 
hole that absorbs all light, made visible only through its distorting interactions with 
other entities. 
The theatrical image is here conceived of as a play of mutually determining encounters, 
not only between perceptible objects (actors, props, music, lighting, spectators, etc.) but 
also between perceptible objects and elisions, non-perceptible objects, active absences. 
As Weber goes on to say: 
It is this ballet of balance, expressed, not just in Chen‟s movements, but above 
all in the way they interact with those of the boatman, that constitutes the 
exquisite theatricality of this scene, which, in our context at least, can be read, 
witnessed, seen, and heard as an allegory of theatricality as medium – not as a 
medium of representation, but as a medium that redefines activity as 
reactivity.
358
 
An initial point. Weber‟s characterisation of theatre as a medium is somewhat 
ambiguous here. It is not a medium of representation, if representation is given a 
particular meaning, one that is suggested by his previous reference to the „“drama” of 
this scene‟ being „not the search to be reunited with one‟s beloved‟.359 It is not, 
fundamentally, a medium of representation if representation is taken to mean „narrative‟ 
or, in one of the definitions ascribed by Derrida as being anathema to Artaud‟s project, 
„the sensory illustration of a text already written... which the stage would then only 
repeat but whose fabric it would not constitute.‟360 Although, as both Derrida and 
Lyotard have extensively shown, a complete escape from representation is as 
impossible as it is, ultimately, undesirable. But, the primary detail that I wish to 
emphasise from this quotation is the notion of theatre as a medium of „reactivity‟. The 
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elisionary act certainly addresses the spectator through reactivity: it is structured as an 
active, causative phenomenon to which other theatrical objects react. Its nature is, 
consequently, complicit with a degree of „assumption‟, or being „taken for granted‟. 
And, when employed, it is necessary for the theatrical image, for the chain of 
representations, that the elisionary act is successful in addressing itself thus. However, 
its secret is that the perceptible events on stage are not „re-actions‟ to moments of 
elision, the boatman is not moving because of the action of the water, but they are, 
rather, „retro-actions‟. Elisionary acts are constituted through a process of „backwards 
discovery‟: the medium of theatre and theatricality generally, in these moments, is 
definable not through reactivity but retroactivity. 
This condition is exemplified by a passage of Don DeLillo‟s, from his 2001 novel The 
Body Artist, which is, in turn, insightfully discussed by Nicholas Royle in his succinct 
article entitled „Clipping‟ (2008). DeLillo describes the experience of dropping 
„something‟, something unknown, which is determined only „belatedly‟ and through its 
effects upon one‟s awareness and perceptions. Initially „you know it only as a formless 
distortion of the teeming space around your body‟361 and, then, „you hear it hit the 
floor‟. These effects determine one‟s awareness of what the unknown „something‟ is: 
„you hear the thing fall and know what it is at the same time, more or less, and it‟s a 
paperclip.‟362 „The same time‟, but „more or less‟, not „the same time‟: the mark of an 
imperceptible, undecidable ambivalence between being determined and expected. 
Retroactively, one comes to know the nature of the fallen „thing‟, of the fall that 
happened, through its discernible effects in the present: 
Now that you know you dropped it, you remember how it happened, or half 
remember, of sort of see it maybe, or something else.
363
 
The memory of the event comes about only after the „knowledge‟ that the event 
happened, „knowledge‟ which has been ascertained through the „evidence‟ of the 
event‟s apparent influences upon perceptible reality. As Royle says, „everything in a 
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sense is already being re-created here‟.364 It constitutes what DeLillo later calls a 
„ghostly moment‟365 within, to use Royle‟s terms, a „ghostly narrative‟ or „spectral 
text‟.366 The passage of DeLillo‟s from which I am quoting here, and with which Royle 
works in his paper, is a relatively lengthy one. One which I am necessarily cutting short: 
an editorial „clipping‟, a decision (dēcīdĕre: to cut off) to elide for the sake of concision 
(concīdĕre: to cut up, i.e. into pieces). 
My elision speaks to the notion of „something missing‟, something that exists but is 
known only through its effects, which DeLillo describes. I have „cut‟ DeLillo‟s text into 
pieces, and then „cut off‟ that which I do not wish to represent. I ask my reader to 
assume, rightly, that the missing part, the part that I have concised, exists, is real and is 
both here, in the background informing my citations, quite literally haunting them, and 
is in another place. It is the same request that is being made by DeLillo‟s falling „thing‟; 
it is the same request being made by the theatrical elision. However, the key distinction 
is that, in both of these instances, the thing elided does not exist. It never did. As 
DeLillo concludes this passage: „The paperclip hits the floor... but when you bend to 
pick it up, it isn‟t there.‟367 Unseen, it haunts the present, without an origin, without 
being „somewhere else‟.368 Retroaction, rather than reaction. In this circumstance, 
everything „is already being re-created here [my italics]‟, only here, always already. 
3.vi “What are rats?”  Jeopardizing Theatre: Funesian Memory and Elisional 
„Representation‟ 
The first episode that I ever saw of the enormously successful US game-show Jeopardy! 
was one aired in 1984. (Although it may sound like a confession, there is a relevance to 
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this statement beyond simply catharsis.) As many readers will know, contestants are 
presented with the answer to a question and, from this, must extrapolate the correct 
question, phrasing it in the form of “what is...” or “what are...”, etc. The first answer of 
this particular instalment was „questioned‟ by a contestant named Greg, from Waverly, 
Ohio, who was presented with: “These rodents first got to America by stowing away on 
ships”. Greg, quite rightly, of course, gave the question “What are rats?” 
This little anecdote quite neatly illustrates the difficulty that theatrical elision creates for 
Funesian memory. Elision can be usefully thought of as a response, an answer, to a 
question that has never been asked. The elisionary act is known through the responses 
to it that are perceptible in the theatrical image, as in the Jeopardy! comparison, in 
which responses are given, the cause of which (the question) must be deduced from said 
responses. But how does this reversibility of causality place Funesian memory in 
„jeopardy‟: imperil it, produce a moment in which everything „hangs in the balance‟,369 
in which memory becomes undecided? This problem has a close affinity with the logic 
of the archive explored by Derrida in his wide-ranging work on memory, history and 
psychoanalysis (amongst many other things), Archive Fever. 
One enters an archive, searching for a truth. But the concept of the archive, as Derrida 
tells us, is more accurately described as a response, a response directed, not towards the 
past, but towards the future: 
The question of the archive is not, we repeat, a question of the past... It is a 
question of the future, the question of the future itself, the question of a 
response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow.
370
 
Theatrical elision elicits a search for a truth, an origin. And for the Funesian model of 
memory, there must be the possibility, the theoretical possibility, of finding one. For 
Funesian memory, the response (the perceptible representation that bears the mark of 
the elided event) must have a cause, situated in the past, to which the response refers. 
When we consider elision, that which „respond‟ to its unseen, unheard acts serve as 
addresses directed towards the future, towards determining a „knowledge‟ of the elided 
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act, as an act which has no existence prior to receiving such a response. Just as the 
archive, so elision. An archive of elision. How can we say this? 
Perhaps to think elision as anarchive: as the institution and destruction of an archive, 
which is to say that the elisionary act is an archival act. Question and answer: a figure of 
locution, which seems, for Derrida, to be a figure characteristic of engagement with the 
archive. Elision participates in the temporal indecision of the archive, Janus-faced, it 
looks to the past and the future at the same time. To look to the archive as a means of 
accessing the past is to be, as Derrida terms it, „en mal d‟archive‟. As he explains, this 
being in „need of archives‟, which is also a „sickness‟, which is „archive fever‟, is: 
To burn with a passion... It is to run after the archive... It is to have a 
compulsive, repetitive, and nostalgic desire for the archive, an irrepressible 
desire to return to the origin.
371
 
The „effects‟ produced by the elisionary act (the perceptible „responses‟ to it) prompt 
this desire to capture what has been „missed‟, the something missing, the something 
„dropped‟, „cut out‟, elided. The desire to find the origin, the „live origin‟, to see it 
happen. 
This, Derrida tells us, is the desire of Freud as „archaeologist‟, as, so I have suggested in 
Chapter 1, „hermeneuticist‟. In a careful reading of Freud‟s reading of Jensen‟s 
Gradiva, Derrida articulates this position explicitly: 
Freud claims again to bring to light a more originary origin than that of the 
specter... He wants to exhume a more archaic impression... an impression that is 
almost no longer an archive but almost confuses itself with the pressure of the 
footstep that leaves its still-living mark on a substrate, a surface, a place of 
origin.
372
 
Freud, like Hanold in Jensen‟s story, is searching for an „irreplaceable place‟, the site, 
„the very ash‟373 (la cendre même), at which he will find the „ultimate cause‟.374 
Gradiva serves as an illustration for this aspect of psychoanalysis, as a science of lost 
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histories, of forgotten truths: the moment sought is that which is „an archive without 
archive, where, suddenly indiscernible from the impression of its imprint, Gradiva‟s 
footstep speaks by itself!‟375 And so, with elision, which is predicated upon the desire to 
make that which is elided „speak‟, to experience it directly. 
The theatrical representations which constitute its „effects‟ function as „prompts‟, a 
familiar notion for theatre, a term derived from the Latin „promptus‟ („brought to 
light‟376). These „prompts‟, as does Freud, as does Hanold, „claim to bring to light‟, to 
offer a means of revealing, bringing to mind, as if for the first time, the missing origin, 
the absent event. However, the possibility of unearthing this origin in its „uniqueness‟ 
is, Derrida argues, a possibility only in dreams and speculation: 
This uniqueness is not even a past present. It would have been possible, one can 
dream of it after the fact... The faithful memory of such a singularity can only be 
given over to the specter.
377
 
His point here is that the unique, singular origin, thought in its uniqueness, is always 
already compromised by iterability from the moment one thinks it. As he says of the 
secret, „there can be no archive, by definition‟:378 once the secret is known, it is no 
longer a secret. But elision is radically anarchivic. Its secret is that it is not only „not 
even a past present‟, but also not even a past. The effect is the same: the original 
moment is irrecoverable. All we can do is communicate with specters. Or try to. This 
phantasmatic elision. As Derrida says of Yerushalmi‟s attempts to speak with the ghost 
of Freud: „the phantom does not respond‟.379 
The elisionary act concurs with the mode of Yerushalmi‟s attempt in its replication of 
the analytic situation (as we shall see further in subchapter 3.vii), in its replication of 
Freud‟s self-decreed practice. And whilst this parallel is not entirely precise (for 
instance, one reason that Freud will not respond to Yerushalmi, Derrida tells us, is that 
„he has already responded‟,380 not so with elision), it concurs as far as this: 
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Leaving one to speak, he [Freud and the phantom] makes one speak, never 
responding except to silence himself, only being silent to let the patient speak.
381
 
The elisionary act is equally silent in itself: we know it through its effects, not directly, 
not in person. It tells us nothing. The unspoken question, the elisionary process compels 
us to enunciate it, to create it (which is also, of course, to assume that we are „re-
creating‟ it). For Funesian memory, which posits the existence of a verifiable original, 
of which mnemic images or experiences are exact copies, elision is anathema.  
Just as Derrida disturbs the status of an origin as singular and authentic origin, the idea 
of an accessible „first time‟, so elision corresponds with this condition by never having a 
„first time‟, never having taken place at all. Just as Hanold cannot revivify Gradiva, the 
desire impelling his archaeological exploits, despite her one-time existence, so the 
elided act cannot be returned to a life that it has never had. As „something missing‟ its 
characterisation is predicated upon an experience located in the future, and 
retrospectively assumed, rather than a nostalgia for a lost original, source or authority. 
Yet it „leaves‟ traces, not copies (how could it?), of itself. It leaves an archive. A 
promptive archive which claims to bring the elided into the light. An archive which, 
quite literally, „produces as much as it records the event‟.382 Indeed, with elision, it 
„records‟ upon condition that it produces the event. This is why we can say that the 
elisionary act is structured as something missed, but is also always „to come‟. 
Derrida defines „the archive as an irreducible experience of the future‟:383 it is to be 
engaged with in the future, and is thus „never closed‟. The archive is „an unconditional 
affirmation, it is the affirmation of the future to come [l‟à-venir]‟.384 And Derrida is 
very specific over his use of this term, „avenir rather than the futur‟ because, as he says, 
the former „point[s] toward the coming of an event rather than toward some future 
present [i.e. „futur‟]‟.385 The archive of the elisionary act, its „effects‟, which are truly 
prompts, are just such an address to the future. They give an impression, are an 
impression, of what has been „missed‟. The elisionary act is always „to come‟, but not 
as a future present. It will never appear, in person, as an evidential or demonstrable 
                                                             
381
 Derrida, Archive Fever, p.62. 
382
 Derrida, Archive Fever, p.17. 
383
 Derrida, Archive Fever, p.68. 
384
 Derrida, Archive Fever, p.68. 
385
 Derrida, Archive Fever, p.68. 
108 
 
object, but only as an „assumption‟ (a taking into oneself) based upon the form of the 
archive, the structuring of the elided event by its own effects. This status of theatrical 
elision as l‟à-venir is similarly suggested by Weber when, describing the “Autumn 
River” scene, he finds that theatre „emerges as a powerful medium of the arrivant.‟386 
„The arrivant‟: this signifies the „arrival‟, the „new comer‟, from „arriver‟ („to arrive‟). 
Theatre as arrivant is always in the process of arriving. The always new comer. This 
cuts to the heart of theatricality. And it is with this example, this model of elision, that 
Weber chooses to illustrate the constant „displacement‟ intrinsic to theatricality, the 
condition of theatre as being „not bound to arrive at a final destination‟.387 For elision is 
the epitome of this aspect of theatricality: it will not arrive, as it cannot arrive as futur, 
only as an experience of the promise, an opening to the future, as l‟à-venir.  
3.vi.i The Unborn Object: Elision and Pseudocyesis 
We can also think of elision as another kind of „to come‟, a „coming into the world‟ 
(venir au monde). A pregnancy, in a literal sense (prae-gnāscī: „before being born‟388), 
the potential to be born, the before of being realised. But for elision, as a model of 
elision, this pregnancy is a phantom pregnancy: a pseudocyesis. As neurologist V.S. 
Ramachandran defines this condition: 
Some women who desperately want to be pregnant – and occasionally some 
who deeply dread pregnancy – develop all the signs and symptoms of true 
pregnancy... Everything seems normal except for one thing: There is no baby.
389
 
This traumatic phenomenon is still largely unexplained, at least conclusively. 
Infamously, and to the professional embarrassment of many doctors who come across 
this relatively uncommon occurrence, there is no way of differentiating between a true 
and a phantom pregnancy based upon the symptoms. Sometimes even to the extent that 
positive results are produced on pregnancy tests. Every symptom is the same. The only 
methods for distinguishing are based upon, as Ramachandran identifies, the physical 
lack of a baby. These methods are listed by Paul Paulman, a family practitioner at the 
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University of Nebraska Medical Center, in an interview upon the subject with the New 
York Times (2006):  
You don‟t hear heart tones from the fetus, you don‟t see the fetus on ultrasound, 
and you don‟t get a delivery.390 
It cannot be heard, it cannot be seen, it does not arrive. It is known only through its 
effects, effects from which a belief, an assumption, a knowledge adopted unto oneself, 
is derived. 
The „phantom‟ of the phantom pregnancy and the phantom of elision are of the same 
order. It is certainly highly resonant, although the connection is surely unintended, to 
hear Ramachandran state: „Pseudocyesis is dramatic [my italics]‟.391 But this 
connection is more than coincidental. Pseudocyesis is similarly caught, suspended, 
between two temporal prospects: it both looks backward to seek an origin and looks 
forward to the delivery of a meeting, in the flesh, an actualisation. In other words, 
pseudocyesis is caught between expectation and mourning. Expectation that the blessèd 
event, the birth, will happen, the delivery will be made: that these promptings, 
symptoms, signs, are a prelude to the object itself appearing. And mourning that what is 
missing will, in fact, never appear. In pseudocyesis, I would suggest, the overwhelming 
belief and expectation in the reality of the pregnancy is predominant. It is this that is 
experienced consciously. The element of mourning here is akin to the „illness of 
mourning‟ that Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok develop through their concept of the 
„entombed‟ secret. It would be appropriate to consider the secret in pseudocyesis, that 
the pregnancy is a phantom one, that there is no physical origin to the bodily symptoms 
manifested, as a secret that the sufferer keeps from herself. The loss of the mourned 
object is, essentially, „split‟ from the psyche. In Abraham and Torok‟s words, it „leads 
to the establishment of a sealed-off psychic place, a crypt in the ego‟,392 the „crypt‟ of 
the secret. 
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Theatrical elision, whilst not being experienced to the same degree as such extreme and 
traumatic states as those that are to be found in pathology, entails a similar process due 
to a similar relationship with the loss of an object. In pseudocyesis, the force driving the 
condition is, as Ramachandran tells us, the wish to be pregnant (or the fear of this, but I 
would posit that the same process could be shown to function in each case, the wish 
always being contemporaneous with its opposite in the unconscious, as Freud teaches), 
the „intense longing for a child‟ which leads to the “baby” being „literally conjured out 
of thin air through a process of unconscious learning‟.393 
However, I would further suggest that the wish that motivates pseudocyesis is more 
usefully thought of not necessarily as the wish for a baby, or to be pregnant, but as the 
wish for a physical object that will correspond, give form, to an aspect of the 
unconscious. The reason for this refinement is the episode provided by Freud in 
reference to, arguably, the founding case of psychoanalysis: that of Anna O. Anna O. 
presents symptoms of pseudocyesis just as her psychoanalytic treatment is coming to an 
end.
394
 Whilst this is not referred to in the initial case history in Studies on Hysteria, or 
in the Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis (in both of which the Anna O. case is discussed 
extensively), it is related at some length in both Ernest Jones‟s biography of Freud (as 
having been told to Jones by Freud) and in a letter from Freud to Stefan Zweig (No. 
265: June 2
nd
, 1932). Freud describes Breuer‟s termination of his treatment of Anna O., 
and his subsequent summoning back to her (that evening) owing to a sudden and grave 
deterioration in her condition. According to Jones, Breuer now found her: 
In the throes of a hysterical childbirth (pseudocyesis), the logical termination of 
a phantom pregnancy that had been invisibly developing in response to Breuer‟s 
ministrations [my italics].
395
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The one time that Freud (or Jones) gives voice to Anna O. in this episode is to quote her 
cry upon being asked „what was wrong with her‟: 
 “Now Dr. B‟s child is coming!”396 
What should we note here? Firstly, there is no evidence that Anna O. ever expressed a 
desire to be pregnant or to have a child. Indeed, Freud notes in Studies on Hysteria that 
„the element of sexuality was astonishingly undeveloped in her‟.397 If the wish driving 
her pseudocyesis were the wish to have a child, this „intense longing‟ would surely have 
been noted elsewhere in the case histories. Secondly, in the exclamation that Freud 
quotes, Anna does not take ownership of the child that her symptoms lead her to believe 
is about to be born. She does not cry „now my child is coming‟, or even „the child‟, but 
identifies it exclusively with Breuer. If her pseudocyesis were the result of the wish for 
a child, this is certainly the opposite that we might expect. My suggestion, and it is 
inevitably a tentative one, is that the unspoken wish of Anna‟s pseudocyesis is not for a 
child, but is rather to materialise a physical, representative object
398
 that will correspond 
to, embody, the rapport between analyst and analysand. A way of bringing their 
therapeutic relationship, indeed we could also say the experience of the psychoanalytic 
treatment and the transference that it unavoidably entails, into the world (venir au 
monde). The „child‟ is a „response‟ to Breuer‟s influence, his treatment, his 
„ministrations‟. It becomes a potential representation of Anna‟s experience of Breuer, 
which explains her identification of it with him, rather than herself. 
I feel sure that more could be said on this case. However, for our present purposes the 
key point is that we find in pseudocyesis a model of elision, an elision of the 
phantomatic child, certainly, but also an elision of the phantomatic object. The missing 
object that is desired, that is desired to be seen, to be heard, to arrive. There is an 
expectation that this representative object will appear, due to its „effects‟, its symptoms, 
and a mourning, from a „secret‟ knowledge, that it never will. And we find in theatrical 
elision that the ambivalence between a mourning for the „something missed‟ and an 
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expectation that it will appear, is similarly predicated upon the wish for an object, a 
„lost‟ object. Like Gradiva, the phantom cannot be met in life; unlike Gradiva, the 
phantom in pseudocyesis and theatrical elision has never had life. For the Funesian 
model of memory, elision presents a radical challenge. It cannot be incorporated within 
the Funesian, Aristotelian, schema of authentic, authoritative originals and mnemonic 
copying. However, elision complements another model of memory well, and this 
alternative, „energetic‟ model offers another way of approaching theatre. A way that can 
take account of such distinctive constituents as elision. 
3.vii „I am looking for you in the image and I can‟t find you any more‟:399 The 
Energetics of Theatrical Elision as Negative Hallucination 
Having discussed the nature of, and problems posed by, theatrical elision, we can turn 
now to examining its place within an energetic theory of mnemic representation and 
how they dialogically inform one another, exploring the consequences that this has for 
how we understand the processes and possibilities of both theatricality and energetic 
theory. 
The idea of the „something‟ that has been „lost‟, that which has been „missed‟, that 
which is experienced as an elision in theatrical representation, is, as we have seen, a 
source of desire. This is a phenomenon that is treated at length throughout 
psychoanalysis. Analysts such as André Green have discussed the „absent object‟ 
through an analysis that helps us to understand the impulse towards „finding‟ that which 
is „missing‟, which we have characterised as mourning and expectation. As he states: 
It is the absence of the object that causes the affect of unpleasure; the 
representation of satisfaction and of the object that conditions it... it is during 
that absence that the tension becomes the spur of phantasy.
400
 
Green refers here to the oft-repeated argument that the absence of the object leads to the 
hallucinatory representation of it, the phantasy of it, as a means of replacing the 
satisfaction that would have been gained from the object itself. However, as we have 
seen with the phantom „child‟ in pseudocyesis, the „object‟ that is missing is a 
representation. Inevitably this is the case when we are working with theatre, a 
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representational medium (representational, as Derrida has shown, even in such 
apparently anti-representational works and theories as those of Artaud). It is an absence, 
in a chain of representations, where a representation should be, as indicated through its 
perceptible „effects‟, its promptings (in a causal ambivalence that is entirely 
appropriate), its „archive‟, its „responses‟. We have multiply named these as such.  
But this circumstance, making theatrical elision the mark of a missing representation 
rather than the loss of a once-possessed, once-known object that can be substituted by a 
hallucinatory object-representation, does not fundamentally alter the experience of its 
absence. As Green goes on to note: 
[The] absence of any representation of the subject is accompanied by a rise in 
the anxiety affect, which may be compared with anxiety about loss of the 
object.
401
 
Whilst Green is talking about the non-representation of the subject (specifically in the 
frame of the mirror), the equivalence that he describes is applicable to non-
representation generally. This is expanded upon by César and Sára Botella (whose work 
on non-representation we will be relatively familiar with from its discussion in Chapter 
1) when they state: 
In our view, it is not the loss of the object but the danger of the loss of its 
representation and, by extension, the risk of non-representation, which denotes 
distress.
402
 
The absence of representation is, so the Botellas argue, a threat to the psyche, a threat to 
the psyche‟s power to represent, a threat of falling into non-representation. A threat that 
is pre-figured by sleep, falling asleep, which, for the child at least, risks „drowning the 
representation of his objects in the effusion offered by sleep‟.403 And a key 
characteristic of this non-representation, indeed what, I suggest, makes it a source of 
conscious distress and disturbance is the awareness of the non-representation, the sense 
that there is an absence and, thus, an absence of something, something missing. This 
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„sense‟ is identified by Green when he states that: „what is lacking is not the sense of 
existence, but the power of representation‟.404 Something „exists‟, but is not perceptible. 
This is an example of the kind of phenomena that Christopher Bollas is referring to in 
his suggestion that: „nothing is a presence that can be felt‟.405 Whilst Bollas is 
discussing a more generalised definition of „nothing‟ in psychoanalytic theory, 
including all kinds of psychoanalytic phenomena and aspects of „lived experience‟ that 
can be characterised as „nothing‟, the type of non-representation that we are concerned 
with here is certainly included. However, it is described most explicitly, and with great 
clarity, by psychoanalyst Michael Parsons in his introduction to the Botellas‟ The Work 
of Psychic Figurability. Here he explains their concept of „memory without 
recollection‟ (which we will return to shortly) as: 
an inchoate awareness of something having occurred [my italics], or some state 
having obtained, at some time other than the present moment; but an awareness 
that cannot be psychically represented.
406
 
He introduces an appropriate term for this, of his own, naming it „an amnesic trace‟. 
But let us stay with this sense, this pre-knowledge, of „something‟ having happened. 
This „awareness‟ is the initial stage of one‟s reception of theatrical elision, before what 
we have called „promptings‟, the „effects‟ of what is missing, have given us an 
indication of the nature of what is missing. It is contemporaneous with the stage that 
DeLillo describes, if we think back to his portrayal of the falling „paperclip‟, when he 
says: „[Y]ou drop something... It takes a second or two before you know it and even 
then you know it only as a formless distortion of the teeming space around your body 
[my italics].‟407 Only „something‟, no more specific than this. At this point it is only a 
rough awareness of something formless: without representation. There is a „gap‟, 
something has „fallen out‟, this much we understand, but its „effects‟, its context, have 
not yet been thought retrospectively. Not yet been prompted towards a certain 
identification, a certain definition. Theatrical elision is just such a space of „something‟, 
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in which there is nothing. And this condition of non-representation finds an affinity in 
the theorisation of „negative hallucination‟. 
Negative hallucination, which we have detailed to a different purpose in the first 
chapter, is neatly defined by Green in these terms: 
I understand negative hallucination not as absence of representation, but as 
representation of the absence of representation, which is expressed clinically by 
an excess of affect.
408
 
The refinement that Green makes from „absence of representation‟ to negative 
hallucination (and which is followed by the Botellas, amongst others), is an apt way of 
describing the way that we have been thinking non-representation and coincides closely, 
as it does, with our definition of theatrical elision as „something missing‟. A non-
representative representation, we could say, which is awaiting representation, and 
mourning that it will never acquire objective representation, a past authenticity. 
Let us think about negative hallucination a little, this peculiar and little discussed 
occurrence. We have seen already that it is a state that emerges from extremes, a 
manifestation of affect that breaks the chain of representation, whose „peculiarity is to 
recover, abolish, replace representation‟.409 It is an amnesic trace, that useful term of 
Michael Parsons, which indicates its status as belonging to a model of memory alien to 
the Funesian, archaeological model that we have seen being undermined by the 
inassimilable nature of elision. What is meant by Parsons‟s term is that the non-
representation is a mark that has been left upon the psyche, but that does not refer back 
to a memory. It is not composed of mnemic traces and has, therefore, no correspondent 
representation. The memory itself has normally been destroyed or has never existed, due 
to a significant trauma. As the Botellas describe it in relation to one of their cases, that 
of a young Vietnamese girl named Jasmine whose parents were killed in the Vietnam 
war when she was two years old: „the analytic session could not be brought to a halt at 
the level of the representable mnemic traces; the memories were unreachable or rather 
non-existent.‟410 There can be no return to an origin, a source, as there is no memory to 
return back to, and thus no copy in the form of mnemic images. The excess of affect 
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involved in this trauma has resulted in non-representation, and it is this process that will 
often lead to the formation of a negative hallucination. 
A statement of our position. Let us be frank now. Such extremes do not sit comfortably, 
do not accord, with our general experience of theatre. Whilst elision is a common 
feature of the theatrical image, it is more usually experienced as a kind of „abdication‟ 
of representation, rather than a forced destruction of representation caused by such 
traumatic affects. From our velvet-cushioned auditorium seats, programme in hand, we 
do not generally suffer from the strain, tension and terror that non-representation, and 
particularly negative hallucination, is so often described as being a site of. Why would a 
staging wilfully decide to „abdicate‟ representation? 
To speak plainly, as we all know, it is frequently for practical reasons. To physically 
represent Fortinbras‟s army in its entirety would require thousands of extras and 
costumes, a stage the size of the Champs-Élysées, and a budget of Croesusian 
proportions. For a scene of, perhaps, 10-15 minutes. It is quite impracticable. Indeed, it 
is a source of some comment and pleasing novelty that Mike Kenny‟s 2010 production 
of The Railway Children numbers a steam train amongst its props (famously, via the 
conversion of a platform at Waterloo Station). This is precisely the kind of object that 
we would perhaps anticipate being elided in a more conventional staging. Although, we 
should note that practicalities are certainly not the only or even, arguably, the primary 
reason for elision as a staging device, and it is often used precisely to produce a 
particular effect through its qualities and status, as we have been defining it. Examples 
of such productions would include Peter Brook‟s previously cited The Tragedy of 
Hamlet, or Ingmar Bergman‟s radical 1970 version of Strindberg‟s A Dream Play (or, 
The Dreamplay, as Bergman called his), of which contemporary critic Åke Perlström 
said “the only thing we see – and hear – are the actors”.411 
But the question becomes, if such psychical extremes as negative hallucination do not 
seem to involve the same order of experience as theatrical elision, how do we justify 
using them as elucidatory models that can, as is my claim, dialogically provide insights 
into the  processes of theatrical representation due to their equivalence? Whilst, in a 
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qualificative argument that we have made in another context, the degree, the force, of 
the experience may differ, the key point is that the model is analogous. We are working 
within the framework that theatrical representation (indeed visual performative media 
generally, as stated in our introductory preliminaries) and mnemic representation are 
correspondent and inform one another. We also find that the Funesian definition of 
memory is incongruous with theatricality. Given these conditions, I suggest that we can 
turn to an energetic approach to memory, one which seeks to take account of the 
affective aspects of representation rather than treating it exclusively as a signifier 
referring to an absent signified or meaning, to provide a more appropriate alternative. 
And theatrical elision is a point of tension where this argument is precisely 
demonstrated. 
Elision disturbs Funesian memory, but is entirely in accord with an energetic conception 
of memory through its affinity with negative hallucination. Negative hallucination 
which is a concept that, if we can follow Celine Surprenant and make use of a 
convenient if slightly arguable distinction (in its seeming absoluteness), appears to align 
with an economic, an energetic, rather than hermeneutic „understanding of 
psychoanalysis‟.412 This is a claim encouraged by Green‟s portrayal of negative 
hallucination as a condition in which „the affect is experienced with maximum intensity, 
being unable to rest on any representation‟:413 negative hallucination is primarily an 
experience of affect, rather than of ideational representation that could be 
hermeneutically interpreted. And, even if negative hallucination in the analytic situation 
involves very high intensities of affective force, its significance, as functionally 
equivalent to theatrical elision, in terms of an energetic conception of theatrical 
representation is structural, as a kind, a specific instance, of „transitory investment‟.414 
Although we should also note that we are not precluding the possibility that theatrical 
elision will result in a high intensity of affective energy, will even be disturbing in its 
effects, it is simply that in this case the model that I am proposing is more self-
evidentially at work. 
We recall here Lyotard‟s exposition of „an energetic theatre‟, in his piece „The Tooth, 
the Palm‟, which, as we previously argued, is useful not so much as a practical 
                                                             
412
 Surprenant, p.121. 
413
 Green, The Fabric of Affect, p.205. 
414
 Lyotard, „The Tooth, the Palm‟, p.287. 
118 
 
proposition or schema for a realisable design of theatre, but as a means of approaching, 
of understanding, theatre generally (particularly those aspects of theatre and 
performances that resist analysis). Lyotard makes use of this term, „transitory 
investment‟, in his discussion of „the tooth‟ and „the palm‟, which are not so much 
„signs‟ as they are „two investments of the libido‟.415 Let us remind ourselves of 
Lyotard‟s description in detail: 
[T]he tooth and the palm no longer have a relationship of illusion and truth, 
cause and effect, signifier and signified (or vice versa), but they coexist, 
independently, as transitory investments... The tooth and the palm no longer 
mean anything, they are forces, intensities, present affects.
416
 
From an energetic perspective, elision has no „meaning‟, represents nothing in itself 
outside its own non-representation (as Green identifies in negative hallucination). And 
whilst we assert that the elisionary act is knowable only through its „effects‟, this is 
quite in keeping with Lyotard‟s rejection of a causal relationship. For Lyotard it is the 
„reversibility‟ of the tooth and the palm, rather than one representing the other or „a 
hierarchy of one position over the other‟,417 that entails the destruction of causality and, 
thus, of the referential sign. As we have detailed above, theatrical elision is similarly 
constituted as a challenge to causality through its reversibility, which the Funesian 
model of memory cannot incorporate: the elided act is „assumed‟ to produce „effects‟ 
through which it can be known (elision as something missed), whilst simultaneously 
there is no elided act and, therefore, the „effects‟ are actually „prompts‟ that 
retrospectively denote the elision (elision as never having happened at all).  
Elision, this key aspect of theatricality, is intrinsically accordant with Lyotard‟s theory 
of theatrical representation (or, in this case, the representation of a non-representation) 
as a „transitory investment‟. As is negative hallucination, which is similarly 
characterised by a condition of reversibility in its „representative‟ capacity, but this 
point we shall address momentarily. Negative hallucination, which figures the structural 
role and potential of the elisionary act within an energetics of theatrical representation, 
demonstrates the consequences that elision involves for an energetic approach. As 
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Green tells us in the quotation above, in affective terms, negative hallucination is 
determined by an inability of the affect to „rest on any representation‟. The result of this 
is „a rise in the anxiety affect‟ linked to the loss of representation. With this we are 
familiar, and the corollary of it is that theatrical elision is also subject to anxiety. It is 
this that impels the wish for representation. 
However, another feature of negative hallucination is detailed by Green in his later work 
The Work of the Negative (1999, originally published in 1993 as Le travail du Négatif), 
when he describes how: 
the deletion [the non-representation of negative hallucination] simultaneously 
sharpens the details and suppresses their existence, as if to draw attention as well 
to the danger that it is thought to be the cause of this deletion.
418
 
Negative hallucination involves an increased prominence (partly as a result of the 
increased anxiety that it provokes) that highlights its status as deletion, that signals its 
existence as a representation of a non-representation. This notion of the deletion 
„drawing attention to itself‟ can be seen throughout the case studies that Green and the 
Botellas present of negative hallucination. For example, Green relates the case of a 
female patient whose „intense stare‟ disturbed and diverted him, however, the reason for 
this intensity is revealed to be that „she was in the grip of a negative hallucination in 
which she no longer saw me‟. As the patient states: „I have two great black holes in 
place of eyes, I see and I don‟t see you... In fact, I can‟t see you‟.419 The negative 
hallucination draws attention to itself, not only through the patient‟s striking description 
of her experience of it as having „holes in place of eyes‟, but, furthermore, through the 
„intensity‟ with which the patient focuses upon that which has been „deleted‟ (i.e. the 
analyst). 
A similar account occurs in the Botellas‟ work with their patient Florian, in which 
Florian, after relating his sighting of the analyst that morning before his session, grows 
increasingly concerned that his observation had been fictitious until the figure of the 
analyst is erased from his mnemic image of that morning altogether. As per our titular 
quotation, he states: 
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“I don‟t know any more if I saw you... I am looking for you in the image and I 
can‟t find you any more”.420 
Florian is „looking‟ in the image, but, as with Green‟s patient, cannot find the deleted 
figure of the analyst, which is a source of preoccupation for him. The increased 
„significance‟ of the deleted content is indicated by the increased „sharpness‟ and sense 
of portentousness in its surrounding context and representations. We see, for example, 
Florian‟s fixation upon, and repetition of, „dark glasses‟:421 for him a significant object 
that forms part of the image, and which both precedes and is derived from the negative 
hallucination. Or, we can cite the Botellas‟ identification that, just preceding the 
negative hallucination itself, there was „a heavy silence, longer, more pregnant than 
usual [my italics]‟.422 This inevitably reminds us of pseudocyesis, a connection that is 
far from coincidental. For this silence acts as a „prompt‟ and „effect‟, which is 
recognised as being a site of abnormal potency and potentiality. An „alert‟, if you will, 
to the proximity, no, better to say l‟à-venir, of negative hallucination. 
And the „prompts‟, „effects‟, that similarly contextualise theatrical elision are also, we 
find, received as being of „more than usual‟ significance, as being, let us say, over-
determined.
423
 They are dually determined as objects themselves, gestures with their 
own significance, and also markers of the elided act („producing‟ and „responding to‟) 
functioning in relation to the elision. Are these two functions ever truly separable? I 
would suggest not: their interaction is constitutive of the object. But the key point is that 
the act of elision leads to a „sharpening‟, an increase in intensity and conspicuousness, 
of those representations that are indicative of it. We can think of Chen‟s interactions 
with the elided boat: here we take note of Chen‟s movements as transformations, as 
aspects, that speak to us of the object Chen, but also that are in dialogic relation with the 
movement of the boat. Such gestures bear the force of each object, one perceptible, one 
elided. 
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3.vii.i „Working as a double‟: Engaging with Negative Hallucination 
This leads us to the consequences of this line of thought. These conditions of negative 
hallucination and elision can result in a certain mode of approach from both the analyst 
and, I would suggest, the spectator, respectively. In negative hallucination, the anxiety 
aroused by non-representation and the „sharpening‟ of its correspondent details evoke a 
certain mode of working between the analyst and the analysand. As the Botellas note:  
There are grounds for thinking that an affect, signalling the danger of non-
representation that was almost awakened in the analyst, immediately „created 
found‟ a figure, an adequate representation.424 
This is a process that we touched upon briefly in Chapter 1, although we shall reiterate 
what is relevant for this context, and is what the Botellas refer to as „functioning or 
working as a double (travail en double)‟.425 They provide a practical example of this 
„figuration‟ by the analyst in the case of Florian, in which they describe that: „at the 
same time as this psychical phenomenon [negative hallucination] took place in Florian, 
there occurred in the analyst a work of figurability‟.426 This „working as a double‟ 
involves the psyche of the analyst facilitating the giving of form to that which has been 
deleted in the psyche of the analysand. The analyst allows him/herself to be „infiltrated 
by an image‟,427 an image arising „under the influence of what the analysand has told 
him‟.428 In this way the analyst „reflects what is only potential in the other‟.429  The 
affective energy of the negative hallucination is „transformed‟, „displaced‟, into a 
representative figure that emerges, in an animistic form, from the psyche of the analyst 
or, to be more precise, from between the psyches of the analyst and analysand: „the 
product of a common work‟.430 It is a question of providing the „amnesic trace‟ with a 
„recollection‟, but, in a reversal of the more usual analytic process: 
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The analyst did not formulate a latent content that he had discovered behind a 
manifest content, but in the absence of both he advanced preconscious 
formations susceptible of... serving as manifest content.
431
 
The radical difference that this approach inaugurates from a Funesian conception of 
memory is noted with the remark: „we are far from a problem of memory linked to 
repression‟.432 
We are working here with a model of memory that is conditioned through reversibility, 
just as we have seen in the case of elision, and just as Lyotard associates with an 
energetic conception of representation (against the referentiality of the sign). This is 
demonstrated, firstly, through Green‟s identification of „negativity‟ as „what is 
appreciated as absent cause retroactively deduced‟.433 An absent cause, only determined 
retroactively: causality is here made precisely uncertain. And, secondly, through the 
Botellas‟ description of the figuration that emerges from „working as a double‟ as being 
„created found‟: the temporal ambivalence here is between the figure that is created for 
the first time, and the experience (falsely assumed, as with the elided content in 
theatricality) of this figure as one that has been lost and is to be recovered. As we have 
said previously, the result of this is that the validity, the „truth‟, of the figuration as a 
mnemic image is, so the Botellas suggest, essentially irrelevant. The prime objective is 
that a representation, to which the affective energy of the negative hallucination can be 
attached or can be manifested through, is installed. Although, this representation must 
be assumed to be appropriate, must be believed, in the manner of a screen memory, for 
the non-representation to be moved past. The Botellas support this theory through 
reference to their reading of Freud, who, as they detail, „put forward an idea, which, it 
seems to us, was revolutionary – namely, that the conviction aroused in the analysand 
by the work of the analyst “achieves the same therapeutic result as a recaptured 
memory”.‟434 
That this process, this therapy, is possible, this is our concern. However, we are also in 
the same territory as Derrida uncomfortably finds himself in Archive Fever, at the point 
at which he discusses the difference between the „intention to kill [Moses]‟ and the 
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„acting out of this desire to kill‟ for the unconscious. He determines that „the 
unconscious does not know the difference here between the virtual and the actual‟.435 
This is the same characteristic of the unconscious that the Botellas‟ strategy of 
figurability exploits. And, as Derrida notes, so we should also note, that „we will never 
have finished, we have not in truth begun, drawing all the ethico-juridical consequences 
from this‟.436 
It is my contention that this process of „working as a double‟, of facilitating the 
emergence of a mnemic image derived from a continuity between two psyches, which 
will serve to figure the elided, the non-representation, is also operative in theatrical 
elision. Elisionary acts address the spectator (indeed, all participants in the theatrical 
image) in such a way that he/she comes to be in the same position as the analyst. Not as 
interpreters, but by „working as doubles‟. The elisionary act seeks to move from being 
„something missing‟ to being an „assumption‟: literally, as a „taking unto oneself‟, a 
„taking for granted‟ (from crēdĕre: to believe), and, perhaps most resonantly, a 
„pretence‟. A pretence that one believes, fooling oneself, playing oneself false: a 
delusion. Unnoticed, this self-deception „just happens‟, the image infiltrates... and, if 
successful, should be silent. This is the structure through which this element of 
theatricality aims to engage the spectator. After the show is over, we can often have an 
image of an elided content, even if we do not know where this image has appeared 
from. How is this possible? As Freud tells us, „there is a grain of truth concealed in 
every delusion‟.437 What truth? Here, this truth is one‟s own. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the spectator‟s work with the theatrical image 
actually is a work of two psyches, an anthropomorphic fallacy, but rather that the 
spectator works „under the influence‟ (as the analyst with the analysand) of the „prompt-
effects‟ that structure, that „produce as much as record‟,438 the elided event. These 
perceptible representations address the spectator through informing him/her as to the 
context, the boundaries, we could say, of the elided representation. It is only through 
community with the spectator that the „missing‟ object can be figured. Hence, one‟s 
own truth: each spectator will have their own understanding of what has been elided. 
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This leaves energetics, as a way of approaching theatre, with a self-evident problem. A 
problem that is frequently, even inevitably, raised amongst methodologies that work 
with alternatives to hermeneutic analysis. The problem of subjectivity haunts an 
energetic approach: it is a snare easily fallen into. Why is this a problem? Specifically 
because the subjectivity of the representation, the product of „working as a double‟, 
associated with the elisionary event forestalls discussion, debate, a critical engagement. 
With each spectator responding personally, there is no single object. The „content‟ of 
the „image‟ is different every time. How can we, therefore, practically take account of 
elision within energetics as a mode of criticism: a criticism based upon an energetic 
understanding, which is more appropriate to engaging with key aspects of theatricality?  
This is the impasse that Ehrenzweig, as we noted in Chapter 2, comes up against in his 
theory of „unconscious scanning‟, in relation to art. It is also the consequence of avant-
garde New York theatre director Richard Foreman‟s advice to his spectators when he 
states that: „it is the impulse that is your deep truth, not the object that seems to call it 
forth‟,439 the „impulse... [is] unconnected to the objects‟.440 Foreman‟s ideas on theatre 
consistently engage with psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic concepts, and his theatrical 
strategies are often derived from the experience of the analytic situation. And the 
analysand‟s subjective response is an integral aspect, in practice, of the analytic 
situation. Freud makes this quite clear when discussing dream interpretation: 
I should like to utter an express warning... against restricting the work of 
translating dreams merely to translating symbols and against abandoning the 
technique of making use of the dreamer‟s associations.441 
Foreman is clearly quite content for his plays to, equally, be responded to in a purely 
subjective way, as he later says, more explicitly: „I try to make plays as hard to 
remember as a vivid dream... you know you‟ve lived with intensity, yet try as you might 
you can‟t remember‟.442 For the critic, for the study of theatre, such exclusive 
subjectivity makes life somewhat difficult. But, whilst Freud‟s Interpretation of Dreams 
is not designed to provide a foolproof reference guide to the symbolic meaning of 
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dream-content (despite „feel[ing] tempted to draw up a new „dream-book‟‟,443 such must 
be resisted), neither does it leave us with a method that extols only the subjective (as 
Foreman leads us to). Rather, Freud is concerned with the processes, the conditions, the 
characteristics by which the dream functions, and by which it can be thought. 
And it is precisely this that I have attempted to elaborate here, in relation to theatrical 
elision. The content, the image, that is the figuration of the elisional act may be 
individual, but our concern is not with determining the significance of the elided 
representation for the spectator, nor is it to „re-place‟ the elisional with an image of our 
own through which we may seek to deduce  the interaction of affect and object. Rather, 
we accept the profoundly unsettling place of non-representation. We work with it, as it 
is, by exploring its processes, its purposes and effects within the theatrical image, within 
the theatrical production. We look to take account of, what Christopher Bollas has 
evocatively termed, „an aesthetics of nothingness‟.444 Although he seeks to convey a 
sense of the numerous kinds, the multiplicity, of nothingness that typify our psychic and 
„lived‟ experiences, the depiction is entirely applicable (as indicated by negative 
hallucination being explicitly included by Bollas). In this „aesthetics‟ it is the „prompt-
effects‟ that allow us access to thinking the energetics of elision, as Bollas describes, 
capturing our familiar causal ambivalence: „each inner intensity bears the mark of the 
nothing which immediately precedes it and follows it‟.445 And it is the challenge of an 
energetic approach to theatricality, an approach that incorporates the elided within the 
theatrical image, an approach that gives the affective force of the non-represented „the 
right to exist‟,446 to develop an „aesthetics of nothingness‟, of the „amnesic trace‟. Better 
still, it is the challenge posed by theatricality to engage with it fully, not only with that 
which is perceptible, and to construct a means to do so. This is the challenge posed, 
first, by the elisionary, and a challenge that we have only just begun to address. 
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Chapter 4: Film and an Energetic Approach 
4.i A Memorious Medium: Replication, Reality and the Memory of Early Cinema 
„Copyright 1896 by T.A. Edison‟. One need not watch too closely to see the repeated 
instances of this handwritten inscription flashing, momentarily, before our eyes whilst 
watching the short „actuality‟ film Feeding the Doves.447 A single frame inserted into 
the continuity of moving pictures, almost subliminal, it is a mark of ownership stamped 
into the body of the film itself. And this is far from an isolated occurrence: similar 
additions were frequently made, which is perhaps not surprising given the Edison 
Company‟s vociferous and obdurate pursuit of exclusivity and copyright protection. But 
we are, I think, entitled to ask why such extreme measures, in the case of film, were 
necessary? Measures that, no matter how briefly, break the „flow‟ of the film and the 
viewer‟s engagement, inevitably affecting his/her experience in an adverse way.  
One reason, I would suggest, is that it is a response to the nature of the medium itself. 
The „actuality‟ was a source of great interest and curiosity primarily due to its offer to 
replicate the pro-filmic world exactly. This possibility was the new technology‟s main 
selling feature, as we can discern from its exploitation by filmmakers such as Mitchell 
and Kenyon, who famously produced, among many others types, a number of „factory-
gate‟ pictures (a staple genre of actuality). These were made by recording the deluge of 
workers that, as a shift ended, streamed from their factory towards a well-positioned 
camera, next to which would be a sign reading: „Come and see yourself as others see 
you‟, along with the appropriate time and place. And, as Ian Jack reports (after the first 
screenings, in 2005, of a then newly-discovered mass of footage, now comprising the 
Peter Worden Collection), „there they would go and, according to contemporary 
accounts, point to themselves on the screen and shout out, tickled by the strangeness of 
it all.‟448 
One consequence of the precise replication of reality, offered by the actuality film, was 
that the work, the hand, of the film-maker goes unseen. To „see yourself as others see 
you‟ is specifically not to see yourself as the cameraman sees you. This is necessarily so 
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for, as implicitly claimed, reality to be seen as reality is: objectively rather than 
subjectively, if we can put it in such terms. It is thus that the Lumière brothers, and 
those that shared their aspirations and methodology, could claim to be „placing the 
world within one‟s reach‟. 
Allied to this „capturing‟ and „replication‟ of reality, as it happened, is the potential for 
perfect repetition that film provides. In terms of the object itself, there is no distinction 
between one „showing‟ and another. The film does not change. This repeatability allows 
the film to be screened without the necessity for any unique or qualitatively 
differentiable skill or „talent‟ as a condition of its screening, unlike media experienced 
as human performance such as music or theatre. The potential for dissociating the 
identity of the filmmaker from the film is, therefore, very high. The actuality, in 
particular, would be very easy to anonymize, to fraudulently claim as one‟s own or to 
simply duplicate and sell. Indeed, this frequently occurred during these formative days 
of cinema, in which copyright law was a grey area at best. For example, in the case of J. 
Stuart Blackton (one of the founders of American Vitagraphic, along with Albert E. 
Smith), as Charles Musser describes: „The new International Film Company paid 
Blackton the compliment of duping all three films and offering them for sale in the first 
issue of The Phonoscope, a new trade journal that began publication in September 
1896‟.449 As Musser goes on to say, it was in response to this ease of unsanctioned 
repetition that „Thomas Edison was soon copyrighting the films produced by his 
company‟.450 The irony of this situation is that one of the primary misappropriators of 
films at this time seems to have been the Edison Company itself: „In his deposition of 
1900, however, Blackton indignantly indicated that many of their films had been 
copyrighted by the Edison Company.‟451 
The promise of the actuality to reproduce faithfully, purely, time and time again, and the 
correspondent assumption regarding the characteristics of film to be able to do so, are, I 
believe, quite genuine, and precipitate the Edison Company‟s means of copyrighting. 
To physically state that this is his, Edison‟s (synecdochically), recording of reality is the 
only way for his name to be attached to the work, which could, after all, have been 
produced by anyone. Indeed, by everyone. Reality, just as the film that has recorded it, 
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does not change: this is the true version, what you would have seen if you had been 
there. 
That the Edison Company‟s statement of ownership is, in our present instance among 
others, situated within the field of the object itself, rather than less intrusively locating it 
at the beginning or the end of the film, is, I would speculate, with the aim of resisting 
any repetition of the material without the appropriate assignation. It is an attempt 
towards permanent inscription: making as difficult as possible any simple, perfidious 
„cutting‟ of the copyright frames. How much of a deterrent would this be? We cannot 
possibly know. But the key point is that this willingness to disrupt the viewer‟s 
experience of the film even to gain this, in all likelihood rather marginal, additional 
benefit and security demonstrates ably the anxiety produced by the perceived capacities 
of this new medium. Anxiety over control, over ownership, over individuality even: the 
assertion that „my‟ reality is „everyone‟s‟ reality, that „everyone‟s‟ is „mine‟, and the 
attack upon the conception of self that this entails, is guarded against here only by the 
„signing‟ of the film. „See yourself as others see you‟, all others, all perspectives, as 
one. This is reality, up on the screen. Edison‟s „signing‟ of his work serves to destroy 
this apparent „impartiality‟. As Gilberto Perez states, in his expansive treatise The 
Material Ghost: Films and Their Medium, in relation to photography, but that for our 
present purposes also has a bearing upon the qualities of film from which the actuality 
derives: „a photograph gains in credence on account of its lack of a signature.‟452 
Edison‟s „signature‟ may compromise the „credence‟, the „impartiality‟, of the 
„actuality‟ (from actum: „a thing done‟,453 linking it indelibly with „reality‟, from rēs + 
ālis: „pertaining to things or matter‟;454 the very appellation of the „actuality‟ 
pronounces its status as „reality‟), but the significant aspect is that the medium seems to 
offer, to threaten, this possibility. 
Paradoxically, the same characteristics of the filmic medium that are exploited by the  
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actuality to create an „attraction‟,455 its seemingly impartial replication of reality and its 
repeatability, are also perceived as being threats, making it a site of almost supernatural, 
certainly inhuman, disturbance. The association of this latter quality with the new 
cinematic medium is similarly identified by Mary Ann Doane in her re-telling of the 
story „The Kinetoscope of Time‟, from the December 1895 issue of Scribner‟s 
Magazine, at the beginning of her highly insightful 2002 work The Emergence of 
Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, The Archive. This story describes the 
Faustian offer, made by a „mysterious man‟, to show the protagonist his own past and 
future through „viewing machines‟ that „are clearly kinetoscopes‟.456 The price of this 
offer is time, given over to the stranger, from the protagonist‟s life. As Doane remarks, 
this story highlights concerns over the status and significance of film‟s ostensible 
capabilities:  
Because time‟s corruption is „proper‟ to it, its fixed representation also poses a 
threat, produces aesthetic and epistemological anxiety. „The Kinetoscope of 
Time‟ registers this threat as the complicity of the machine with the demonic.457 
Cinema‟s seeming ability to halt the „corruption‟, the decay, of time is presented by 
Doane as deciding its connection with „the archival impulse of the nineteenth 
century‟.458 In combining an exact replication of reality, in duration (unlike 
photography), and absolute preservation through potentially limitless repetition, cinema 
proffers the dream of complete archivization, of a complete repository of reality. Doane 
makes this characterisation explicit: „the significance of the cinema, in this context, lies 
in its apparent capacity to perfectly represent the contingent, to provide the pure record 
of time... In it images are stored, time itself is stored.‟459 Even, indeed particularly, the 
contingent, the unexpected, the „trivial‟, we could say, is preserved. The power of 
cinema is not to discriminate. It records everything, mechanically unaware of 
significance or value, which are, after all, human impositions. „Cinema presents the 
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illusion – and the commercially successful illusion – of what [Étienne-Jules] Marey 
could only dream about, the possibility of a continuous and nonselective recording of 
real time.‟460 
We will come to this point regarding the „illusionary‟ nature of this „possibility‟, but for 
the moment let us stay with this initial, totalising conception of cinematic potential. For 
in this conception of cinema we can see the influence of a Funesian conception of 
memory, as a structuring of thought, as a model through which to define the processes 
and functions of this emergent medium. This mode of thinking cinema in terms of a 
kind of „mnemic repository‟ is discernible really at the time of its origin, as almost a 
primary means of understanding the medium. As Lisa Starks has noted: „Moving 
pictures were first seen as the storehouse of memory providing a material record that 
promised immortality.‟461 Funesian memory, as we have defined it, is an „ideal‟ of 
memory as flawless recollection, as a „storehouse‟ of perceptions and experiences, 
which facilitates the possibility of identical reconstruction. So Borges, in describing 
Funes‟s abilities, announces: „Now his perception and his memory were infallible.‟462 
We can think of Funesian memory as a model that works through the recording and 
replication of a perception or event that „actually happened‟, as a model that involves 
the assumption that a past experience is „verifiable‟ through its recollection, and as a 
model that posits memory as being constituted through the causal relationship of a 
„copy‟ referring to an „original‟ (i.e. Aristotelian). And through this we can see how 
Doane‟s description of the actuality as that „which appeared to capture a moment, to 
register and repeat “that which happens”‟463 is equally applicable both to the actuality, 
in its emphasis upon the perceived cinematic qualities of replication and repetition, and 
to Funesian memory. Indeed, Borges himself makes the connection between Funes‟s 
indelible mnemic powers and the comparable capacities of the cinema, when he remarks 
that „in those days there were no cinemas or phonographs; nevertheless, it is odd and 
even incredible that no one ever performed an experiment with Funes.‟464 
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Quite what kind of „experiment‟ Borges has in mind we do not know. But the key point 
of interest for us is that Borges is clearly suggesting that cinema, and the phonograph, 
would stand as the appropriate, the most fitting, media through which an experiment 
could be carried out. They have for Borges some purchase upon, and some affinity with, 
Funes‟s abilities, that allows them to provide a form of privileged access to his 
experience and mode of hyper-mnesic (not to be confused with „hypomnesic‟) 
existence. Funes and these reproductive, recording machines „remember‟ in the same 
way. 
We can elaborate on this relationship, working from this particularly productive 
quotation from Borges, still further. Whilst we are not told from when the narrator is 
reminiscing, we do know (for a precision in dating is characteristic of this short piece) 
that this encounter between the narrator and Funes, the encounter that occurs after 
Funes‟s accident, is supposed to have taken place in February 1887 (with Funes dying 
shortly after, in 1889). These technologies, which Borges, writing in 1942, would of 
course have been quite familiar with, do, in fact, become relatively widely available 
almost immediately after the date we are given for Funes‟s death. The cinema, as we 
know, is developed in a recognisable form later than the phonograph: 1895 being, we 
can justifiably claim, the beginning of its mass appeal, with the first public showing that 
charged admission. Although it is true that various forms of the technology, such as that 
of Eadweard Muybridge, existed before this, they were generally experimental and not 
easily accessible. The phonograph, on the other hand, was developed by Edison in 1877 
and patented in 1878; however, its mass production did not begin until around 1890. In 
terms of the „availability‟ of the cinema and phonograph, therefore, Borges is quite 
correct. I take the implication of this reference, when combined with the chronological 
proximity of Funes‟s biographical history and the historical development of these 
recording technologies, to be that cinema and the phonograph (although mainly the 
cinema due to its visual status, aligning it more closely with the primarily imagistic 
nature of memory
465) are positioned by Borges as veritable „successors‟ to Funes‟s 
means of engagement with the world. As Funes leaves the world so these, properly 
hypomnesic, machines continue to operate within the model that he inaugurated, 
continue to offer the ideal that he represented. 
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4.i.i „Curses and ghosts‟, or „the haemorrhage of significance‟466 
After establishing this connection, we can perhaps recall our association of Marvin 
Carlson‟s theory of „ghosting‟ with Funesian memory in Chapter 3, Part 1, and consider 
that the term takes on a particularly resonant significance in relation to cinema. The 
„mnemic repository‟ of film offers the „actual‟ ghost of the past: not so much a re-
enactment as a re-animation. The image is, literally, an insubstantial emanation of the 
thing itself, specifically of the thing in time, of the moment of the thing. This is what 
appears before us, the replication of the thing itself in the reality of its time. And it this 
condition that, I suggest, prompted the strikingly similar responses of two separate 
reviewers of the Lumière brothers‟ mythically originary show of 28th December 1895 at 
the Salon Indien, as related by Ian Christie: „Both the Paris papers which reported the 
first Lumière show ended on the same note:... death will cease to be absolute... [and] it 
will be possible to see our nearest alive again long after they have gone [my italics].‟467 
Whilst the tone of these two reviews is certainly one that captures the excitement at the 
novelty and unknown promise of this cinematic innovation, another contemporary 
report sounds a note of dissatisfaction and even distaste. Russian author Maxim Gorky, 
then working as a newspaper journalist, described the people that he saw on screen in a 
typically evocative style, writing that: 
Their smiles are lifeless, even though their movements are full of living energy... 
the grey, the soundless, the bleak and dismal life... it is the movement of 
shadows, only of shadows. Curses and ghosts.
468
 
This dissatisfaction is a dissatisfaction with the ability of the cinema of the actuality to 
present life, to present reality, in its entirety. The promised „replication‟ of reality that 
the actuality, in particular, is predicated upon is found, by Gorky, to be of life but 
„lifeless‟. „Bleak and dismal‟, it is but a „shadow‟ of itself. Such a sense directly leads, I 
would suggest, to the rapid demise of the actuality, whose popularity wanes and 
collapses in quite short order around 1906, to be subsumed by the self-determinately 
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„fictional‟ film. As Tom Gunning has illustrated, „actuality films outnumbered fictional 
films until 1906‟.469 However, it is only a short time between the first great successes of 
a cinema that could properly be called „narrative‟, particularly Edwin S. Porter‟s 
innovative and influential films Life of An American Fireman followed by The Great 
Train Robbery, both being released in 1903, and its development as the dominant mode 
a mere 3 or 4 years subsequent. As Gunning states: „The period from 1907 to about 
1913 represents the true narrativization of the cinema‟.470 But the „fictional‟ film that 
comes to dominate cinema serves, I would argue, to provide a kind of salve that masks 
the sentiment of dissatisfaction, as expressed by Gorky; a sentiment that, as we shall 
see, persists and often haunts cinema in later times.  
Now though to return to the source of this dissatisfaction: in a cinema that is conceived 
of as the unadulterated replication of reality, then, something is found to be „missing‟, 
something is „lost‟. But what is this element of „life‟ that is „lost‟? There is no one 
answer, although, to my mind, it is nothing more or less than the human. This strictly 
„inhuman‟ notion of cinema is identified by Doane, through her equation of it with 
„other nineteenth-century machines‟: „as a machine, a motor, the cinema... harness[es] 
energy in an unrelenting movement seemingly independent of human labor [my 
italics].‟471 The cinema is, in this view, simply a machine: a replication machine. 
Of course, film, as a medium, does not function in such an exclusively mechanistic way, 
despite its appearance (particularly in the actuality) and early promise. Doane‟s 
qualification „seemingly‟, in the preceding quotation, alerts us to this fact. To begin 
with, we can think of the long history in film criticism that has debated the extent to 
which film can be considered as „art‟. This question is a relatively early one in the life 
of film, particularly in the life of film as a subject of academic study. It is one fraught 
with a certain anxiety over the status of the medium and its works, and is notably 
considered by Rudolf Arnheim in his definitional work Film as Art (first published in 
German as Film als Kunst in 1932; in English translation in 1933). In this, he declares 
his intention „to refute thoroughly and systematically the charge that photography and 
film are only mechanical reproductions and that they therefore have no connection with 
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art‟.472 Rather, he claims that „even in the simplest photographic reproduction of a 
perfectly simple object, a feeling for its nature is required which is quite beyond any 
mechanical operation [my italics].‟473 This „feeling‟ can only have its source in the 
human engagement with the object being filmed, whether consciously („selected 
deliberately‟) or unconsciously („not by any means always chosen‟474). Whilst Arnheim 
does note that „film... may, but need not, be used to produce artistic results‟, that „the 
movies are not necessarily film art‟,475 they do, I suggest, always involve a human 
element in their construction. 
We move from film not always being „only mechanical reproduction‟, and often being 
classifiable as „art‟ (according to Arnheim) because of a human origin and organisation, 
to film always being the product of human „design‟ (although this should not be taken to 
suggest that film is always art, the definition of which we are little concerned with here, 
but always artifice). As Perez has described in relation to the documentary, the genre of 
film that can be considered perhaps most „faithful‟ to reality, and of a type with the 
actuality: 
In a way the camera deceives us, by its very directness, whenever its depictions 
seems so immediate that we take them for reality plain and simple, forgetting the 
artifice that goes into them, the slant of which they are capable.
476
 
And whilst Perez is somewhat critical of Christian Metz‟s assertion that „every film is a 
fiction film‟,477 to a certain extent he is in agreement with this sentiment. As he 
persuasively argues: „what a movie depicts can, in each of its details, be said to have 
been... But the movie as a whole, the world of the movie, comes into being on the 
screen. What has been is documentary, what comes into being is fiction‟.478 
Every film is, then, at the least a compromise between the „documentary‟, the depiction 
of what „has been‟, and the human organisation, the „ordering‟, that produces the film 
on the screen. Without this ambivalent duality, without this human element, not only 
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does film become a source of „dissatisfaction‟, but it also becomes a form drained of 
„meaning‟. It is to this condition that the suggestive phrase „the haemorrhage of 
significance‟, emphasised by its titular role above, refers. The quotation in full is drawn 
from Ben Brewster‟s discussion of Noël Burch‟s comprehensive study of early cinema, 
Life to Those Shadows. Brewster describes Burch‟s „history of the “primitive” cinema‟ 
as: 
A history of the discovery and installation of means of cinematic representation 
to control the dispersal, the haemorrhage of significance characteristic of simple 
replication.
479
 
In this view, cinema progresses from the „simple replication‟ of the actuality (which is 
still, we should note, subject to a degree of human control) to the development of 
increasingly sophisticated methods for organising the images on screen, the cinematic. 
Whether this is through editorial practices and devices, or the establishment of complex 
narratives, genre conventions, and fictional diegeses, the film image is imbued with 
meaning, with context, with the „significance‟ that comes from a sense of intentionality. 
This progression marks a shift in the anticipated question of interest for the cinematic 
spectator, from „how am I being shown these images?‟, to „why am I being shown these 
images?‟ Whilst the filmic object is always „organised‟ to a certain extent, later 
developments amount to an intensification in the „control‟ of this organisation. This 
increase in control facilitates, and provides the potential for, the reading of increased 
levels and sophistication of „significance‟. 
4.ii The Predicational Image and the Filmic Connection with Reality 
Yet despite this requirement for organisation, and to return to the tension between 
replication and organisation, a tension, an undecidability and an almost schizophrenic 
oscillation that my own practice, perhaps inevitably, becomes caught in, cinema cannot 
escape its connection with reality even if it should so wish. There remains a sense, a 
belief, that cinema offers reality itself. This condition is explicitly noted by Susan 
Sontag, in her classic essay „Film and Theatre‟, when she states that: „In the cinema, 
however, every member of the audience... believe[s] that the camera cannot lie... 
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Cinema, therefore, gives us what is experienced as the truth of life [my italics].‟480 It is 
a belief that recalls the claims for film, the perceived threat and opportunity that it 
entailed, from its very earliest days of marketing the actuality and the copyright anxiety 
of Edison. It is a belief that can, however, occupy the same space as a conception of 
film that determines it as being inevitably organised, an aspect unacknowledged when 
the actuality was described in terms of its „non-discrimination‟, its „non-selectivity‟, its 
impartiality. And it is a belief that is extrapolated, I would suggest, from the fact that 
the material of film is reality. What I mean by this is that the cinematic image, the 
image that is organised and is always organised („always already‟ organised, we could 
say) into a diegesis, for example, is a replication of „reality‟. It shows a moment that 
occurred in front of a camera, one that happened in reality, and that, as Perez says of the 
photograph, thus „has its own kind of aura... stemming from the uniqueness, the original 
particularity, not of the picture but of the referent whose emanation it captures.‟481 This 
„aura‟, if we can call it that, invests the film with an „experience‟ of „truth‟, of „life‟, 
through its relation to „reality‟. It causes a tension, a certain degree of undecidability, 
around the status of the filmic image. 
Whilst the spectator may „know‟ that the diegesis of the film is fictional, or at least the 
product of human intervention, and any notion of the fictional film being mistaken by 
the spectator for reality has, generally (a point we shall come to), long been a 
discredited one,
482
 the image through which it is constituted maintains this relation to 
„reality‟. In this sense, Sontag is quite right that there is a belief that „the camera cannot 
lie‟. Deriving from the cinematic image‟s historical status as being aligned with 
photographic reality, noted by Perez when he states that: „what a movie depicts can, in 
each of its details, be said to have been: each thing we see must have been there before 
the camera, which has no imagination and “infinite appetite for the material” [my 
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italics]‟,483 the image is structured towards the assumption that „this is what reality is 
really like‟. 
But is it? If we are focusing exclusively upon „realistically‟ produced films, such as 
cinéma-vérité, this claim may be quite comfortably attributed to the cinematic image. 
However, what of films that deploy high levels of special effects or animation, and that 
are composed of images that could not possibly have „been there before the camera‟? 
The connection with reality remains. We will recall Sontag‟s qualification, in her 
assertion quoted above, that cinema „is experienced as the truth of life‟. The „reality‟ 
that such cinematic images, in the former case (special effects), which are subject to 
technological manipulation, enhancement or other „non-photographic‟ modification, is a 
„predictive‟ reality. They show us, authentically, the wager is, what reality would be 
like if certain events occurred or if certain conditions were met (including psychological 
or perspectival „realities‟, such as Bergman‟s Hour of the Wolf (1968), or Gilliam‟s 
Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas (1998)). It is a predicational reality. For example, to 
cite a well-used 
example, the 
image of the 
White House 
being utterly 
destroyed by an 
alien space-ship 
in the 1996 
blockbuster 
Independence 
Day (Figure 3) 
shows the 
spectator the 
reality that 
would be, if such 
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an event were to occur. It is an offer of omnipercipience that cinema has been making 
throughout its history, a feature that Tom Gunning indicates when he describes (through 
the example of the 1924 film Ben Hur) „the Hollywood advertising policy of 
enumerating the features of a film, each emblazoned with the command, “See!”‟484 The 
spectator is given the opportunity to witness a replication of the reality that would be or 
would have been (in Gunning‟s instance, of „The Star of Bethlehem‟ or „The Last 
Supper‟, for example). 
This cinematic phenomenon, this connection of the filmic image with reality, is a 
characteristic that accords with the concept of „premediation‟ developed by Richard A. 
Grusin. Grusin describes premediation as „the desire or demand... to make sure that 
when the future comes it has already been remediated, to see the future not as it emerges 
immediately into the present but before it ever happens.‟485 It is the desire, and potential 
seemingly offered by film, to „see‟ reality before it becomes reality. An example of 
premediation is provided by Slavoj Žižek who, in his Welcome to the Desert of the Real 
(2002), has provocatively discussed „Hollywood disaster movies‟ as providing an 
„object of fantasy‟.486 The fantasy that they involve, that they give object to through 
their imagining and imaging of „reality‟ (fantasies due to their status as desired/feared 
realities, „libidinally invested‟, as Žižek says), is the „unthinkable‟, the „defining 
catastrophe‟. Žižek proposes that these filmic images of ruination prefigure, 
„premediate‟, we would say, the disaster of 9/11. It is for this reason that we may get an 
impression, when watching news footage of the planes striking the World Trade Centre, 
of having „seen this before‟. For Žižek, in a sense, we have. These are images that we 
have seen „replicated‟ in countless „disaster‟ and „action‟ films, and the experience of 
déjà vu that is prompted by seeing the image of the World Trade Centre falling evinces 
the connection of the cinematic image with reality. As Despina Kakoudaki tellingly 
recounts, in her study of race and the „disaster‟ film:  
Personal accounts of the aftermath of the attacks often revisited the disaster film 
genre. “I thought it was an ad for a new blockbuster movie,” “I thought I was in 
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a disaster film,” “This was just like Independence Day,” were some of the 
responses I heard from friends and in news reports.
487
 
The cinematic image is „experienced as the truth of life‟, not reality itself, but an 
experience of reality, of the perception of reality, that foreshadows the terrible truth of 
the images first broadcast by CNN at 8.49am on September 11
th
, 2001. Indeed, Žižek 
provides a useful anecdote that illustrates well the implicit connection with reality that 
the cinematic image has, no matter its production through special effects or the degree 
of its „photographic‟ realism: 
The ultimate twist... at the beginning of October 2001, the press reported that a 
group of Hollywood scenarists and directors, specialists in catastrophe movies, 
had been established at the instigation of the Pentagon, with the aim of 
imagining possible scenarios for terrorist attacks and how to fight them.
488
 
This episode demonstrates a tacit understanding of the power of cinema to replicate 
„reality‟ before it has happened: why turn to filmmakers? Simply because the images 
that they display to us are images that seem to show the „reality‟ of what is imagined, of 
what is, often, fantasy. To reiterate, this is not to suggest that the spectator believes that 
the diegesis on screen is „real‟, but that the image shows the reality of „what would 
happen‟, „what it would be like‟. The image‟s indexicality is assured (self-assured): this 
is what the White House would look like; this is what you would see if the Statue of 
Liberty were washed away by rising sea levels (The Day After Tomorrow, 2004); See! 
The Colosseum of Rome! (Gladiator, 2000); See! Zombies tearing into the flesh of their 
victims! (Night of the Living Dead, 1968). 
In addition to this we should note the converse, the exceptions that prove the rule: we 
are all, I am sure, familiar with filmic images that claim to present a predicational 
reality, a reality that „would be‟, but that instead elicit a response of „it wouldn‟t happen 
like that‟, „that‟s wrong‟. Of course, this is often intentional, for example for diegetic 
purposes (such as the Yakuza conflict that ends with the destruction of Japan, and the 
world, in Takashi Miike‟s Dead or Alive, 1999), often for comedic effect (the horse-
drawn carriage that careers over a cliff in Van Helsing, 2004, exploding upon impact), 
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but is equally often due to errors and deficiencies (one only need glance at the multitude 
of internet forums that rail against the breaking of a claim to reality, such as „the 
absence of interleaved roadwheels on the Tiger/T-34 tank‟489 in Spielberg‟s Saving 
Private Ryan, 1998). Such instances as these play with, or inadvertently diminish, the 
connection with reality that the film image offers any particular spectator. 
Animation can take this element of play to an extreme: often there is no claim for the 
image to be „replicating‟ reality, to be presenting a vision of „how reality would be‟ 
under certain conditions (of course, including fictional conditions).
490
 Chuck Jones‟s 
decidedly postmodern 1953 Warner Bros. classic Duck Amuck serves as an exemplary 
illustration of this extremity. However, I would suggest that even here the filmic image 
remains in relation to „reality‟ in that it presents a view (in both senses) of „what reality 
is not‟. Whilst it does not „replicate reality‟, the image bears a relation to „reality‟ 
through deliberately displaying an image that could not occur „in reality‟. The status of 
this image as being within the filmic medium, which is archetypally suffused with its 
identification as a machine for replicating „reality‟, creates a tension between image and 
medium. This is a similar model to that proposed by Doane in relation to the 
„irreversibility‟ of filmic time, as she says: „irreversible linearity forms the substrate and 
support for any particular film‟s temporal experimentation‟.491 Just so, the cinematic 
image‟s relation to „reality‟ through „replication‟ „forms the substrate‟ for any 
divergence from, experimentation with or negation of „reality‟. Often we find this 
tension being developed into, and with, a sense of playfulness and the comedic. As 
such, it is a condition that closely mirrors one of Freud‟s „techniques‟ of the joke, which 
he describes in Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, that is, „faulty reasoning‟. 
Freud relates an example of this:  
An impoverished individual borrowed 25 florins from a prosperous 
acquaintance... The very same day his benefactor met him again in a restaurant 
with a plate of salmon mayonnaise in front of him. The benefactor reproached 
him: “What? You borrow money from me and then order yourself salmon 
                                                             
489
 From: <http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4295> [accessed August 2010]. 
490
 Although it should be noted that this is not always the case, that animation can equally aim towards a 
„replication‟ of reality by including a number of „reality-effects‟, as discussed in detail by Naomi Wood in 
her essay „Domesticating Dreams in Walt Disney's Cinderella‟ (The Lion and the Unicorn, 20, 1 (1996), 
pp. 25-49. 
491
 Doane, p.113. 
141 
 
mayonnaise?”... “I don‟t understand you”, replied the object of the attack; “if I 
haven‟t any money I can‟t eat salmon mayonnaise, and if I have some money I 
mustn‟t eat salmon mayonnaise. Well, then, when am I to eat salmon 
mayonnaise?”492 
The humour here is derived from the fact that the reply of the „impoverished bon vivant‟ 
„has been very markedly given the form of a logical argument. But quite unjustifiably, 
for the reply is in fact illogical.‟493 Similarly, with the kind of cinematic image that we 
are dealing with, such as the animated, we may be prepared for the cinema to address us 
through an image that pertains to „what reality is like‟, or „would be like‟. Any such 
expectation is incited by the „form‟, that is, the medium. But instead we are presented 
with, so it is supposed, „what reality is not like‟: a contravention of expectation, „logic‟, 
and „reality‟. Freud describes an aspect of „faulty reasoning‟ as being that „the value of 
phantasy is exalted unduly in comparison with reality; a possibility is almost equated 
with an actual event‟.494 And we can deploy this same characterisation for the filmic 
image‟s „unreality‟, specifically through animation, with the simple modification of „a 
possibility‟ to „an impossibility‟ being „equated with an actual event‟. The key point to 
be taken from this discussion is that the filmic image, whilst, clearly, not being reality 
itself, always involves an „experience of reality‟, always bears a relation to reality. 
Whether this be through the image‟s (not the diegesis) claimed replication of „reality‟, 
the „replication‟ of a predicational „reality‟, or the tension created by the „negation‟ of 
reality. 
4.ii.i The Replication of „Reality‟: Threat and Opportunity 
And this relation of the filmic image to reality is a feature that constitutes both a threat 
and an opportunity. The replication of „reality‟ poses a threat to any diegesis, indeed to 
any film, that seeks to convey meaning, what Doane refers to as the „consistently 
disturbing potential of meaninglessness, of providing the spectator with nothing to 
read... in the process of an unthought and mechanical recording.‟495 The image taken as 
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image, through its implicit or explicit claim to be replicating „reality‟ as it was or as it 
would be, constitutes a potential aspect of the filmic image that posits itself as 
„unthought and mechanical recording‟. This facilitates the possibility of the image only 
being seen in relation to its replication of „reality‟: in this case, there is nothing outside 
this function. There is no diegetic „meaning‟, no „significance‟. The threat that this 
entails is a return to the „dissatisfaction‟ that Gorky elaborates. It is an apparent loss of 
the „human‟ element: the organisation that, as I previously suggested, serves to obscure, 
to palliate, the dissatisfaction that Gorky identifies with the inability of film to re-create 
reality in totality, but that can equally be identified with the „meaninglessness‟ with 
which the filmic image threatens this organisation. 
In regard to our previous example, the image of the destruction of the White House in 
Independence Day could here be seen apart from its status in the narrative of the film, 
apart from its symbolic associations. Associations with, for example, the fear of a 
faceless, unknown and implacable force that threatens to destroy America, aligned by 
Jan Mair in the context of this film with a fear of Islamism,
496
 and apart from its 
possible significance in comparison and contrast with, perhaps, images from other 
„disaster‟ movies, or with other films by Roland Emmerich. It can be seen as only a 
recording, a replication of „reality‟. A possible, predicational reality, certainly, but there 
is a sense, an element, of the image which finds it presented as the product of an 
impartial camera nonetheless. Indeed, the threat to „meaning‟ or narrative from this 
simple „showing‟ of „reality‟, as it was or would be, is noted even as recently as 2002 by 
William McDonald, who makes the point (paraphrased by Kakoudaki) that „special 
effects diminish the ability of audiences to imagine things for themselves... and 
overwhelm whatever story there is‟.497 It is due to their „replication‟ of „reality‟ that 
these images, so it is implied here by McDonald, make any work of imagination on the 
part of the spectator seemingly unnecessary. And, as we can see, an image that is not 
constructed through such special effects, thinking, for example, of the actuality, or 
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Dogme 95 films,
498
 poses this threat of „meaninglessness‟ through „mechanical 
reproduction‟ even more directly. 
In many ways, we can usefully consider this aspect of the cinematic image, which is 
defined through its relation to reality, as a mode of thought analogous to Gunning‟s 
„cinema of attractions‟, discussed earlier. It is the medium‟s apparent capacity to 
replicate „reality‟, „that bases itself on... its ability to show something‟,499 and nothing 
more, which makes it „different from the fascination in storytelling‟,500 which works 
against any sense of „significance‟. This simultaneity is quite unsurprising, as the notion 
of a „cinema of attractions‟ emphasises the image‟s relation to reality: it does not 
introduce, but accentuates this ever-present, ontological characteristic of film. As 
Gunning states: „the cinema of attractions does not disappear with the dominance of 
narrative, but rather goes underground, both into certain avant-garde practices and as a 
component of narrative films, more evident in some genres... than in others.‟501 
Whilst we have been discussing the replicative relation of the image to „reality‟, we 
should, however, briefly note that the negation of reality established by the image in 
animation, in particular, is not exempt from this threat of „meaninglessness‟. Instead, it 
poses a modification of the model that requires a fuller treatment than we can allow 
digression for here. Suffice it to say that, I suggest, rather than the possibility of there 
being nothing outside this image except its relation to reality, there is the possibility of 
there being nothing except its relation to „unreality‟, to what is not possible in reality.  
Indeed, the threat of possible de-signification is one that „haunts‟ film, one to which it is 
constantly exposed, by the nature of the image, by its own composition through and as a 
replication of „reality‟. We can see this threat realised in, for example, the manipulation 
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and viewing practices of the „possessive spectator‟, as theorised by Laura Mulvey. What 
the „possessive spectator‟ desires to „possess‟, according to Mulvey, is „the driving 
force of the movie, the star‟:502 the actor or actress with whom this spectator identifies, 
who they, often, idolise and with whom they seek proximity. In attempting this act of 
possession, the „fetishistic‟ spectator fixates upon an image or sequence of images of 
their desired object, which they are „driven... to stop, to hold and to repeat‟.503 The film 
seems to offer the reality of the star him/herself but, in the obsessive repetition of the 
possessive spectator, „the apparatus overtakes the figure‟s movements as they are 
inescapably repeated with mechanical exactitude. The human figure becomes an 
extension of the machine‟.504 Like a word repeated over and over again, the significance 
of the image, both in terms of its status within the organisation of the diegesis and in 
terms of the desired star‟s apparent reality, supported by the diegetic fiction, is 
subsumed by its status as a replication of a moment of pro-filmic reality, of the means 
of its production, of the „reality‟ of the film‟s physical construction and mechanistic 
aspects. As Mulvey describes how: „the fetishistic spectator... can suddenly, 
unexpectedly, encounter the index... so that the fictional world changes into 
consciousness of the pro-filmic event. As fictional credibility declines... „reality‟ takes 
over the scene‟.505 Film is, thus, always in a tenuous position as far as its „signification‟, 
its ability to convey „meaning‟, is concerned. The filmic image‟s relation to „reality‟ 
through replication constantly threatens to destabilise diegetic, or any other, 
signification. 
However, we have focused thus far upon the threat that the image‟s relation to reality 
poses but, as indicated earlier, it also provides cinematic opportunities. Earlier we 
quoted Perez‟s claim that „in a way the camera deceives us, by its very directness‟.506 
His meaning here, and our meaning in quoting him, is that the film itself is always a 
product of human organisation, to a certain degree, even the documentary or actuality, 
despite the status of the filmic image as a replication of „reality‟. However, we can take 
this notion of „deception‟ further. Film has the potential to exploit the sense of „belief‟ 
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in its authenticity, what is „experienced as the truth of life‟, that it garners from the 
relation of its filmic images to reality. We previously claimed that the fictional diegesis 
itself is not, „generally‟, mistaken by the spectator for reality. Only that it has a „sense‟ 
of reality. Clearly, there are some diegeses that are in a sense „fictional‟, in that they are 
organised, as all diegeses are, and yet are usually „believed‟ as being „real‟, such as the 
documentary and the actuality. Belief, as with all things, is a matter of degree. But, 
more often than not, I would suggest, it is the intention of the films in these genres to 
provide a genuine replication of reality „as it is‟, as faithful a rendition of reality as 
possible. We can put it in the following terms: that there is a concurrence between the 
filmic image‟s relation to „reality‟, its mechanical reproduction, and the correspondent 
claim made by the diegesis to be an „authentic‟ duplication of „reality‟, in duration. The 
claim of the diegesis is based upon, and derived from, the „evidence‟ provided by the 
filmic image. It actively seeks to deny itself any sense of signification. Examples of this 
approach would include, for instance, such documentaries as Luc Jacquet‟s 2005 La 
Marche de l‟Empereur (March of the Penguins). The organisation of the filmic images 
is intended to act in the service of accurately presenting the „reality‟ that the images 
show, explicating it, distilling it. The spectator‟s belief in the diegesis depends to a 
significant degree upon trust in the intention of this organisation. 
However, let us consider an alternative case, one in which the diegesis of the film is 
similarly presented as an absolutely faithful reproduction of „reality‟. It also bases this 
claim upon the relation to „reality‟ of the filmic image, denying itself diegetic 
signification or meaning. The difference here is that the „reality‟ that the diegesis claims 
to be presenting is not the reality that the filmic image reproduces. It only seems to be. 
The reality that the filmic image actually replicates, so there is the potential for in these 
cases, is the „staging‟ of a reality, made to seem as though it is an „authentic‟ reality that 
would concur with the claims of the diegesis. Let us cite a brief example to illuminate 
our meaning here. The early documentary film Nanook of the North (1922) by Robert 
Flaherty, detailing the daily existence of the eponymous Canadian Inuit, has been 
famously criticised for the fact that Flaherty staged many of the scenes, whilst the 
diegesis of the film claims them to be „reality‟. For example, in Figure 4, below, we see 
„Nanook‟ (real name Allakariallak) preparing to throw a spear, a pose adopted, so the 
spectator is to suppose, in the course of hunting. However, at the time that  
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Flaherty is recording 
this image, 
Allakariallak hunted 
exclusively with a 
gun. The „reality‟ 
that the camera 
captures is certainly 
what a reality 
„would look like‟: it 
is a replication of the 
„reality‟ of 
Allakariallak 
enacting traditional 
Inuit pursuits, we 
could say. But this is not the „reality‟ that the diegesis claims, it is not a replication of 
the reality of Inuit daily life in 1922, not a „genuine‟ reproduction of „Nanook‟s‟ life. 
In this instance, the image‟s relation to reality has been made to serve the claims of the 
diegesis, not vice-versa. The diegesis has, essentially, parasitized the aspect of the filmic 
image as mechanical reproduction, and manipulated the sense of belief that this has the 
power to arouse. It is, ultimately, a deception. But, once again, there are degrees. It is 
arguable, for instance, that Flaherty was attempting to approach a more „authentic‟ Inuit 
lifestyle, free from the influences of Western technology. Flaherty‟s is a „deception‟ far 
removed from similar manipulations that have been undertaken through the potential 
that the filmic image‟s relation to reality offers. 
We can also think of more extreme instances, such as the famous example of The Blair 
Witch Project (1999). The promotion of this film meticulously presented it as „genuine‟ 
footage. The publicity and the diegesis of the film posited that the film itself was 
recovered from a handheld video recorder, found in the log cabin in which the final 
scenes occur. And whilst this diegetic device is far from original (in the horror genre 
alone one only has to think of the slightly earlier The Last Broadcast (1998) or 
Cannibal Holocaust (1980)), its elaborate interweaving with the publicity campaign,  
Figure 4: 'Nanook' throwing a spear: the diegetic misrepresentation of the 
filmic image. Nanook of the North (1922), dir. Robert J. Flaherty, Pathé 
Exchange. 
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and the mythos thus 
established, in my 
judgment, are. This 
marketing even went so 
far as to construct 
publicity material in the 
form of mock, but 
certainly realistic, 
„Missing Persons‟ posters 
of the three protagonists 
(Figure 5). Again, we see 
that the claims of the 
diegesis as to what reality 
is being shown conflict 
with the reality that the 
filmic image replicates. 
Of course, in relation to The Blair Witch Project, the claims of „authenticity‟ were never 
entirely serious. However, an interesting phenomenon, which has arisen due to this 
initial diegetic and promotional claim, demonstrates aptly the strength, the potency, of 
the belief engendered by the filmic image‟s relation to reality: the assumption among a 
number of spectators that this film is real. Even a cursory survey of Internet newsgroups 
and posting sites demonstrates the continuing extent of doubt, and of mistaken 
conviction, over the status of the film, with such anxiety-ridden questions as „did the 
people on The Blair Witch Project really die?‟ or „did The Blair Witch Project really 
happen?‟ 
It is a situation assessed in detail by Margrit Schreier in her 2004 examination of how, 
through the use of various „cues‟, spectators distinguish between fact and fiction when 
approaching particular forms of media. The Blair Witch Project serves her as a „hybrid 
case‟ „situating itself on the borderline between fact and fiction‟.507 This film is of 
particular interest to her precisely because, echoing our identification of its diegetic and 
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Figure 5: Blurring the boundaries of 'reality'. A promotional poster 
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promotional claim to be an authentic replication of a „reality‟ that is not the reality to 
which the filmic image relates, as she says: „on the pragmatic level, the paratext... 
locates the film within the category of nonfiction products‟.508 Schreier‟s study is 
composed, in the main, of a statistical analysis drawn from Internet-based newsgroups 
and the prevalence of varying responses to The Blair Witch Project within the 
discussions that occur there. A majority correctly ascertained the fictional status, the 
„deception‟, of the diegesis, whether this be through „background knowledge 
(concerning the marketing strategy)‟, oddly the primary reason, or „the sheer 
impossibility of the film content‟509 (which generally focused not upon the implicit 
requirement for the spectator to accept the existence of supernatural „witches‟, but upon 
such relatively minor details as the inability of the protagonists to read a compass). 
However, there remained a substantial minority (approximately 40%) that comprised „a 
third group of viewers [who], while eventually coming to realize the film‟s fictionality, 
are nevertheless temporarily confused as to its ontology.‟510 Indeed, Schreier leads us to 
understand (as is borne out by my previous remark regarding the continuing doubts and 
convictions that seem widespread on Internet forums) that there exists another, albeit 
small, minority that remain convinced of the authenticity of the film. A minority that are 
convinced to the extent that some „recipients of The Blair Witch Project... actually 
confused the two [„fact‟ and „fiction‟] by forming search parties for the fictional 
characters who had gone missing.‟511 
What these reactions of confusion, temporary or otherwise, clearly demonstrate is a 
certain susceptibility, a certain willingness or tendency, amongst some spectators, to 
accept the claim of the diegesis that it is an authentic reproduction of reality. As with 
Nanook of the North, The Blair Witch Project establishes its claim of reality upon the 
filmic image‟s ontological relation to „reality‟. The „reality‟ that the diegesis claims, on 
the basis of apparent concurrence with the reality reproduced by the image, is that of the 
self-filmed and recovered footage of Heather Donahue, Joshua Leonard and Michael 
Williams as they are shown exploring Burkittsville, Maryland, as they are shown lost in 
the woods around Coffin Rock, as they are shown becoming increasingly distressed and 
as they are shown, finally, being attacked and presumably killed in a deserted house in 
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the middle of the forest. However, the reality that actually takes place before the 
camera, which the image actually relates to, is that of the actors Heather Donahue, 
Joshua Leonard and Michael Williams, that which shows what the reality put forward 
by the diegesis would „look like‟, that shows the „reality‟ of a „staging‟. There is a 
disconnection between the reality replicated by the image and the claim of the diegesis, 
which is elided by manipulation of the „experience of reality‟, the sense of belief in the 
reality of the film, prompted by the image‟s ontological relation to reality. Whilst The 
Blair Witch Project performs the same „deception‟ as Flaherty, we can come back to 
this question of degree, of intention. An intention which is, in this case, most plausibly 
and directly, the acquiring of publicity through innovation, and an attempt to heighten 
the engagement and response of the spectator for the purposes of entertainment. 
What this example demonstrates, developing from that of Nanook of the North, is the 
strength of the sense of belief in the reality of film that we have been describing. It 
illustrates an aspect of desire, an aspect associated with this nudging, tugging, 
insinuating, sense of belief. Let us speak of this „belief‟ that we seem to return to again 
and again. Firstly, there is a willingness to believe, against the protestations, we can 
suppose, of conscious thought. There is an opening to belief. As Julia Kristeva has 
recently described, there is a „“need to believe,” that narcotic that makes living 
easier‟.512 As a „narcotic‟ this „belief‟ has an addictive, compulsive quality, and is an 
object of desire, an object to be sought. Kristeva quotes Pascal near the beginning of her 
interview with Carmine Donzelli, the form taken by her 2009 work This Incredible 
Need to Believe, and it is a quotation that certainly has resonance for our present subject 
matter: „“The mind believes naturally, and the will loves naturally; so that, lacking real 
objects, they have to cling to false ones” (Pensées, 2.81)‟.513 This „need‟ to believe 
facilitates, opens the way to, the „deception‟ of which cinema is, potentially, capable 
through exploiting the image‟s relation to reality. And this element of „belief‟ can be 
thought of in another way, for, as Kristeva determines, „when I say “I believe,” I mean 
“I hold as true.”‟514 The desire to believe is a desire for truth (at least a truth that can be 
accepted, „held‟, as truth), for the truth of reality, for an encounter with the genuine, for 
an experience of the origin. 
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As Alain de Mijolla says of film footage taken of Freud in his twilight years, for 
psychoanalysts „especially‟ for whom an encounter with the „reality‟, the „original‟, of 
Freud holds a particular appeal (as the original of the origin, as it were): „they [viewers] 
find the Founding Father in these films... they [the films] contribute to giving us a better 
sense, rather than comprehension, of Freud‟.515 Let us look again at the mock-„Missing 
Persons‟ poster that advertises The Blair Witch Project (Figure 5). Towards the bottom 
of this we will note the words, written larger than any other except for „Missing‟ itself, 
„Evidence Exists‟. This is what the diegesis of the film wants to be taken as, and claims 
that it can be taken as: „evidence‟. Evidence of a reality that it claims to replicate. 
„Evidence Exists‟: there is an insistence here, an insistence that the truth can be „seen‟ 
(evidence, from ē + vidēre: „to see out‟516), „seen out‟. This implication of externality 
constitutes an impression that there is only the external „showing‟, there is no 
„signification‟ beyond this. This „evidence‟ is „impartial‟. It can be believed. And this 
desire to believe is always prior to the experience of the film itself. The spectator, so the 
filmic situation assumes, in at least some part, to at least some degree, has a desire to 
believe before being shown the film, and a sense of belief deriving from the image‟s 
relation to „reality‟ during the film. By presenting itself as „evidence‟, the diegesis 
legitimises this belief, allows it license to exist. 
We have seen the „opportunity‟ that the image‟s relation to „reality‟ affords the film, 
affords the diegesis of the film, we could say. The opportunity to enact a „deception‟ (an 
accurate description, even if vaguely „puritanical‟ in its associations). However, we 
have presented cases in which this potential, this potential for the intentional 
manipulation of the „sense of belief‟, of the „experience of the truth of life‟, has been 
employed to relatively innocuous ends. As a final example, I would like now to 
reference a case that exemplifies the danger intrinsically posed by the potential for 
exploiting this ontological feature of film: what can be at stake in accepting the 
correspondence of diegesis and image as equivalent relations to reality, in believing the 
filmic as „evidence‟. 
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4.ii.ii A Film Unfinished 
„Film was the most efficient tool to show that because, when you see an image, it is 
evidence, you can use it as evidence‟.517 
The „that‟ referred to in this quotation, from an interview with Israeli director Yael 
Hersonski, is the „immorality‟ and „corruption‟ of seemingly wealthy Jews, as depicted 
in a 1942 Nazi propaganda film „recording‟ life in the Warsaw Ghetto. Her 2010 
documentary, A Film Unfinished, is composed primarily of footage from this earlier 
film (which was, indeed, left unfinished, for an unknown reason). To achieve their aim, 
the Nazi filmmakers contrasted images of said „wealthy‟ Jews with images of their 
destitute and suffering co-religionists. Thus they would suggest that the former were to 
blame for the plight of the latter, with a chillingly calculated irony, and seek to 
„demonstrate‟ the apparent callousness of the „rich‟ Jew for his fellow man. It is an 
unsurprising revelation that the scenes in this „documentary‟ featuring the lifestyle of 
bourgeois Jews (Figure 6) were completely fabricated. 
However, it is surely quite unexpected, startling even, that the images of poor Jews 
(Figure 7) were also „constructed‟. One of the eye-witnesses from the Warsaw Ghetto, 
who was interviewed by Hersonski during the research for her film, recalled the 
working practices of the Nazi film-crews and, as related by Hersonski, described how: 
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Figure 6: The 'reality' of life for ‘wealthy’ Jews in the 
Warsaw Ghetto. A diegetically imposed fabrication. A Film 
Unfinished (2010), dir. Yael Hersonski, Oscilloscope 
Pictures. 
Figure 7: The 'reality' of life for poor Jews in the Warsaw 
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dir. Yael Hersonski, Oscilloscope Pictures. 
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When we see a street [in the film] we can't know that they stopped it from both 
sides, outside the frame, and chose the exact people they wanted to enter the 
frame because they wanted to achieve an image, which will include the dying 
person on a sidewalk and the rich man or woman passing by him and not 
looking at him.
518
 
It is clearly insufficient to simply record the dying person, rather the context must be 
just right, the setting just so. We can perhaps identify with Hersonski when she 
expresses her astonishment that „even the scenes I regarded as purely documentary or 
authentic one [sic] were not‟.519 
And herein lies the insidiousness of this image, as one among many. The inclusion of 
the person dying, an element of tragic, historical accuracy (documented in a thousand 
forms, from contemporary reports and diaries, including the heroic archival work of the 
group Oyneg Shabbos, to photographs and recorded survivor accounts), lends 
authenticity to the elements that are deliberately connived (i.e. the staging of the 
indifference of the „rich man or woman‟). The truth of death, valuable as a „guarantor‟ 
of authenticity, is put in the service of the wholly subjective and ulterior intended 
„meaning‟ of the image: the perception of this „indifference‟. As Hersonski notes, the 
Nazi filmmakers are clearly displaying „quite an advanced thinking about 
filmmaking‟.520 Indeed, the entire diegesis of the film, as a propagandist impression of 
the Ghetto, is the product of human manipulation.  
Despite such constructions and misleading practices, when, in the aftermath of the war 
and for many years subsequently, excerpts from this film and similar images were 
shown they had a substantial influence in forming social, cultural and historical 
impressions of the reality of life in the Warsaw Ghetto. Perhaps understandably, as 
Hersonski explains: „During the first decades after the war it was more urgent to just 
show what happened, and there was not a good opportunity to discuss the nature of 
these images.‟521 The desire to „show the truth‟, to „evidence‟ it, intensified through 
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temporal proximity to the events, supersedes close interrogation of the precise validity 
of these films. They were taken as „truth‟, believed to be „evidence‟. „When you see an 
image, it is evidence‟: the diegetic narrative, the significations that it seeks to convey, 
uses this understanding to give credence to its claims regarding the „reality‟ of the 
Warsaw Ghetto. 
However, the „evidence‟ that the mechanical reproduction of the image provides here is 
not of this „reality‟, despite its appearance and despite its „paratextual‟ contentions, but 
of a „reality‟ that accords with the diegesis, that is „produced‟ exclusively for this 
purpose: „we can understand not in the way of the reality that we see but the way the 
image itself was produced‟ [my italics].522 We can see, in Figure 8, this production at 
work: the image, from A Film Unfinished, shows a member of the Jüdischer 
Ordnungsdienst, or Jewish Ghetto Police, escorting away a Jewish man involved in  
„rioting‟ that is 
supposed to have just 
taken place. This riot 
was, as we may now 
expect, staged for the 
benefit of the 
camera. If we look to 
the left of this image, 
in the background 
behind the Police 
officer, we see one of 
the German camera-men (circled) recording the „event‟. Clearly this is one of the 
images assigned to be cut from the final version of the film: it exposes the „reality‟, 
claimed by the diegesis, to be a fraudulent one. And when we apprehend this 
disconnection between the claim of the diegesis and the reality that the image replicates, 
the disconnection revealed in this moment, the nature of the diegesis changes. It 
becomes a replication of reality, but the reality of the production and intention of a 
deception, of an exercise in Nazi propaganda: this is the „experience of reality‟ that 
comes to be derived from the reality to which its images relate. However, this 
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apprehension is, of course, only possible with non-diegetic, external knowledge. It is for 
this reason, in particular I would suggest, that eyewitness accounts become so 
important. 
Through these cases we see, then, the potential for „deception‟ that is made available to 
film by the „sense of belief‟ that it institutes, arising from the relation to „reality‟ of its 
images, and the possible dangers that are facilitated by this. We have seen, therefore, 
how this relation to „reality‟, from the perspective of the filmic, constitutes both a threat, 
to the conveyance of meaning or diegetic signification, and an opportunity, for the 
abdication of said meaning, and the correspondent exploitation of the willingness to 
attribute evidentiary status to the film that this enables. The filmic exists in tension with 
this ontological condition, which is not a constant, but „characterises‟ the film through 
its varying degrees and intensities, and the interactions of this phenomenon with the 
film‟s inescapable element of human organisation. The way in which the film integrates 
and responds to this intrinsic relation to reality, this essential feature that lies at its heart, 
either experiencing it as a risk to be wary of, or as a prospect to embrace and thus 
situating it as a fundamental aspect of its diegesis, each present their own problematic 
issues and limitations. To explore these further, I return now to the model of Funesian 
memory, engaged with in the previous sub-chapter, and how its affinity with these 
particular principles of film, the element of human organisation and the filmic relation 
to reality, helps us to think the difficulties engendered by them. It will also enable us to 
think some of the restrictions and omissions that conceptualising, defining, film through 
these terms, through these processes, imposes. 
4.iii The Filmic Relation to Reality and its Association with Funesian Memory 
We have posited, in our previous discussion of the actuality, that cinema, through its 
status as a „recording machine‟, accords closely with the exactitude of a Funesian model 
of memory. They can be said to „represent‟ in an analogous manner. We can now refine 
this assertion further. Clearly the filmic image‟s relation to reality is commensurate with 
Funesian memory: it is this element that the actuality emphasises, and they share the 
presupposition that they are able to precisely record, store and replicate reality, with 
theoretically infinite and exact repetition. Indeed, the camera does, at least on one level, 
do this. However, upon enunciating this, we immediately found that a strand of 
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contemporary responses to such a conception of cinema were profoundly negative, with 
Maxim Gorky‟s description prompting our attribution of the epithet to which we have 
consistently returned in this context: „dissatisfaction‟. The source of this dissatisfaction, 
we averred, was the fact that this model of cinema excluded a crucial aspect. Defining 
the cinema as a „recording machine‟, exclusively, had the consequence that the human 
element was missing. We found this human element in the inevitable „organisation‟ that 
the film, the film on screen, undergoes, as soon as that first judgement is made to point 
the camera, to record a certain space, and all that is in it, for a certain duration. 
However, the question that we unavoidably come to is whether this is sufficient? 
Whether this is the human element that we, and Gorky, and the original promises for the 
medium, were previously „missing‟? Does this satisfy? 
Firstly, we can say that the threat of being „only reality‟ still exists, despite this human 
organisation. The filmic image still bears a relation to reality. This means that a 
straightforward, literal adoption of Funesian memory as a model for cinematic 
representation is always possible. However, the mode through which a human influence 
is identified here, as the organisation of a signifying diegesis, remains fundamentally 
bound to the model of Funesian memory. The reasons for this are two-fold. We can 
immediately see the connection established through the film‟s intrinsic repeatability. 
Once the diegesis is organised, it becomes precisely repeatable. It is exactly the same 
object each time it is shown. This is not the same as the de-signification compelled by 
the privileging of the filmic image‟s replication of reality, the condition that there is 
nothing „external‟ to this replicative function. The diegesis is only, here, being 
identified as repeatable, including its potential to convey „meaning‟. And this 
conveyance of „meaning‟, this signification, constitutes the second means by which the 
organisation of the film connects with a model of Funesian memory. The act of 
organising filmic images to form the diegesis, and to convey signification, presupposes 
the appropriateness of an interpretive schema that seeks to „uncover‟, to „excavate‟, an 
existent and previously established „meaning‟ to which the diegesis refers. Just as with 
Funesian memory, this assumes that this conception of the diegesis, as the referent to an 
absent „meaning‟, an absent „text‟, an absent „object‟ (akin to Funes‟s perceptions) that 
exists „elsewhere‟ and which can be accessed through this referentiality, is the only 
possible alternative, without which the diegesis must be given the status of direct 
156 
 
„evidence‟. It is an argument that we may be somewhat familiar with, having seen a 
comparable position put forward in relation to theatre, and having analysed the 
problematic relationship that it has with theatricality. But what problems does this 
position entail in relation to cinema? Why, as I imply, should we be suspicious of it? 
Firstly, we have implicitly indicated the danger to which this conception exposes us: the 
expectation of finding „meaning‟ within the filmic diegesis, the organisation of filmic 
images, necessitates the condition that, if one believes that there is no „meaning‟ to be 
found, the logical corollary is that there is no organisation. The diegesis then seems to 
bear the same status as the filmic image, as a replication of „reality‟. Of course there is 
always a degree of organisation but, as we have noted, the „abdication‟ of significance 
acts to elide it, claiming impartiality. Such a conception of cinema based upon the 
model of Funesian memory asserts a binary opposition, in which the filmic image 
relates to reality in a precisely mnemic manner that is either organised and „signifying‟, 
thus being hermeneutically decipherable, or „rejects‟ organisation and is „non-
signifying‟. This oppositional structure, founded upon an implicit willingness to trust 
the hypomnesic offer made by the medium, opens the risk of the kind of manipulation 
that we saw in A Film Unfinished. When film is thought of as congruent with the model 
of Funesian memory, then the denial of diegetic organisation, and thus of reference to 
an external „meaning‟, provokes an understanding of the film as „implacable 
memory‟523 of a reality „almost intolerably precise‟:524 as „evidence‟ of what actually 
occurred in a form that exceeds the capacities of distracted, interrupted, fatigable and 
fallible human vision (with the exception of the „superhuman‟ Funes). 
Willingly, „naturally‟, as Pascal says, it is the belief initiated, inaugurated and sustained 
by this characterisation, this ontological condition, that enables a potential 
manipulation, a re-writing, of reality and the formation of what we can think of as a 
„false memory‟. „False memory‟, defined by Elizabeth F. Loftus as being „constructed 
by combining actual memories with the content of suggestions received from others‟,525 
is, indeed, an apt comparison for such manipulation, such „deception‟. This can be seen 
as it involves the integration of the filmic image‟s relation to reality (taken as an „actual 
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memory‟) with the „suggestions‟, the persuasions, that are intended through filmic 
organisation, with the effect of forming the diegesis into a „construct‟ with the status of 
a „false memory‟. When the purpose of this process is the substitution of historical truth, 
its prospects for iniquity are profound. Such are the stakes at work in this, and such are 
the grounds for our initial scepticism and wariness regarding the conception of filmic 
representation in association with a Funesian mnemic model. 
Secondly, there remains a sense of „something missing‟. Still. There remains another 
aspect of film, one that these discussions, these modes of thinking, do not approach. We 
have identified the „human element‟ of film with its „organisation‟; however, this does 
not seem, I think it will be agreed, quite sufficient. Just as, so I have argued, a Funesian 
conception of memory does not encompass the totality of possible ways of thinking 
memory, so there is an aspect of the cinematic that is not understandable through this 
conception either. And it is an aspect of the cinematic that entails another identification, 
another recognition, of the „human element‟. But first we must think how we come to 
this notion that „something is missing‟? How do we see this being expressed? 
Much of our discussion thus far has accorded and overlapped with the structure of 
various „levels‟ through which film can be approached, proposed by Roland Barthes in 
his important essay „The Third Meaning‟ (originally published as „Le troisème sens‟ in 
1970). Barthes distinguishes, in the first instance, between two such levels: the 
„informational‟, „which gathers together everything I can learn from the setting, the 
costumes, the characters, their relations... This level is that of communication‟,526 and 
the „symbolic‟, which he divides into the „referential‟, the „diegetic‟ (or „thematic‟), the 
„Eisensteinian‟ (although Eisenstein is only Barthes‟s example, this facet is concerned 
with the symbol that refers to the filmmaker‟s „networks‟, and is in relation to his/her 
oeuvre and practices) and the „historical‟. The crux of the „symbolic‟ is given by 
Barthes when he states that: „taken in its entirety, this second level is that of 
signification‟.527 For Barthes, „signification‟ is defined in its distinction from 
„communication‟: it requires interpretation, in contrast to the direct „message‟ of 
„informational‟ communication. The framework with which we have been working 
engages with that of Barthes quite comfortably, without in any sense duplicating or 
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precisely coinciding with it. The „symbolic‟ level in Barthes‟s schema provides an apt 
correlative with the notion of human „organisation‟, as we have thought it. Each is 
concerned with the conveyance of „signification‟. Although it should be briefly noted 
that the way in which Barthes is using the term „diegetic‟ is somewhat different from 
our use of it: his has a narrower focus upon the „range of topics‟ and their treatment 
discernible in a film, whereas we have used it to refer to the „world‟ created by the film, 
its narrative and any meaning-bearing structure.  
However, I would not propose any simple similitude between Barthes‟s demarcation of 
the informational and the symbolic, and ours between filmic organisation and the 
„direct‟ replication of reality (not least as this always involves an element of 
organisation in any case). No. The informational level is also, in our understanding, an 
aspect of human organisation of the filmic. But this qualification is not the key point 
that I am seeking to address. The key point is the correspondence between Barthes‟s 
symbolic level and our recognition of human organisation as the site of filmic 
signification. For, just as we have suggested that there is an insufficiency in the 
Funesian notion of the human element in film, that is, limiting it to exclusively 
functioning through the formation of a signifying organisation, so Barthes also notes a 
sense of „something missing‟ within this model, within the Funesian model. For 
Barthes‟s „levels‟ of the informational and the symbolic are also complicit with the 
Funesian mnemic model, as demonstrated through their similarity with our conception 
of filmic organisation, and the mode of referential interpretation that its status as 
signification presupposes. It is this „sense‟ that induces Barthes to put forward a third 
level for approaching film, as he says: 
Is that all? No, for I am still held by the image, I read, I receive (and probably 
even first and foremost) a third meaning – evident, erratic, obstinate. [My 
italics].
528
 
I will have cause to return to this quotation more fully in due course, but for the moment 
I wish to stay with this point that there is something „dissatisfying‟ about cinema 
approached through the model of Funesian memory. It is a point that returns us to 
Gorky‟s original pronouncement of his displeasure, that leaves us with but „curses and 
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ghosts‟, despite their configuration, re-configuration and modification by human 
organisation, shaping them to carry a particular significance, however interpreted. A 
Funesian approach produces ghosts as it cannot completely take account of that which, 
as Barthes says, „still holds‟ us, that is „received‟, not interpreted: that which is an 
„unthought‟ aspect of the human. In this approach, there is always an aspect of the 
human experience missing. It is a limitation that is alluded to, inconspicuously, in 
Borges‟s narrative: the encounter between Borges‟s narrator and Funes demonstrates the 
nature and extent of what has been lost, as the price for Funes‟s mnemic capacities.  
When the narrator first encounters Funes, after his accident, Funes describes his prior 
state in disparaging terms: „he had been what all humans are: blind, deaf, addle-brained, 
absent-minded‟.529 None of these „faults‟ are for Funes. His mind is clear, „intolerable in 
its richness and sharpness‟.530 And he is, thus, appropriately dismissive of the human 
narrator (by implication of the previous statements, Funes is no longer entirely human: 
„superhuman‟, as he is termed at the beginning of the narrative, perhaps, but certainly to 
some degree inhuman), as the narrator notes in, almost embarrassed, parentheses: „(I 
tried to remind him of his exact perception of time, his memory for proper names; he 
paid no attention to me.)‟531 The engagement between Funes and the narrator is entirely 
one-sided; it consists of the narrator sitting „in the dark, because he [Funes] knew how 
to pass the idle hours without lighting the candle‟,532 and „out of the darkness, Funes‟s 
voice went on talking to me‟.533 Just a voice, disembodied, as the narrator recalls: „It 
seems to me I did not see his face until dawn‟.534 The parallel of this scenario with the 
supposed position of the spectator sitting, passively viewing, accepting, believing, 
interpreting, in the darkness of the cinema is certainly, I suggest, more than a 
coincidence. This is the experience that the Funesian model assumes. Any sense of 
mutual engagement is confounded, leaving the narrator, as he finally terms his 
condition, „benumbed‟.535 
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This „numbness‟ is a useful way for us to think the „dissatisfaction‟ that a Funesian 
mnemic model produces, as it implies a certain reduction in „sensation‟, a deprivation in 
the faculty for experiencing, „physically‟, „affectively‟, we could say. The Funesian 
model constitutes a form of „deadening‟, to take advantage of the range of definitions 
associated with „numbness‟, felt as a „theft‟ („numb‟: from „nim‟, which etymologically 
corresponds to various senses of „take‟ or „to steal‟536), a theft of potential intensity 
from the cinematic situation. The associations that „benumbing‟ has with a discourse 
and terminology of energetics, as a loss of nervous (electrical) energy, for example in 
the loss of feeling in a limb or, paradoxically, as the result of an excess of energy, for 
example due to a shock, also feeds into this depiction, this impression, that I am 
attempting to convey. A depiction that enables this term to be used as a means of 
moving towards an alternative way of thinking and approaching the filmic. 
This characterisation is supported by the allusions and conceptions through which some 
sources have expressed a sense of dissatisfaction, or an identification of some kind of 
indeterminate „lack‟, some kind of „deficiency‟, with the filmic medium, and often done 
so in connection with an energetic description. An example of this is Antonin Artaud, 
who, despite primarily working in and theorising theatre, also wrote presciently about 
cinema (as Susan Sontag notes in „Film and Theatre‟), acted in several films and even 
created a scenario for Germaine Dulac‟s 1927 Surrealist film The Seashell and the 
Clergyman. Artaud wrote, in the short text „Theatre and Cruelty‟, from The Theatre and 
Its Double, that:  
Cinema, in its turn, murders us with reflected, filtered and projected images that 
no longer connect with our sensibility, and for ten years has maintained us and 
all our faculties in an intellectual stupor. [My italics].
537
 
We can see the associative connection between Artaud‟s criticism of cinema as 
instilling an „intellectual stupor‟ and the „numbness‟ that we discussed previously. But 
the key point is that cinema is seen as cutting the spectator off, we could say, from their 
„sensibility‟, from their ability to engage with a work, not through „analytic‟ 
interpretation or passive „acceptance‟, but through sensation, through experiencing it 
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affectively, through being „moved‟. Or, even more explicitly, we can cite André Bazin 
who, whilst certainly no sceptic as to the merits and potential of film, claimed in his 
1951 essay entitled „Theatre and Cinema‟ that: 
It is as if a certain inevitable lowering of the voltage, some mysterious aesthetic 
short circuit, deprived us in the cinema of a certain tension.
538
 
Here we come to the heart of the matter, in regard to this sense of „something missing‟. 
It is not, I would suggest, that there is actually anything „missing‟ in the filmic, but 
rather that a „blind-spot‟ has developed owing to the means of approach, the perspective 
through which the filmic is seen. How is this so? We can note the terms with which 
Artaud, for example, elaborates his portrayal of cinema, and they are quite telling: the 
fact that he typifies the cinema as being defined by its constitution as „reflected‟ and 
„filtered‟ images demonstrates that he is viewing cinema exclusively through its status 
as an organisation for the conveyance of signification. Indeed, both Artaud and Bazin 
come to these particular conclusions, and characterisations, based upon a perspective of 
cinema that corresponds to the Funesian mnemic model. Such a perspective results in a 
duality of mutually-determining conditions: there is an aspect of the „human experience‟ 
that is found to be „missing‟, an aspect of the human that is deprived, that is „exiled‟ 
from how the filmic is engaged with, making the experience somehow „inhuman‟, and 
there is a sense of a depletion in the energic, the „voltage‟ or „a certain tension‟. 
Therefore, a turn to, and focus upon, the role of cinematic organisation is not, I would 
suggest, the „redemption‟ of the human, of life, we can say, that it appears to be. 
That this is the result of a Funesian mnemic perspective is a connection made by 
Lyotard in his most direct exposition on film, Acinema (1973), which we shall be 
examining in greater detail in due course, but for now is of interest primarily for its 
critique of cinematic organisation. As Lyotard argues:  
Direction first divides... a reality and its double, and this disjunction constitutes 
an obvious repression. But also, beyond this representational disjunction... it 
eliminates all impulsional movement, real or unreal, which will not lend itself to 
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reduplication, all movement which would escape identification, recognition and 
the mnesic fixation.
539
 
Lyotard‟s concern here is the organisation, the editing, the construction of a 
significatory diegesis: what he refers to as the „direction‟ that institutes a „disjunction‟ 
between the film „on screen‟ (the diegesis) and the film as mechanical recording of 
reality, but that, more importantly („beyond this representational disjunction‟), 
particularly for our present argument, has the effect of „eliminating all impulsional 
movement‟. Filmic organisation, which works as part of and in collaboration with the 
Funesian mnemic model, silences any engagement or experience of the energetic 
aspects of cinematic representation, of the affective force that, we have demonstrated, is 
concomitant with representation, as its „other‟, and its conjunctive/disjunctive, 
„tensorial‟ constituent. The suppression of which, in this instance, indeed leaves us with 
only „curses and ghosts‟. 
However, Lyotard‟s meaning here requires some reinterpretation, in much the same way 
that we found it necessary to reorient his suggestions regarding theatre in „The Tooth, 
The Palm‟: to regard what is, by Lyotard‟s own tacit admission, an unrealisable model 
for practical realisation („That is my question: is it possible, how?‟540), rather as a mode 
of thinking and approaching the particular medium. So, whereas Lyotard discusses in 
„Acinema‟ a conception of cinematic practice, one that would, for example, embrace 
rather than „eliminate‟ the „movement... which will not lend itself to reduplication‟, I 
propose, as with „The Tooth, The Palm‟, that Lyotard‟s approach in this text be taken as 
an introduction, better, a provocation towards a certain way of seeing, a certain way of 
thinking, the filmic. 
And the correlation between these two texts is far from accidental: Lyotard is 
developing his proposed „energetic theatre‟ through „The Tooth, The Palm‟, at the same 
time that he is also exploring the possibilities of what could appropriately be called an 
„energetic‟ cinema in „Acinema‟,541 both having been originally published in 1973 
(„L‟Acinéma: Le nihilism des Mouvements convenus‟ in Revue d‟esthétique, Vol. 26, 
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Nos. 2-4, and „La dent, la paume‟ in Des Dispositifs pulsionnels), a year before 
Libidinal Economy (1974), with which we were significantly concerned in Chapter 2. It 
is at this moment that Lyotard is most actively expositing his ideas regarding an 
„energetics‟. 
The mode of thought that we derive from „Acinema‟, in this instance, involves an 
engagement with film that does not focus upon the Barthesian informational or 
symbolic levels of „meaning‟, nor upon the organisation of the filmic diegesis or its 
relation to a past reality, but upon that which „would escape... mnesic fixation‟. „Mnesic 
fixation‟: Lyotard‟s term for the model of memory that we name Funesian. We seek 
another conception of memory, another model for approaching cinematic 
representation, one that is not defined through fixity or referentiality: an energetic 
conception of memory, an energetic model of representation.  
For it would be a mistake to think that the structures, processes and qualities of the 
cinema are only, or even best, realised in comparison to a Funesian model of memory. 
And cinema does not, in fact, presume this. Rather, as Todd McGowan has noted, in his 
eminently judicious 2007 re-evaluation of the place of Lacan in film theory, The Real 
Gaze: „Film art captures and mirrors the logic of an internal world‟.542 Cinema does not 
reflect only one element of the psyche, one perspective of, in this instance, memory, but 
engages with the „logic of an internal world‟, of the psyche, in a non-exclusive sense. It 
engages with the energetic as much as the hermeneutic, or the hermeneutically 
addressed. The task here is now to explore how the filmic can be approached through an 
energetics? How can we restore that which is experienced as „something missing‟ in the 
engagement with the cinematic? 
4.iv Exceeding the Image: Obtuse Corporeality and Filmic Resistance to „Mnesic 
Fixation‟ 
We have said that this „something missing‟, the „blindness‟ in an approach to cinema 
through the Funesian mnemic model, is experienced as the confluence of both an 
absence of a certain „human element‟ and a depletion or suppression of the energic. And 
it is precisely the connection between these two that provides us with the means through 
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which we can engage with an energetic approach to the filmic. We made a promise 
earlier to return to a quotation from Barthes in which he claims to „receive... a third 
meaning – evident, erratic, obstinate‟543 when viewing the cinematic image, and here so 
we shall. For Barthes, this „third meaning‟ is characterised as an „excess‟. It is that 
which „exceeds the copy of the referential motif... exceeds meaning‟.544 It cannot be 
„delimited‟ through the ascribing of a „fixed meaning‟, or by defining it through its 
referentiality or reproduction of reality. In fact, it is „that in the film which cannot be 
described, the representation which cannot be represented.‟545 The „third meaning‟ is 
„the one “too many”, the supplement that my intellection cannot succeed in absorbing, 
at once persistent and fleeting, smooth and elusive, I propose to call it the obtuse 
meaning.‟546 
But we can hold these characteristics in mind for the time being; it is another epithet 
that I wish to emphasise at this moment: that which names this „third meaning‟, this 
„obtuse meaning‟, as being „evident‟. We are familiar with the notion of the filmic 
image being „evidentiary‟ („when you see an image, it is evidence‟), and with the 
possibility for the diegesis to claim evidentiary status („you can use it as evidence‟). 
However, this is not the sense in which Barthes is using the term. This former use of the 
designation „evidence‟ is described by Barthes in relation to the symbolic meaning of 
film, which „is intentional... evident certainly (so too is the other), but closed in its 
evidence, held in a complete system of destination. I propose to call this complete sign 
the obvious meaning.‟547 It is „closed‟ as this understanding of evidence is based upon a 
presupposition of fixed referentiality. We will note the understated acknowledgement, 
hidden in parentheses, that „the other‟ is also „evident‟. This „other‟ is Barthes‟s „obtuse 
meaning‟. It is also „evident‟, but not in a way that accords with the Funesian mnemic 
model. 
Rather, it is closer to the notion of „evidence‟ explicated by Rosalind Galt in her short 
paper on „The Obviousness of Cinema‟, particularly in reference to the thought of 
philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. To begin, on a point of detail, both Nancy and Galt 
explicitly connect the terms „obvious‟ and „evident‟. As Nancy states: „the image, clear 
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and distinct is something obvious and evident.‟548 Galt argues that there is an opposition 
between the way in which Nancy uses these terms „obvious‟ and „evident‟, which for 
him have a certain degree of equivalence, and the way in which Barthes is using them. 
As she states: 
Bordwell, Metz and Bellour read the obviousness of classical Hollywood largely 
through the structures of narration and meaning production. Likewise, in Roland 
Barthes‟s analysis of Eisenstein stills, the “obvious meaning” of symbolism and 
signification are contrasted with the poetic, elusive “obtuse meaning.”549 
And this is certainly Barthes‟s correct position in as far as the „obvious‟ goes. However, 
in terms of the „evident‟ (synonymous with the „obvious‟ for Galt), Barthes‟s position is 
more complex. It is only the „“obvious meaning” of symbolism and signification‟ that is 
„closed in its evidence‟, the “obtuse meaning” is also „evident‟, but in a different way. It 
is, in fact, akin to Galt‟s depiction of Nancy‟s use of the „obvious‟ and the „evident‟: 
For Nancy, by contrast, the image‟s obviousness is precisely that which 
separates it from the world of meanings and things... Here, the image is obvious 
because it is distinct – sacred even – separate from the quotidian world of 
meanings and pleasures... cinema‟s codification of language and subjectivity are, 
in this analysis, what‟s left when you take away the image.550 
It is a somewhat confusing linguistic eventuality that Nancy‟s „obviousness‟ is the 
aspect of the image, or the filmic as his theory is being deployed here by Galt, and by 
myself, that refuses to enter „the world of meanings‟, whereas Barthes‟s „obvious 
meaning‟ is that of signification, symbolism, and „meaning, which comes to seek me 
out‟551 (that is, meaning that is „conveyed‟, that exists priorly and „elsewhere‟). The 
connection that I am seeking to establish is actually between the description attributed 
to Nancy‟s notion of the „obvious‟, and the „evidence‟ of Barthes‟s „obtuse‟. Whilst 
Galt makes no reference to the „evidential‟ status of the obtuse, she does assert its 
„elusiveness‟. „Elusive‟ for the same reasons, I would suggest, that Nancy‟s „obvious‟ 
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could also be termed „elusive‟. Both „elude‟ meaning, elude language, elude being 
represented through another form and elude the referentiality or fixity that would 
integrate them within a Funesian model of memory and representation, whilst 
constituting something „fundamental‟ to the filmic, something literally „essential‟. 
What do we mean by this? There is a sense in which the „obtuse‟, and Nancy‟s 
„obvious‟, are ways of denoting a certain experience of „corporeality‟, of „tangibility‟, 
within the filmic. This is the „alternative‟, but really coincident, mode of reception that 
they propose in their „elusiveness‟, in their „over-spilling‟ of signification. And it is 
summarised neatly in a turn of phrase used by Galt when she says that: „Nancy 
addresses the nature of the cinematic image; its intimate materiality‟ [my italics].552 His 
„obvious‟ and Barthes‟s „obtuse‟ are conveyed, are „received‟, and are „knowable‟, not 
through „intellection‟, as Barthes says. But they are rather experienced, I suggest, 
through a „physical‟, „sensual‟, awareness of, and connection with, their simple 
„beingness‟. They exceed meaning and interpretation, they overwhelm through their 
quality of „fullness‟, to become a „materiality‟ that is engaged with, interacted with 
„intimately‟. And it is in this „other‟ aspect of the filmic that we can perhaps find the 
„human element‟, which we discovered to be „missing‟ from a Funesian mnemic model. 
4.iv.i Considering „Haptic Visuality‟ 
Our ability to consider this „human element‟ comes to the fore if we try to consider the 
„location‟ of Barthes‟s „obtuse meaning‟. Where is it taking place, if not referring to an 
absent meaning to be discovered? How is it „received‟, if it „bears precisely on the 
signifier not on the signified‟?553 Vivian Sobchack provides a clear and effective answer 
to these questions, when she states that: 
It is the lived body that provides both the site and genesis of the „third‟ or 
„obtuse‟ meaning that Roland Barthes suggests escapes language yet resides 
within it. [My italics].
554
 
Sobchack‟s 2004 book, Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image Culture, is one 
of the key texts in a relatively recent turn in film studies towards what is often termed 
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the „haptic‟. The emphasis of this approach is to explore the mutual engagement of film 
and spectator at a bodily level. It works from the supposition that the film is not there 
simply to be „viewed‟ by a passive spectator, but that it is also experienced physically: 
that the film „touches‟ the „spectator‟, as an encounter between two bodies. Jennifer 
Barker, in her recent work The Tactile Eye, defines this method in a particularly 
comprehensive way, as one that: 
approaches the film and the viewer as acting together, correlationally [sic], along 
an axis that would itself constitute the object of study... It is not a matter simply 
of identifying with the characters on screen, or with the body of the director or 
camera operator, for example. Rather, we are in a relationship of intimate, 
tactile, reversible contact with the film‟s body.555 
And Sobchack is clearly identifying Barthes‟s notion of the „obtuse‟, by „situating‟ it at 
and in the „lived body‟ of the spectator, as being complicit with just such a way of 
thinking the filmic. 
The „obtuse‟ comes into existence only through contact with the „lived body‟: it is 
experienced as being „of‟ the film, but is determined through a certain mutuality, an 
interaction with the body of the spectator. This interaction, this mutual „touching‟ 
between the film and the spectator, constitutes the sense of „excess‟ that characterises 
the obtuse and serves to denote the „human element‟ that goes beyond meaning, that is 
strictly „indescribable‟. As Sobchack states: „the body [is] a “third term” that both 
exceeds and yet is within discrete representation‟.556 The body‟s sensual experience of 
the filmic is necessarily in conjunction with the field of filmic representation, it is 
derived from an engagement with the filmic representation, but it is also that which is 
found to be „other‟ to filmic representation, „more than‟ filmic representation. 
One need only look to an example given by Barthes to gain a sense of how this notion 
of „excess‟ is being thought here, how it is functioning. As Barthes describes: „Look at 
another bun [of hair] (that of the woman in image IX [from Eisenstein‟s Ivan the  
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Terrible, see Figure 9]): it contradicts 
the tiny raised fist... it gives the woman 
something touching... or sensitive‟.557 
Barthes‟s „bodily‟ experience of this image, 
that which he finds „touching‟ in a double 
sense of the word, is in relation to a 
contradiction within the field of 
representation: the difference between the 
hair and the fist.
558
 But this is a contradiction 
that is experienced entirely at the level of the 
signifier: this difference is a tactile one 
between the varying impressions of physical 
mass, the impression of an „excessive mass of the hair‟,559 the touch of the hair, the 
delicateness of the fist. The obtuse meaning of the image is experienced physically: it 
refers to no signified. It is felt as a contact between the „surface‟ of the filmic „body‟ and 
the „surface‟ of the spectator‟s body. 
That this corporeal mode of engagement is experienced as a meeting of surfaces is an 
important characteristic of the haptic. It is one enunciated by Laura Marks in another of 
the foundational texts of the „haptic turn‟, as we could call it, The Skin of Film: 
Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses (1999): „Haptic looking tends to rest 
on the surface of its object rather than to plunge into depth, not to distinguish form so 
much as to discern texture‟.560 It is important for us to clarify this characteristic of the 
model, for the purposes of gaining a more accurate and nuanced understanding of the 
nature of the interaction between the filmic body and the spectator‟s body. It is not so 
much an interaction between two discrete and separate entities, as it is an experience of 
mutuality, in a shared moment and a shared surface; each body defining itself, 
experiencing itself, in relation to the other. As Elena del Río has explained: 
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Figure 9: The hair and the fist: the obtuse 
meaning. A still of Sergei Eisenstein's Ivan the 
Terrible. Reproduced from Roland Barthes's 
'The Third Meaning' (Image Music Text, 
trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 
1970). The poor quality of the image is 
regrettably unavoidable, being a reproduction 
of a poor quality original. 
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As the image becomes translated into a bodily response, body and image no 
longer function as discrete units, but as surfaces in contact, engaged in a 
constant activity of reciprocal alignment and inflection.
561
 
But, as Jennifer Barker has been precise in arguing, we should not take this to indicate 
that the bodies of the filmic and the spectator become identical. She clarifies this, rather 
evocatively, when she describes the condition of the bodies involved in „haptic seeing‟: 
We are up against each other, entangled in a single caress, but we do not elide 
the boundaries altogether between our body and the film‟s body; rather, we exist 
for a moment just on both sides of that boundary.
562
 
„For a moment... on both sides‟ and a „constant activity of reciprocal alignment‟: 
constantly for a moment. Despite its appearance, there is no contradiction in this 
statement. It is a situation encapsulated by Barker in the phrase „constant oscillation‟ :563 
I take this to mean, neither one nor the other, always one and the other. Indeed, always 
already, as there is no haptic experience without it already existing as such: it becomes 
in the moment of its experience. It is through this corporeal engagement, this 
„understanding‟ between and of the bodies of the filmic and the spectator, that we can 
begin to approach that which is experienced as „missing‟ in the filmic, when perceived 
exclusively through a Funesian mnemic model. This is the ground for a different model, 
a different conception of filmic „evidence‟, based upon a tangibility that eludes 
referential meaning: an association that the word „evidence‟ certainly can be seen to 
bear, through its legal definition as signifying „proof‟. „Proof‟ is of legal use precisely 
for its capability to be „known‟ directly, to require no interpretation, to not refer 
elsewhere for its meaning. This is a model that eludes mnemic fixity, being an 
experience of the surface, of the encounter between two surfaces, in a moment. Always 
in a moment. Given this initial outline of a model, we can turn now to see specifically 
how it connects with, and can adapt, an energetic approach to the filmic. 
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4.iv.ii Lyotard‟s Acinema and the Energetics of an Obtuse Corporeality 
To state my position from the opening, it is my supposition that there is an imbrication 
between the energetic and the haptic models. We have seen the way in which the 
interaction between the body of the spectator and the filmic body have been theorised in 
the „haptic turn‟ above. However, I suggest that a parallel structure of interaction is 
posited by Lyotard in his exposition of an energetics in film, throughout his paper 
„Acinema‟. Indeed, my positioning of this key paper by Lyotard constitutes an 
important intervention in the debate around the haptic in film studies. Whilst Barthes‟s 
conception of the obtuse has, as we have seen, been noted as a precursor to the haptic 
theory, Lyotard‟s energetics has, to my knowledge, never been raised in this context. 
We have shown how Lyotard is critical of „organisation‟ in cinema for its effect of 
„eliminating all impulsional movement‟, and ensuring the unchallenged establishment 
of „mnesic fixation‟. This is an argument that we have repositioned to be an attack, 
equally, upon critical approaches to the filmic that function through a Funesian mnemic 
perspective. However, we have not addressed the alternative that Lyotard posits. The 
alternative that Lyotard presents as a „libidinal economy of cinema‟,564 and that 
comprises his answer to his own question: „how and why the specular wall in general, 
and thus the cinema screen in particular, can become a privileged place for the libidinal 
cathexis‟.565 For Lyotard there are two „poles‟ of cinema which, at the extreme of each, 
offer an experience of „intensity‟, of „discharge‟: these are „extreme immobilization and 
extreme mobilization‟.566 We shall briefly define each of these in turn, and identify how 
Lyotard is thinking the state of the energetic in them. 
The archetype of „extreme immobilization‟, that Lyotard offers, is that of the „tableau 
vivant‟. The tableau vivant „holds a certain libidinal potential‟567 through the 
eroticisation of that which is immobile. In the tableau vivant it is the „whole person‟, of 
the immobile human model, that is invested with intensity through becoming a 
„detached erotic region to which the spectator‟s impulses are connected‟.568 For the 
realisation of this energetic potential, the apparent unity of the „whole person‟ has to be 
undone through their immobility. As Lyotard explains:  
                                                             
564
 Lyotard, „Acinema‟, p.176. 
565
 Lyotard, „Acinema‟, p.176. 
566
 Lyotard, „Acinema‟, p.177. 
567
 Lyotard, „Acinema‟, p.177. 
568
 Lyotard, „Acinema‟, p.177. 
171 
 
We must sense the price... that the organic body, the pretended unity of the 
pretended subject, must pay so that the pleasure will burst forth in its irreversible 
sterility.
569
 
This price is the „pretended unity‟ of which Lyotard speaks. As Eleanor Kaufman 
explicates in her discussion of this passage: „the posed immobility of the characters 
highlights and eroticizes certain bodily parts‟ [my italics].570 The „unity‟ becomes 
distorted, fragmented, and this facilitates the expression of intensity. The relevance of 
this is that, for Lyotard, the „body‟ of the cinema is open to the same process. He claims 
that: 
This is the same price that the cinema should pay if it goes to the first of its 
extremes, immobilization: because this latter... means that it would be necessary 
to endlessly undo the conventional syntheses that normally all cinematographic 
movements proliferate.
571
 
In this conception, the cinema necessarily involves „identification, recognizable forms, 
all in all, matter for memory‟,572 that is, „unity‟, „syntheses‟, which must be present, 
even if „pretended‟, so that they can be distorted. Thus, it „give[s] rise to the most 
intense agitation through its fascinating paralysis‟,573 paralysis which necessarily 
involves fragmentation. In energetic terms, Lyotard is quite clear that this „agitation‟ is 
situated with the spectator. It is the spectator that experiences „intensity‟ due to his/her 
distortion, his/her „perversion‟, of unity in filmic representation, which its immobility 
provokes. The impression that we should arrive at here is of an interaction between the 
spectator and the filmic body: the immobility of the latter „connects‟ with the libidinal 
impulses, the „agitation‟, of the spectator (through its „fascinating paralysis‟), which 
distort and fragment the unity of the filmic body in the act of their release. This 
distortion of the filmic body is both the means and effect of an energetic expression. 
And whilst, as we have said, Lyotard is proposing this immobility to be a practice of 
avant-garde cinema, I would suggest that we can more usefully think of it as a mode of 
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viewing cinema generally. Is it not possible to define immobility as a way of thinking 
the filmic, a way of „experiencing‟ it, which results in the distortion of filmic 
representation? I believe that it is. However, we will return to this discussion shortly, 
after we have examined the second „pole‟ that Lyotard identifies: „extreme 
mobilization‟. 
The first point that Lyotard makes regarding „extreme mobilization‟ is that the locus of 
„agitation and libidinal expense‟574 is changed. It is now situated with „the support 
itself‟,575 that is, with „the screen itself, in all its most formal aspects‟.576 This „extreme 
mobilization‟ is experienced as a mobility of the cinematic apparatus, entailing the 
„opacity‟ of the means of production. This is an abstract cinema, rather than an 
apparently unified, representative one in which the „film strip‟ as Lyotard says, is 
„abolished (made transparent)‟. Here, the film strip „offers itself as the flesh posing 
itself‟.577 It is not concerned with the formation of an identifiable form, which is then 
subject to distortion, but „blocks the synthesis of identification and thwarts the mnesic 
instances‟578 through a sheer abstraction, which is the result of the support‟s lack of a 
fixed position, its constant „mobility‟. However, the aspect of this that primarily 
concerns us is the „movement‟ of the energetic. And we can see that this is the reverse 
movement of that which we found in „extreme immobilization‟ above. Here the filmic 
body is experienced as being originally distorted, requiring a paralysis and distortion in 
the unity of the spectator‟s own body, for the release of libidinal intensity (experienced 
by the spectator, of course, for the filmic body is a machine body and is without 
libidinal force if apart from the spectator). Lyotard frames this model in the following 
terms: 
It is at the price of renouncing his own bodily totality and the synthesis of 
movements making it exist that the spectator experiences intense pleasure: these 
objects [the filmic body in extreme mobilization] demand the paralysis not of 
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the object-model but of the „subject‟-client, the decomposition of his own 
organism.
579
 
As with „extreme immobilization‟, Lyotard proposes „extreme mobilization‟ as a 
practice of cinema. However, we can again reconfigure this to become a mode for 
approaching the filmic more generally. 
The ground for this, perhaps, becomes clearer when we note that, for Lyotard, extreme 
mobilization and extreme immobilization are not two opposing alternatives for cinema. 
Rather, „it is only for thought that these two modes are incompatible. In a libidinal 
economy they are, on the contrary, necessarily associated‟ [my italics].580 We can see 
these „modes‟ as two intrinsic aspects of the filmic, both experienced through the 
interaction between the filmic and the spectator. They involve the mutual distortion of 
the unity of the body, filmic or spectatorial, in the contact between these bodies. Just as 
„haptic seeing‟ involves a „constant moment‟ of reciprocity, of inter-mingling in an 
„entangled caress‟, so Lyotard‟s „acinema‟ (the term that he uses to designate the 
cinema that takes place at the extremes of mobility and immobility) involves the 
coincidence, the simultaneity, of these two bodies in contact. A contact experienced as 
an oscillation, a „constant oscillation‟, between two loci of libidinal investment. In this 
contact they exchange libidinal energy, become invested, because of, and resulting in, 
their loss of unity. A loss of unity that is mirrored in „haptic seeing‟ by the notion, 
enunciated by Barker, of „existing for a moment just on both sides‟: being both one and 
the other, two surfaces as one, fragmented in their experiencing of each other. 
Existing as an engagement between two bodies, in a moment, „haptic seeing‟ is an 
experience that „does not copy anything‟,581 as Barthes says of the obtuse. It refers to 
nothing outside itself, as del Río claims: „the notion of human and electronic bodies as 
surfaces in contact is not in keeping with rigid binary demarcations of externality and 
interiority‟.582 Its experience is determined entirely in the instant of contact. This 
condition is directly opposed to that which is deemed of value through a Funesian 
mnemic model: the „production‟ of meaning. Lyotard elucidates this position near the 
beginning of „Acinema‟: „the object [i.e. the filmic object]... is valuable only insofar as 
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it is exchangeable against other objects... such a process is not sterile, but productive; it 
is production in the widest sense‟.583 The Funesian model cannot accommodate that 
which is not „exchangeable‟, that which cannot be exchanged for an absent referent, a 
signified, a meaning. In this sense, „haptic seeing‟ can be depicted in terms of being, as 
Barthes names it, „useless expenditure‟.584 Indeed it accords with Lyotard‟s acinema and 
Barthes‟s obtuse in „conforming to‟, what Lyotard calls, „the pyrotechnical 
imperative‟.585 This is a „dissipation of energy‟ without return, a release of energy with 
the purpose of simply expending it, not in the production of anything. As Lyotard 
describes, through the examples of a child striking a match and fireworks, it is: a „sterile 
consumption of energies‟.586 
And the experience of the „human bod[y] to be, in fact, really... “moved” by the 
movies‟587 is, I would suggest, an experience of precisely such a „sterile motion‟, such a 
„sterile explosion of libidinal discharge‟.588 Barthes‟s conception of the obtuse provides 
a way of thinking this connection, through his description of it as both a corporeal 
engagement with the filmic, a feature of „haptic seeing‟ (as we have found Sobchack 
claiming it to be), and as an energetic concept. Barthes‟s attribution of an energetic 
schema to the obtuse is an element of this concept that is infrequently drawn upon, but 
is of great interest to our present discussion. Barthes determines that the obtuse, the 
„third meaning‟, is at once in „a permanent state of depletion‟,589 whilst also finding 
that: 
We can also say on the contrary – and it would be just as correct – that this same 
signifier is not empty (cannot empty itself), that it maintains a permanent state of 
erethism, desire not finding issue in that spasm of the signified which normally 
brings the subject voluptuously back into the peace of nominations.
590
 
Firstly, we should define this unusual word „erethism‟, for it is crucial to our use of this 
passage. „Erethism‟ is a pathological term designating „the excitement of an organ or 
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tissue in an unusual degree‟.591 Secondly, how can we reconcile this duality of 
„permanent depletion‟ and „permanent erethism‟? In fact, this circumstance is quite to 
be expected, given our previous assertion that the obtuse „conforms‟ to the 
„pyrotechnical imperative‟: it expends its energy instantly, in the moment. It is 
experienced as a release of energy, but cannot be thought as such: as soon as the obtuse 
is „known‟ its energic force has been consumed. It is, thus, appropriate to characterise it 
as being at once „depleted‟ and „erethismic‟. The obtuse is an experience of the 
movement of libidinal intensity, in that it involves the passage of „desire‟, unattached to 
a signified, „not finding issue‟ through a signified. This desire is thus in motion, 
expressed through the „excess‟, the tangibility of the obtuse. Expressed through the 
„haptic seeing‟ with which the obtuse is complicit. The feeling of being „moved‟ 
through a haptic engagement with the filmic is accurate, thus, I ultimately would claim, 
in both a physical sense and an energetic one, as an experience of „sterile motion‟, of the 
movement of libidinal intensity through its discharge. Although these senses should not 
be taken as being separate, they are entirely coincident, as Jennifer Barker rightly states, 
in a slightly different context: „we are moved, both emotionally and physically, in two 
directions at once.‟ [My italics].592 
This, finally, is the way in which we can consider the conflation of the energetic and the 
haptic in cinema: as an experience of a movement. However, Barthes is specific in 
detailing the nature of the movement that we are referring to, when he identifies that: 
„the “movement” regarded as the essence of film is not animation, flux, mobility, “life”, 
copy, but simply the framework of a permutational unfolding‟.593 Cinema has often 
been defined in terms of diegetic or mechanical movement, for example as Doane 
states: „at its most basic level, the film moves forward relentlessly‟.594 Cinema as a 
medium of motion, of the moving image, is very familiar to us. However, I contend that 
this movement can be thought in another way, a way indicated by Barthes. As 
„permutational unfolding‟ this movement is a „transformative‟ movement. It is a 
transformation that is enacted through an engagement between the filmic body and the 
spectatorial body, that sees the becoming of an interactive modality, a reciprocal 
mutuality, through the contact that these bodies make with one another. It is a 
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transformation that occurs in the moment, as a „sterile‟ expenditure of energy that is 
always already consumed in its expression. It is the transformation that these bodies 
undergo through the exchange, the oscillation, of libidinal intensity that their contact 
facilitates: the distortion, the „decomposition‟, of their apparent unity. 
Finally, this transformative movement is entirely opposed to a Funesian mnemic model 
of representation. As Barthes says, it does not „copy‟, it is not referential and, as 
Lyotard notes, it resists „mnesic fixity‟. The difficulty that this leaves us with, as with 
all attempts at an energetic approach, is how can we use these ideas, critically, without 
falling into pure subjectivity? My tentative answer to this, as with similar issues 
concerning theatricality in the previous chapter, is that we should not be seeking to 
establish any new kind of mnesic fixity based upon new concepts. Rather, an energetic 
approach calls for a focus upon the processes at work themselves, rather than attempting 
to discover a „meaning‟. As we have seen from the role of energetics in psychoanalytic 
practice, this involves responding to the ways in which these processes, these 
movements of intensity, affect and challenge representation, and how they are 
functioning in each case. However, the present discussion should be seen, not as a 
definitive solution, but rather as a beginning, a provocation and an opening into a 
potential way of thinking these issues. 
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Final Words... 
The aim of this work has been to raise questions. 
I have sought to demonstrate that an energetic approach offers a radically alternative 
way for understanding visual media. And from this, I have intimated that it has the 
potential for addressing the challenges of new visual media, in the same way that it 
addresses those aspects of the antecedent media, theatre and film, which resist 
interpretation. 
Memory has been our point of access. It has provided us with two models of, two ways 
of approaching, visual representation, based upon two definitions of memory, held in 
tension one with the other. A Funesian mnemic model posits visual representation in 
terms of being a „copy‟, as being referential to an „elsewhere‟. It suggests a mode of 
response that seeks „meaning‟, that seeks to excavate a hidden truth in the image. And, 
as we have seen, it is an approach that is not always appropriate to its subject. It is 
challenged and resisted by specific aspects of the media to which it is directed, only 
some of which we have enunciated here. 
In the second definition, an energetic conception of memory is one which presents 
memory as being determined not through its capacity to refer to the past, to recall 
previous impressions, but as the facility through which the affective can be expressed. 
Energetic memory functions as a „surface‟ of mnemic images that are distorted and 
fractured by the passage of affect. When serving as a model through which visual media 
can be approached, the unique characteristics of the medium with which it is engaged 
demand a reactive capacity from the mode of address, a sensitivity to the differentiation 
of their intrinsic features and a change of emphasis in terms of the way that energetic 
theory functions. We have thus drawn upon different aspects of an energetic theory, as 
appropriate to the aspect of the visual medium to which we are attending. But, we must 
not forget that our point of departure in thinking visual representation through an 
energetics is inevitably memory. As we see from Freud, and later psychoanalytic theory 
in particular, memory is the means and model by which an energetics can be thought 
through visual representation. The archetype of an energetic approach is the coincidence 
of the affective force with the mnemic image, the conjunctive-disjunctive relationship 
that they establish. 
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This work is then an outline, a framework, a theory, which seeks to gesture towards a 
possible way of thinking visual media. It is not prescription, but speculation, and is thus 
to be responded to, to be developed, to be expanded and, it is hoped, to be engaged with 
in new and surprising encounters. It is a process that, even by the nature of its 
conceptual structure, is necessarily unfinished. 
Finally, to return to the challenge that provided one of the key impetuses for this study, 
we can consider what I assert to be the most productive and valuable „next encounter‟: 
the bringing of our energetic model into communication with new visual media. 
Through this we would seek not only to instigate an original and innovative method for 
responding to the „difficulties‟ of new visual media, but also to articulate their intrinsic 
distinctiveness from their precursors, as we have described. The particular form of new 
visual media that, I believe, offers the most fascinating routes for further investigation is 
that of the videogame. Its growing cultural significance together with its status as both 
screen and interaction, as both a bodily and imagistic engagement with the spectator-
participant, the player, make it an especially promising field of enquiry. 
Whilst the aim of this work has been to raise questions, we know that it is not answers 
that we seek. Rather, it is an understanding of how to frame the right questions. All that 
remains is for us to keep asking, how...? 
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